People v. Ruthenberg

• Decision Date: 15 January 1925
• Docket Number: No. 180.,180.
• Citation: 229 Mich. 315,201 N.W. 358
• Parties: PEOPLE v. RUTHENBERG.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

229 Mich. 315

201 N.W. 358

PEOPLE

v.RUTHENBERG.

No. 180.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Dec. 10, 1924.

On Writ of Error, Jan. 15, 1925.

Exceptions before Sentence; Charles E. White, Judge.

Charles E. Ruthenberg was convicted of criminal syndicalism. On exceptions before sentence. Conviction affirmed, and circuit court advised to proceed to judgment.

Argued before McDONALD, BIRD, SHARPE, MOORE, STEERE, FELLOWS, and WIEST, JJ.

Argued before McDONALD, C. J., and CLARK, BIRD, SHARPE, MOORE, STEERE, FELLOWS, and WIEST, JJ.Andrew B. Dougherty, Atty. Gen., O. L. Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Charles W. Gore, Pros. Atty., Max F. Burger, Sp. Asst. Pros. Atty., and George H. Bookwalter, Asst. Pros. Atty., all of Benton Harbor, for plaintiff.

Frank P. Walsh and Humphrey S. Gray, of Benton Harbor (I. E. Ferguson, of Chicago, Ill., of counsel), for the People.

WIEST, J.

Convicted of criminal syndicalism, defendant prosecutes review on exceptions before sentence. The information charged:

‘That heretofore, to wit, on the 20th day of August A. D. 1922, in the township of Lake * * * (Berrien county, this state), C. E. Ruthenberg did voluntarily assemble with a certain society, group, and assemblage of persons, to wit, the Communist party of America, formed to teach and advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism. * * *’

Act No. 255, Public Acts 1919 (1922 Supp. C. L. § 15585 [2] et seq.), defines the crime of criminal syndicalism, specifies acts constituting the offense, and fixes the penalty:

‘Section 1. Criminal syndicalism is hereby defined as the doctrine which advocates crime, sabotage, violence or other unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform. The advocacy of such doctrine, whether by word of mouth or writing, is a felony punishable as in this act, otherwise provided.

‘Sec. 2. Any person who by word of mouth or writing, advocates or teaches the duty, necessity or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence or other unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform; or prints, publishes, edits, issues or knowingly circulates, sells, distributes or publicly displays any book, paper, document, or written matter in any form, containing or advocating, advising or teaching the doctrine that industrial or political reform should be brought about by crime, sabotage, violence or other unlawful methods of terrorism; or openly, willfully and deliberately justifies by word of mouth or writing, the commission or the attempt to commit crime, sabotage, violence or other unlawful methods of terrorism with intent to exemplify, spread or advocate the propriety of the doctrines of criminal syndicalism; or organizes or helps to organize, or becomes a member of or voluntarily assembles with any society, group or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism is guilty of a felony and punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than ten years or by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars, or both, at the discretion of the court.’

A national delegate convention of the Communist party of America was called by the central executive committee of the party to meet at Bridgman, Berrien county, this state, in August, 1922. Delegates to the convention were not informed of the place of meeting, but under direction proceeded from city to city toward Bridgman, and were finally steered there. Near Bridgman an isolated hotel and cottages furnished accommodations for the 75 persons attending the convention, and a natural amphitheater amid the woods afforded a place for sessions. Every person attending had a party or assumed name. No communication with the outside world was permitted. Each participant in the convention was assigned a number and given a large manilla portfolio in which to place all papers and documents at the close of each day, to be taken up by the ‘grounds committee’ for safe-keeping. Defendant's party name was ‘Damon,’ and his portfolio was number 50. These portfolios were deposited each night, by the committee, in two barrels, sunk in the ground at a distance from the hotel, and covered with sand, leaves and sticks. Regulations of the ‘grounds committee’ provided:

‘No incriminating literature or document shall be kept in baggage or in rooms. All such matter must be turned over to the committee every evening. The grounds committee must arrange for the safe-keeping of this matter.’

A central washtub in which to burn incriminating papers was also maintained.

Convention sessions were held. Defendant, as a member of the central executive committee of the Communist party of America, by virtue of his office, attended the convention as a fraternal delegate with the right to address, and did address, the convention. One duly elected delegate in attendance was a special employee of the United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Investigation. A delegate from the Comintern (Communist or Third International) Moscow, Russia, was present, and a delegate from the Hungarian federation and another from the Red Trade International at Moscow were present and participated in the convention. Defendant reached the convention on August 15th and remained there until arrested on August 22d.

Federal officers, investigating activities of communists, traced down the convention place, recognized certain communists in attendance, and laid the matter before the sheriff of Berrien county. The communists in attendance recognized the federal officers and laid plans to disperse, with right to foreigners to go first, and many of the delegates hurriedly left. The sheriff, with a number of deputies and the federal officers, visited the convention place one morning and arrested defendant and sixteen others, without warrants for arrest or search, seized their baggage, and took them to the county jail. The sheriff then learned of the depository of the grounds committee and made search, found the barrels, and seized their contents.

The information as filed contained four counts. The court quashed the first, second, and third counts, on motion of defendant, leaving the fourth count as the charge. Defendant insists that this statute violates sections 2, 4, 16, and 19, article 2, of the Constitution of this state, and section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Does this statute contravene the right of the people to peaceably assemble? To so hold would require us to say that it is violative of the Constitution to make it a crime for one in sympathy with and on his own volition to join in an assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate crime, sabotage, violence, or other unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform. We cannot make any such holding.

Does the statute prevent freedom of speech? This statute reaches an abuse of the right to freely speak, write, and publish sentiments, and is squarely within the accountability allowed to be exacted in the very provision invoked. This statute does not restrain or abridge liberty of speech.

As said of a similar statute in People v. Steelik, 189 Cal. 361, 203 P. 78:

‘The Legislature has power to punish propaganda which has for its purpose the destruction of government or the rights of property which the government was formed to preserve.’

See, also, State v. Hennessy, 114 Wash. 351, 195 P. 211.

In Schaefer v. United States, 251 U. S. 466, 40 S. Ct. 259, 64 L. Ed. 360, the accused invoked the constitutional right of free speech, in a prosecution under the Espionage Act, and received this merites rebuke:

‘But simple as the law is, perilous to the country as disobedience to it was, offenders developed, and when it was exerted against them challenged it to decision as a violation of the right of free speech assured by the Constitution of the United States. A curious spectacle was presented. That great ordinance of government and orderly liberty was invoked to justify the activities of anarchy or of the enemies of the United States, and by a strange perversion of its precepts it was adduced against itself. * * * Verdicts and judgments of conviction were the reply to the challenge, and when they were brought here our response to it was unhesitating and direct. We did more than reject the contention; we forestalled all shades of repetition of it, including that in the case at bar. Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47;Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U. S. 204;Debs v. United States, 249 U. S. 211;Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616.’

See, also, Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 326, 41 S. Ct. 125, 65 L. Ed. 287;State v. Holm, 139 Minn. 267, 166 N. W. 181, L. R. A. 1918C, 304.

In People v. Lloyd, 304 Ill. 37, 136 N. E. 513, a prosecution under a similar criminal syndicalism act, the court stated, in answer to the claim that the act violated the right of free speech:

‘It would be a strange Constitution, indeed, that would guarantee to any man the right to advocate the destruction by force of that which that Constitution guarantees to the people living under its protection.’

See, also, People v. Most, 171 N. Y. 423, 64 N. E. 175,58 L. R. A. 509;State v. Boyd, 86 N. J. Law, 75, 91 A. 586.

The reasons advanced here against the constitutionality of the act have been urged against similar acts in other jurisdictions and found to have no merit. The act does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution.

Defendant claims the statute is too vague to form the basis of a prosecution for felony and is a nullity because it punishes as a felony the enunciation of a doctrine without regard to the intent, the occasion, the result or the imminent result of the enunciation.

The Legislature may, to safeguard security of persons and property, denounce as criminal specified acts inimical thereto, and make guilt of an offender rest upon his voluntary act, without any felonious intent. This statute...