People v. Ryan
| Decision Date | 02 April 1956 |
| Docket Number | Cr. 3106 |
| Citation | 140 Cal.App.2d 412,295 P.2d 496 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. John Steven RYAN, Jr., Defendant and Appellant. |
Lewis H. Butler, Clayton R. Janssen, Jr., San Francisco, for appellant.
Lawrence Vold, San Francisco, of counsel, amicus curiae in support of appellant's contentions.
Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., Clarence A. Linn, Asst. Atty. Gen., Victor Griffith, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.
Convicted of first degree robbery, defendant has appealed from the judgment and from the order denying his motion for new trial. He does not question the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict. He claims an erroneous instruction was given upon the trial of the issues presented by his 'not guilty' plea, and that upon the trial of the issues presented by his plea of 'not guilty by reason of insanity' the district attorney committed prejudicial misconduct and the court erred in the admission of certain evidence and in the giving of certain instructions.
Inasmuch as no one questions the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdicts, the testimony need not be summarized in as great detail as otherwise might be necessary.
The offense was committed on March 22, 1954. Defendant was attending law school and also held a full time position as deputy sheriff serving civil process. His wife also was employed, as a teacher in the public schools. They lived in the same apartment building as did Mrs. McKernan, the victim of the robbery.
That afternoon he was at home studying. Suddenly he left his desk, picked up his service revolver and effected a disguise consisting of a towel wrapped around his head, sunglasses and a handkerchief over his face. He then proceeded downstairs to the McKernan apartment and knocked on the door. It was approximately three o'clock and Mrs. McKernan was at home alone. When she opened the door defendant pointed the revolver at her and announced 'This is a robbery.' He demanded her money and she gave him all that she had, about $14. He then told her she would have to disrobe because he did not want her to follow him. She partially disrobed and he gagged her and taped her hands together. He left the McKernan apartment, returned to his own apartment and with the exception of his shoes changed into a different suit of clothes.
When the police arrived to investigate the robbery, defendant accompanied them to the McKernan apartment. Mrs. McKernan recognized his voice as being strikingly similar to the voice of the man who had robbed her and informed the police thereof, adding that the robber had been wearing shoes exactly like the defendant's.
On April 26th, he was arrested and charged with the crime. At that time he was interviewed by the chief of police and by the sheriff in the office of the chief of police. He related to them in considerable detail what he could remember of the circumstances surrounding the crime. The interview was recorded.
Upon the witness stand he remembered but a few of the events which occurred on the afternoon of March 22nd. He testified that after completing his work of serving papers that day he came home, changed his clothes and started to study. He had a severe headache and took some aspirin. The next thing he remembered was a door opening and a woman standing there. He did not remember the location of the door. He remembered something 'about a television set, just the idea of a television set, and something about venetian blinds.' He remembered saying something about five children, but couldn't remember in what connection-- 1
Defendant exhibited a similar lack of memory of the details of the crime when severally interviewed by the psychiatrists who testified at the second trial concerning his sanity, interviews which they indicated formed in part the basis for their opinions.
In explanation of the much more complete memory of the events which transpired upon the afternoon of March 22nd which he exhibited earlier when interviewed by the sheriff and the chief of police, defendant testified that his own recollection had been confused with facts which the chief of police and a detective sergeant had severally told him and accounts of the crime which had appeared in the newspapers. The detective sergeant testified that he did not discuss with the defendant any of the details of the crime.
Upon the first trial the defense was unconsciousness during the time of the commission of the crime; upon the second trial, temporary insanity during that period.
Defendant claims prejudicial error in the asserted failure of the court to instruct appropriately on the subject of his claimed unconsciousness during the commission of the acts charged. He says, in his closing brief, that in this regard the court should have instructed substantially as follows: 'If you find that the defendant was not conscious of taking property from Mrs. McKernan by force or violence or of using a deadly weapon in so doing, you must find him not guilty even though you find that at other times during his stay in the apartment he was partially or fully conscious.'
But defendant did not present this issue with any such clarity during the trial. He requested and the court gave CALJIC Nos. 71-C and 71-D except that the court omitted the concluding portion of 71-D which reads: 'and if you should find that the defendant committed an act, which, if he was conscious, would have constituted the crime charged against him or have been an element of that crime, and if you should not be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he then was conscious, you shall find that he then was unconscious.'
Later, the jury returned to the courtroom and the foreman asked: 'In arriving at a verdict, are we to consider to what degree defendant knew what he was doing?' Thereupon the court, outside the presence of the jury, discussed with counsel what instructions should be given. Defendant's counsel said 'I think the instruction that would cover that would be consciousness,' and later 'Re-read the two instructions on consciousness and any instructions you give on intent,' whereupon there ensued a discussion 2 during the course of which defendant's counsel had an opportunity to present the issue he now presents but failed to do so. At the conclusion of that discussion, the court again read to the jury Instruction No. 71-C and the same portion of 71-D previously given, plus the full text of No. 71-C, Alternate. When the court during the discussion outside the presence of the jury stated, in effect, that it was excluding the indicated portion of No. 71-D because it was in the nature of a formula instruction (the court saying, 'that is stereotyped--'if you should find'--') was the time and the opportunity for defendant's counsel to direct attention to the phase thereof ('or have been an element of that crime') to which he now attaches pivotal significance. If counsel had done so, we have no reason to doubt that the court would have covered the point by some appropriate addition to the instructions which it did give on the subject of unconsciousness. It would hardly seem reasonable to hold that trial judge solely responsible for failing to perceive the asserted significance of the words 'or have been an element of that crime,' virtually buried in the 'If you should find' clause, when counsel, whose advice and assistance the court has especially invited, failed to direct attention to those words and failed to mention their claimed significance. See a discussion of this principle in Jensen v. Southern Pacific Co., 129 Cal.App.2d 67, 77-79, 276 P.2d 703, and cases there cited. Indeed, there is a fair basis for an inference that the asserted significance of the words 'or have been an element of that crime' did not occur to defendant's counsel until after oral argument upon this appeal.
No mention of any phase of this subject was made in defendant's opening brief upon this appeal. That brief, in the words of counsel, was 'directed solely to errors committed at the second trial on the issue of insanity.'
Later, amicus curiae filed a brief 'directed to [the question as to] how prejudicially erroneous were the supplementary instructions,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Lucas
...thus far been singularly unsuccessful in winning adherents. It has recently been rejected in the following cases: People v. Ryan, 140 Cal.App.2d 412, 295 P.2d 496 (Sup.Ct.1956); People v. Carpenter, 11 Ill.2d 60, 142 N.E.2d 11 (Sup.Ct.1957); State v. Goza, 317 S.W.2d 609 (Mo.Sup.Ct.1958); F......
-
Longoria v. State
...and in three federal circuits. Downs v. Arkansas, Ark., 330 S.W.2d 281; People v. Nash, 52 Cal.2d 36, 338 P.2d 416; People v. Ryan, 140 Cal.App.2d 412, 295 P.2d 496; Castro v. People, 140 Colo. 493, 346 P.2d 1020; Early v. People, Colo., 352 P.2d 112; State v. Davies, 146 Conn. 137, 148 A.2......
-
People v. Kelly
...is my thesis that, contrary to the concession in Wolff that M'Naughton is a part of the 'legislative scheme' (cf. People v. Ryan (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 412, 425, 295 P.2d 496), the ancient test has been solely a judicial product and therefore may, in deference to advances in medical and lega......
-
State v. Andrews
...thus far been singularly unsuccessful in winning adherents. It has recently been rejected in the following cases: People v. Ryan, 140 Cal.App.2d 412, 295 P.2d 496 (Sup.Ct.1956); People v. Carpenter, 11 Ill.2d 60, 142 N.E.2d 11 (Sup.Ct.1957); State v. Goza, 317 S.W.2d 609 (Mo.Sup.Ct.1958); F......