People v. Ruthford

• Decision Date: 21 May 1975
• Docket Number: Cr. 18431
• Citation: 534 P.2d 1341,121 Cal.Rptr. 261,14 Cal.3d 399
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 534 P.2d 1341 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Archie Theodore RUTHFORD, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 261

121 Cal.Rptr. 261

14 Cal.3d 399, 534 P.2d 1341

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Archie Theodore RUTHFORD, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 18431.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

May 21, 1975.

Richard J. Stall, Jr., Marina Del Rey, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Don W. Goldstein, Marina Del Rey, for defendant and appellant.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., S. Clark Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., William R. Pounders and Roger W. Boren, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

WRIGHT, Chief Justice.

Defendant Archie Theodore Ruthford appeals from a judgment entered upon convictions by jury of two counts of armed robbery. (Pen.Code, § 211.) He contends that the prosecutor engaged in prejudicial misconduct by failing to disclose to defense counsel the principal motivation for the adverse testimony of a key prosecution witness and by forestalling defense counsel's awareness of such motivation through misrepresentations made to the court. We conclude the prosecutor was guilty of prejudicial misconduct which denied defendant a fair trial and accordingly reverse the judgment.

Two men appeared at an apartment occupied by Mrs. Constance Hannaford and Mr. Ferdinand Castillo. The spokesman for the two, Fred Thomas, said he was looking for a rental apartment for himself and his wife. The men examined a vacant apartment in the same building and thereafter returned to Mrs. Hannaford's apartment. Thomas then produced a gun and announced a 'holdup.' He and his companion took certain personal property in the possession of Mrs. Hannaford and Mr. Castillo and ordered them into a bedroom where they were bound face down on a bed. Despite the victims' disclaimers that no more articles of value would be found, the two intruders ransacked the apartment, found a coin collection and threatened to harm the victims if more valuables were discovered. Mr. Castillo offered to disclose where some money was located if the men would not harm Mrs. Hannaford. The two agreed and Mr. Castillo led them from the bedroom to a cache of money in the pocket of a coat hanging in a closet.

After the men left and the victims had freed themselves, Mr. Catillo observed the car from which he had seen the two robbers emerge when they first approached the apartment. He called an alarm to by-standers and rushed to the vehicle. Thomas emerged from the car, ordered Mr. Castillo not to take down the license number and kicked and punched at him. The second man remained in the car which Thomas thereafter reentered and the two drove away.

The car was traced through its license number and was found to be registered in Thomas' name. It was subsequently discovered abandoned in a parking lot. Thomas and defendant, who were neighbors, left Los Angeles with their wives the evening of the robbery and spent several days in Las Vegas. Upon returning they vacated their respective apartments. Several items stolen from the victims were later discovered in a Las Vegas pawn shop.

Mr. Castillo was unable to identify defendant as Thomas' accomplice in the robbery. Mrs. Hannaford was unable to identify defendant from among photographs shown to her, or at a lineup, but positively identified him in court as the second man who had entered her apartment. She testified that she had paid little attention to the accomplice during the robbery, that she had looked directly at him '(j)ust for a split second' but had had a good side view of him and that she had had no opportunity to view defendant's profile until she observed him in the hallway of the court-house immediately prior to the preliminary hearing.

Thomas himself testified as the final prosecution witness. ¹ He named defendant as his accomplice and testified as to the accuracy of the testimony as related by the victims. He further indicated that defendant had been armed with a pistol.

Defendant took the witness stand in his own defense and denied any participation in the robberies. He admitted having known Thomas and said that up until the time of trial he had considered him a friend. He remembered the day of the robbery because it was his wife's birthday and he had decided to take her to Las Vegas. Although he was unemployed at the time, his wife did have a job. He testified that Thomas and his wife were invited to make the trip to Las Vegas but Thomas protested that he had no money for such a journey. Later, sometime between 12 and 1 o'clock, Thomas returned stating that he now had money.

The two couples drove to Las Vegas where defendant and his wife remained until the following night, leaving Thomas and his wife to return by bus. Defendant further testified that he felt compelled to return to be present at a garage sale to be held at his daughter-in-law's home as he planned to use the proceeds for a trip abroad. He also told the jury, somewhat inconsistently with the foregoing testimony, that he and his wife had moved out of their apartment across the hall from Thomas' apartment because defendant's wife had been diagnosed as having cancer and required hospitalization. Further, he stated that her last paycheck had been delayed and that they had no money for the rent.

Following defendant's conviction, he received a letter from Thomas which stated, in part: 'The D.A. came to see me and offered me (my wife's) freedom in return for my testimony against you.' Defendant thereupon moved for a new trial on the ground that the People had suppressed relevant evidence bearing on the credibility of Thomas. At a hearing on the motion for a new trial it developed that Mr. Norris, the deputy district attorney assigned to try the case when Thomas and defendant were charged as codefendants, had talked with Thomas after he had entered his plea of guilty. Thomas volunteered that he would be willing to testify against defendant if his (Thomas') wife, who had been convicted of robbery committed by her and her husband, would receive a lenient sentence. She had been preliminarily sentenced to the Department of Corrections for 90 days' evaluation pursuant to the provisions of Penal Code section 1203.03.

Deputy Norris discussed Mrs. Thomas' case with the trial deputy who was assigned to the court of the judge before whom Mrs. Thomas was later to be arraigned for sentencing. The trial deputy discussed the matter with the judge and thereafter related to Deputy Norris that in sentencing Mrs. Thomas the judge 'would consider' Thomas' cooperation. Deputy Norris relayed this assurance to Thomas in the presence of Deputy District Attorney Arnold Wiener, the deputy who, following Thomas' pleas of guilty, prosecuted defendant. Deputy Norris also informed Deputy Wiener independently of the meeting with Thomas, of the nature of the agreement struck with Thomas regarding his testimony against defendant. Although the alleged bargain was never characterized as a 'promise' of leniency to Mrs. Thomas, Deputy Norris understood and apparently shared Thomas' belief that the so-called bargain was premised upon a 'guarantee' that by agreeing to consider Thomas' cooperation the sentencing judge had thereby indicated that Thomas' wife, if incarcerated at all, would not receive a state prison term. In Deputy Norris' words: 'Mr. Thomas agreed upon (hearing of the judge's willingness to consider his cooperation) to testify, and, in essence, what he has indicated here in court is probably the way he understood it; (the judge), by considering it, would certainly mean no State Prison.'

In the light of the circumstances hereinabove described, defendant's principal argument at the hearing on his motion for a new trial was that Thomas had given perjured testimony at trial and that the prosecution had known the same to have been false. The trial court may well have correctly concluded that Thomas' testimony was not perjured. At the hearing on the new trial motion Thomas, a manifestly clever witness, was asked only if he had received special consideration with regard to his plea bargain and his own sentencing. Thomas aptly responded: 'I was never even asked why did I testify. I was asked specifically was there leniency to me. I was asked specific questions about my own case. There was never--no specific question, 'Where (sic) you promised anything at all?' There was always a qualification on the question, and I answered the questions as they were asked. They were asked semantically. I answered them semantically.'

Defendant's second ground for the granting of his motion for a new trial was the prosecutor's failure to apprise him or his counsel of the circumstances which elicited Thomas' testimony, so that adequate inquiry could have been made about these circumstances during cross-examination. It is the alleged misconduct of the prosecutor in this respect which defendant now raises on appeal. In addition to the prosecutor's passive failure to reveal the inducement for the testimony of the key prosecution witness, defendant relies on the prosecutor's affirmative misrepresentation to the court, made in defendant's presence, that no promises had been made to the witness. ²

I

It is a common practice for law enforcement officers or prosecutors to offer certain inducements for the testimony of prosecution witnesses since this is often the only means of obtaining crucial evidence. Yet, as we have often stated, the role of the district attorney is more than that of an advocate. 'His duty is not to obtain convictions, but to fully and fairly present to the court the evidence material to the charge upon which the defendant stands trial . . ..' (In re Ferguson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 525, 531, 96 Cal.Rptr. 594, 598, 487 P.2d 1234, 1238; see also People v. Kiihoa (1960) 53 Cal.2d 748, 753, 3 Cal.Rptr. 1, 349 P.2d 673; People v. Sheffield (1930) 108 Cal.App. 721, 732, 293 P. 72, 77.) The fundamental responsibility to present material evidence to the court includes a duty to disclose to the defense substantial...