People v. Sacks
Decision Date | 11 January 1938 |
Citation | 276 N.Y. 321,12 N.E.2d 425 |
Parties | PEOPLE v. SACKS et al. |
Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Irving Sacks and another were convicted of violating section 340 of the Banking Law, Consol.Laws, c. 2, and section 580 of the Penal Law, Consol.Laws, c. 40. From a judgment of the Appellate Division, First Department, -- App.Div. --, 300 N.Y.S. 1332, which affirmed a judgment of the Court of Special Sessions convicting the defendants, named defendant appeals.
Judgment of named defendant's conviction reversed, and information dismissed. Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First department.
Harold H. Corbin and Edward J. Bennett, both of New York City, for appellant.
William Copeland Dodge, Dist. Atty., of New York City (James J. Wilson, of New York City, of counsel), for the People.
The defendants have been convicted of the crime of violating section 340 of the Banking Law (Consol.Laws, c. 2), and the judgment has been affirmed by the Appellate Division on the ground that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conspiracy count in the information, thereby indicating that as to the other count the evidence was insufficient in the opinion of that court. The information is in two counts: The first charges the crime of violating section 340 of the Banking Law, in that the defendants did unlawfully engage in the business of making loans ‘of money, credit, goods and things in action in the amount of three hundred dollars or less and charging, contracting for and receiving a greater rate of interest therefor than permitted by law without being lawfully authorized by article 9 of the said Banking Law.’ The second count charges the defendants with the crime of conspiracy in that they conspired with each other and with divers other persons to commit a crime, ‘to wit, the crime of violating sections 340 and 357 of the said Banking Law * * * that is to say, unlawfully to engage in the business of making loans of money in amounts of three hundred dollars or less without being duly licensed so to do.’
Section 340 of the Banking Law reads: ‘No person * * * shall engage in the business of making loans of money, credit, goods, or things in action in the amount or of the value of three hundred dollars or less and charge, contract for, or receive a greater rate of interest, discount, or consideration therefor than the lender would be permitted by law to charge if he were not a licensee hereunder except as authorized by this article and without first obtaining a license from the superintendent of banks.’
Section 357 of the Banking Law refers to loans made by those not engaged in the business.
The dominant fact, upon which the crime of violating these sections must be based, is a loan-a loan for which excessive interest is received. The transaction may take many forms. For the purpose of evading the statute it may have the appearance of a legal transaction but, if in essence or in fact, the transaction be a loan, and excessive interest taken, a crime has been committed.
The defendant Irving Sacks has been in the installment business in the city of New York for 30 years. His place of business at the time of the trial was 100 West Forty-Second street, on the fourth floor. He testified: In the latter store Sacks sold jewelry and novelties for cash and on installment, as the case might be, and his average stock in that store for a number of years had been inventoried at $40,000. The method of the installment business is to require security, and Sacks described it as follows: The business was transacted in the name of the Metropolitan Credit Company, and employed 15 to 20 salesmen, with an office staff of approximately 25 employees. The company paid its salesmen a commission of 20 per cent. Collections required 1 1/2 to 2 years before the final payment was made.
The defendant Samuel M. Morton had been selling jewelry on the installment plan for years. He had been sales manager for O. F. Bale & Co., 21 Maiden lane, and said that his duties were ‘capacity as outside sales manager, meaning I trained salesmen how to sell merchandise on installment such as clothing, watches, etc. to people that held a job, industrial workers, factory workers, chain store operators, etc., elevator operators, also city employees.’ He met Mr. Sacks at the jewelers' convention at the McAlpin Hotel in 1932, and thereafter, in 1935, went with Sacks as a salesman to concentrate on a special type of business, ‘city employees exclusively.’ Sacks said to him: ‘city employees, if they miss payments we put the garnishee in against them and I receive my money.’
Morton pleaded guilty and turned state's evidence. He was the first witness called by the People, and his description of the scheme as planned I now outline. Sacks showed him a letter and said: ...
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...sufficient to sustain the indictment, that is, when taken together and uncontradicted, it would be sufficient to convict (People v. Sacks, 276 N.Y. 321, 12 N.E.2d 425; People v. Ward, 37 A.D.2d 174, 176, 323 N.Y.S.2d 316, 318; Paperno & Goldstein, Criminal Procedure, Part I, § 155). There i......
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...if the borrower had purchased a security from a third person on the instalment plan and pledged it with the lenders. See People v. Sacks, 276 N.Y. 321, 12 N.E.2d 425. Such a plan of financing, unless used as a device for usury, is permissible in the absence of statute. Where it has the sanc......
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...if the borrower had purchased a security from a third person on the instalment plan and pledged it with the lenders. See People v. Sacks, 276 N.Y. 321, 12 N.E.2d 425. Such a plan of financing, unless used as a device for usury, is permissible in the absence of statute. Where it has the sanc......
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