Taylor v. State
Decision Date | 25 January 1943 |
Docket Number | 35143. |
Citation | 11 So.2d 663,194 Miss. 1 |
Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Parties | TAYLOR v. STATE. |
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
G C. Clark, of Waynesboro, Grover C. Powell, of Atlanta, Ga and Hayden C. Covington, of Brooklyn, N. Y., for appellant.
Greek L. Rice, Atty. Gen., by Geo. H. Ethridge, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
The Legislature of Mississippi at its 1942 regular session enacted Chapter 178, General Laws of Mississippi 1942, which the Reporter will set out in full.
Appellant was indicted, tried, convicted and sentenced for violation of Section 1 of that Act. He appeals.
He first contends that the evidence is not sufficient to support his conviction.
Summarized the evidence is that appellant and his wife, the latter part of May and the first of June 1942, appeared at the homes of a Mrs. Joyner and Mrs. Denson in Madison County, Mississippi, and then and there, according to the testimony of Mrs. Joyner, said to those present:
A Mrs. Bryant, who was present, testified: "Well, he said it was wrong for our President to send these boys across in uniform to fight our enemies; said it was wrong to fight our enemies; said they were being shot down for no purpose at all; said Hitler would rule, but he wouldn't have to come here to rule; and he said the quicker the people here quit bowing down and worshiping and saluting our Flag and Government, the sooner we would have peace."
Mrs. Denson gave the same version in substance of what was said at her home, except she added: He had theretofore appeared at the home of Mrs. Bryant and sold her some literature.
Mrs. Joyner and Mrs. Denson had each lost a son in the attack upon Pearl Harbor. He also said their sons would come back and live with them forever. Appellant says it was his intention to comfort them. They were strangers to appellant and the record does not disclose how he knew their sons had been killed.
Appellant admitted making some of the statements and flatly denied making others. He alone testified in his own behalf as to whether the statements were or were not made. His wife, who was present when it is claimed the statements were made, was not present at the trial and did not testify. It was the province of the jury, not ours, to say who was testifying truthfully-these three ladies or appellant.
The proof furthermore is that each of these three ladies purchased from appellant certain written literature, consisting of twenty-two books and pamphlets, for thirty-five cents. A number of these books and pamphlets were introduced in evidence. Certain excerpts from this literature were selected and introduced by the State. Four of such excerpts were:
Other passages in this literature teach that "the so-called democracies" hold out no hope of peace, security, life or happiness-that the only place of safety is in Theocracy; that if there is a conflict between state law and what Jehovah's witnesses conceive to be Jehovah's law, the state law should not be obeyed; that Jehovah's witnesses take a pledge not to salute the flag and that to undertake by law to force a child to salute the flag is to "fame mischief by law." Appellant justified his attitude and conduct by quoting on the stand certain passages of the Scriptures and calling attention to other passages therefrom appearing in the literature.
In addition to the foregoing, appellant himself testified that he was an ordained minister. His earthly ordination was evidenced by a printed postcard, containing the printed signature of the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society and its president, and which card has a blank space for the name of the person to be ordained and a blank for the identifying signature of such person. Both of these blanks had been filled in by appellant. Appellant also evidenced his ordination as a minister by referring to certain Scriptural passages. He said he had been a full time Jehovah Witness for twelve years; that he came to Mississippi from Alabama and had been here some three months; that he had contacted many of the other citizens, white and colored, of Madison County and had sold to them many sets of the literature; that his financial income from this work consisted of the excess of the sale over the cash prices of the literature and as much as $25 per month paid him by said society, "upon our getting in so much time, If we don't work we don't eat"; that there were one hundred and forty-four thousand such workers in the United States; that the workers were under a superintendent; that he was not a pacifist and he loves his country; that he was in the Army in the last World War on duty in Honolulu, and after having served about eighteen months he purchased his release therefrom by paying "the government $140."
Placing these words and acts against the statute, it will be seen that they may be reasonably construed to violate it in these respects: (1) that they are calculated to encourage disloyalty to the Governments of the United States and of Mississippi, and discourage enlistment in the armed forces of the Nation; (2) that they advocate the cause of the enemies of the United States; and (3) that they reasonably tend to create an attitude of stubborn refusal to salute, honor, or respect the flag or government of the United States. Assuming the validity of the law, we think the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict of the jury.
Appellant contends that this statute is unconstitutional as to him because it deprives him of the right of free speech and free press guaranteed by the Constitutions of Mississippi and the United States.Const.Miss.1890, § 13; Const.U.S. Amend. 1. The act, as an entirety, is sufficiently comprehensive in its objects, including, for instance, sabotage and acts of violence against the sovereign, to meet this constitutional attack, but the question is whether it is constitutional as applied to appellant and his conduct. The question should be tested by the powers of the sovereign in war-time and the corresponding rights and duties of the people during such time. Even in peace-time the right of free speech does not mean unbridled license of speech. The right may be abused, for which abuse punishment may be meted out under the police power of the State. The Constitution protects the right but not the abuse. For instance, one has no right even in times of peace to use language, oral or written, which wrongfully injures another in person or property, or tends to corrupt public morals, induce crime, endanger the public safety, or which advocates a change in industrial conditions or the form of government by use of force, violence or other unlawful means. State v. Quinlan, 86 N.J.L. 120, 91 A. 111; State v. Boyd, 86 N.J.L. 75, 91 A. 586, affirmed 87 N.J.L. 328, 93 A. 599; State v. Fox, 71 Wash. 185, 127 P. 1111, affirmed in 236 U.S. 273, 35 S.Ct. 383, 59 L.Ed. 573; People v. Most, 171 N.Y. 423, 64 N.E. 175, 58 L.R.A. 509; State v. Gibson, 189 Iowa 1212, 174 N.W. 34; State v. Tachin, 92 N.J.L. 269, 106 A. 145, affirmed 93 N.J.L. 485, 108 A. 318; State v. Gabriel, 95 N.J.L. 337, 112 A. 611; People v....
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