People v. Sampsell
| Citation | 34 Cal.2d 757,214 P.2d 813 |
| Decision Date | 21 February 1950 |
| Docket Number | Cr. 5021 |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. SAMPSELL. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court (California) |
Lloyd Edison Sampsell, in pro. per., and J. Oscar Goldstein, Chico, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for appellant.
Fred N. Howser, Attorney General, Walter L. Bowers, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
The defendant, Lloyd Edison Sampsell (also known as Lloyd Edison Sampsel) was tried by jury and found guilty of (1) the murder of Arthur W. Smith; (2) assault with a deadly weapon with intent to murder one Harley Cook; and (3) robbery in the first degree. To the first two counts of the indictment (murder and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to commit murder) the defendant pleaded not guilty; as to the third count (robbery) he stood mute and the court entered the plea of not guilty for him. During the course of the trial, however, the defendant took the stand in his own behalf and admitted that he had planned to, and did in fact, rob the Seaboard Finance Company, a corporation, located in San Diego.
On the morning of March 27, 1948, the defendant and a companion (Clarence (Ben) Richardson) went to the offices of the Seaboard Finance Company at Second and B Streets in San Diego for the admitted purpose of robbery. The defendant was armed with a gun which he exhibited to the employees forcing them to turn over the contents of the cash drawers to him. He then demanded that the manager open the safe and when the manager protested that he could not do so, one of the young women employees volunteered to do so. The defendant admitted that she had every reason to fear violence from him. After the defendant had taken the money from the safe and was on his way out of the office, Mr. Smith, a customer, came out of one of the loan booths and started for the door which defendant had reached first. Smith tried to pass the defendant who refused to let him go. Cook, an employee, seeing the situation, grabbed Sampsell's hands at the wrists and tried to push him past Smith. Smith then got a hold on Sampsell's neck and head. It was at this point that the shooting occurred. Sampsell fired three shots, one of which killed Smith, and another wounding Cook. Sampsell got out of the building and ran part way up the block with two of the employees, the manager and assistant manager, in pursuit. Sampsell, after turning to fire at his pursuers, then jumped on the running board of a car driven by a Mr. Bootman and shot his gun directly into the car thereby causing a collision with another car. Sampsell then commandeered another car, and at the point of his gun, ordered the driver to proceed in the same direction. He jumped off the running board at First and Broadway and ran into a bus depot and was lost in the crowd. He was apprehended almost a year later in Phoenix, Arizona.
Defendant testified voluntarily and freely in his own behalf, telling of the robbery in narrative form, and insisted on relating his entire criminal record although he was informed that it was not necessary for him to do so. He makes no contention that the evidence does not support the verdict, with the exception of the count as to assault with intent to commit murder. His theory is that because of certain errors in the giving of certain instructions and the failure to give others, and because of misconduct on the part of the district attorney, he has been deprived of due process of law and the equal protection of the law. It appears that the deprivation complained of is the possibility that, except for the errors, the jury might have recommended life imprisonment rather than returning a verdict finding him guilty of murder in the first degree without recommendation.
It is contended that the trial court erred, in that the jury was not plainly instructed that its verdict must be unanimous, not only as to guilt and degree, but as to the penalty to be imposed, and that the failure to so instruct deprived him of his right to trial by jury as guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of the State of California.
The applicable instruction, as given, is as follows:
Murder is classified into two degrees, and if you should find the defendant guilty of murder, it will be your duty to determine the degree of the offense, that is, whether first or second degree.
'Before you may return a verdict in this case, you must agree unanimously not only as to the innocence or guilt of the defendant, but also, if you should find him guilty, as to the degree of his offense.
'Although there are two degrees of murder, the evidence in this case is such that either the defendant is innocent of the charge of murder or he is guilty of murder in the first degree, for murder which is committed in perpetration of a robbery is murder of the first degree, whether the killing was intentional, unintentional or accidental.
'If any individual juror, or the jury as a whole, entertains a reasonable doubt as to which one of two or more punishments should be imposed, it is your duty to impose the lesser of the two.' (Emphasis added.)
In this connection, the defendant contends that he has been prejudiced because the jury did not expressly state the penalty to be imposed. (See instruction set forth above.) He states that section 190 of the Penal Code provides that 'Every person guilty of murder in the first degree shall suffer death, or confinement in the state prison for life, at the discretion of the jury trying the same; * * *' and that it is unconstitutional, as construed by this court, in that persons in the same class may be sentenced to death either expressly by the jury, or by implication from the silence of the jury as to penalty. He also contends that where the jury has been instructed to remain silent as to the penalty to be imposed there can be no certainty as to its unanimity in that respect. The following portion of the instruction is said to be a usurpation of the discretion of the jury: 'If you should fix the penalty as death you will not specify the death penalty in the verdict.'
The same instruction, with one immaterial exception, as that given by the trial court as to the form of verdict, was requested by the attorney for the defendant and 'refused as covered.' After the sentence reading '* * * but if you should fix the penalty as death, you will not specify the death penalty in the verdict,' defendant's request contained the following sentence 'and you will say nothing about punishment in the verdict.' (Emphasis added.) There was no request by the defendant for an instruction that the verdict as to penalty (or as to guilt or degree) must express the unanimous decision of the jury, although such an instruction was given by the court. There was a request that the jury be polled as to its verdict on the murder count, and on the count of assault with intent to commit murder. As to both counts, the poll showed a unanimous jury. Polling was waived by the prosecution and the defense as to the robbery count.
It would seem that in the present case, even under the view taken by a minority of this Court (see dissenting opinions, People v. Williams, 32 Cal.2d 78, 195 P.2d 393) the penalty was left entirely to the discretion of the jury as provided in Penal Code, section 190. The trial court instructed the jury that it was its duty to impose the lesser of the two penalties if any individual juror entertained a reasonable doubt concerning the penalty to be imposed. Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 68 S.Ct. 880, 885, 92 L.Ed. 1055, relied upon by defendant, presents a different state of facts. The jury, in that case, was told: 'And, finally, you will recall I said that you are instructed that before you may return a qualified verdict of murder in the first degree without capital punishment, that your decision to do so must, like your regular verdict, be unanimous.' (Emphasis added.)
By the defendant's own admissions, he was engaged in an armed robbery. There is no question but that Arthur W. Smith met his death at the hands of the defendant during the course of that robbery. Section 189 of the Penal Code provides that 'All murder which is perpetrated by means of poison, or lying in wait, * * * or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or which is committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate * * * robbery * * * is murder of the first degree * * *.' Emphasis added. People v. Hill, 22 Cal.2d 863, 865, 141 P.2d 418; People v. Bautista, 22 Cal.2d 867, 141 P.2d 417; People v. Vaiz, 55 Cal.App.2d 714, 131 P.2d 407.
Defendant argues that the (chief deputy district attorney) district attorney was guilty of prejudicial misconduct in two instances, both of which occurred during his closing argument to the jury.
The first instance is as follows: ...
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