People v. Ruiz
| Decision Date | 11 July 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 95CA1693,95CA1693 |
| Citation | 935 P.2d 68 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Joe RUIZ, Sr., Defendant-Appellant. . II |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Gale A. Norton, Attorney General, Stephen K. ErkenBrack, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Timothy M. Tymkovich, Solicitor General, Peter J. Cannici, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
The Law Offices of Jeanette S. Eirich, Jeanette S. Eirich, Denver, for Defendant-Appellant.
Opinion by Chief Judge STERNBERG.
Defendant, Joe Ruiz, Sr., appeals the denial of his motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Crim. P. 35(c). We affirm.
Defendant was initially charged with twelve felony counts based on allegations that he participated in a criminal episode in which he and others forcibly entered a dwelling and repeatedly assaulted the occupants. During the attack, one of defendant's companions shot one of the occupants in the leg, allegedly at defendant's direction.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant entered a guilty plea to a single count of second degree burglary (burglary with intent to commit either assault, menacing, or false imprisonment). The plea agreement contained a stipulation that defendant would not be sentenced to serve more than ten years in the custody of the Department of Corrections.
The court sentenced defendant to serve ten years in the custody of the Department. At sentencing, neither the court nor the deputy district attorney made any statements with respect to the defendant's likely security classification.
Thereafter, upon reaching the Department's diagnostic unit, defendant learned that, because of the factual allegations of the crime for which he was being sentenced, and because he had a prior conviction for a violent felony (first degree sexual assault), the Department was classifying him as a violent offender.
Defendant then filed this Crim. P. 35(c) action seeking to vacate his plea of guilty on the ground that he was not advised of the fact that the Department could classify him as a violent offender. More specifically, defendant asserted that the court had an obligation to advise him that such a classification could result in adverse consequences such as placement in a more secure facility and required participation in violent offender treatment programs.
In a written order, the trial court denied defendant's motion without a hearing, reasoning that the court had no obligation to advise defendant concerning the restrictiveness of the setting or the particular type of facility in which he would serve his sentence. Defendant appeals from that order.
Defendant argues that he had a due process right to be advised of the possibility that he would be classified as a violent offender because such a classification is a direct consequence of a guilty plea. We disagree.
"A plea of guilty effects a waiver of fundamental rights and, therefore, must be knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made to be valid." People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523, 525 (Colo.1987).
Due process relative to the implications flowing from a guilty plea is provided if the trial court advises defendant concerning the direct consequences of the conviction. Conversely, due process does not require the court to advise defendant regarding consequences which are collateral to the conviction. See People v. Pozo, supra ().
Direct consequences, unlike collateral consequences, are "those which have a definite, immediate, and largely automatic effect on the range of possible punishment." People v. Moore, 841 P.2d 320, 324 (Colo.App.1992) ().
Thus, the determinative issue is whether a defendant...
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Bertolo v. Shain
...not have a due process interest in his prisoner classification. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n. 9 (1976); see also People v. Ruiz, 935 P.2d 68, 69 (Colo. App. 1996) ("Because a prison inmate has no protected liberty interest in any particular security classification, due processprotect......
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People v. Montaine, 98CA1948.
...automatic effect on the range of possible punishment." People v. Moore, 841 P.2d 320, 324 (Colo. App.1992); see also People v. Ruiz, 935 P.2d 68 (Colo.App.1996). A. Mandatory parole is a direct consequence of a guilty plea because it imposes a significant limitation on defendant's freedom. ......
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People ex rel. J.D.
...aware of any, holding that due process requires an explanation of all collateral consequences of such a limitation. Cf. People v. Ruiz , 935 P.2d 68, 70 (Colo. App. 1996) ("[P]rison security classifications are collateral consequences of a guilty plea and not the type of direct consequence ......
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People v. Birdsong
...are those which have definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of possible punishment. See People v. Ruiz, 935 P.2d 68, 69 (Colo.App.1997). "The essential element defining a 'direct consequence' of a guilty plea is that it have an effect on the range of punishment." Id. ......
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Collateral Effects of a Criminal Conviction in Colorado - June 2006 - Criminal Law
...Jones, 957 P.2d 1046 (Colo.App.1997). 19. Birdsong, supra note 5. 20. People v. Montaine, 7 P.3d 1065 (Colo.App.1999). 21. People v. Ruiz, 935 P.2d 68 (Colo.App.1996). 22. CRS § 18-1.3-801. 23. Moore, supra note 2 at 324; see also Moore v. Hinton, 513 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1975) (before pleadi......