People v. Sampson

• Decision Date: 17 January 1985
• Docket Number: Nos. 4-84-0300,4-84-0573,s. 4-84-0300
• Citation: 130 Ill.App.3d 438,473 N.E.2d 1002,85 Ill.Dec. 403
• Parties: , 85 Ill.Dec. 403 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Vincent SAMPSON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1002

473 N.E.2d 1002

130 Ill.App.3d 438, 85 Ill.Dec. 403

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Vincent SAMPSON, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 4-84-0300, 4-84-0573.

Appellate Court of Illinois Fourth District.

Jan. 17, 1985.

Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy State Appellate Defender, Springfield, for defendant- appellant.

Chris E. Freese, State's Atty., Sullivan, Robert J. Biderman, Deputy Director, State's Attys. Appellate Service Com'n, Gwendolyn Klingler, Staff Atty., Springfield, for plaintiff-appellee.

McCULLOUGH, Justice:

After bench trial on stipulated facts, defendant was convicted of the offenses of driving while under the influence (DUI), and of driving too fast for conditions (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 95 1/2, pars. 11-501(a), 11-601(a)) in Moultrie County case Nos. 84-T-8 and 84-T-9. He was sentenced in 84-T-8 to 6 months' probation, and ordered to attend an alcohol treatment program at his expense and pay court costs. He was sentenced in 84-T-9 to pay a $50 fine, inclusive of court costs. Defendant appealed the judgment of the circuit court of Moultrie County in 84-T-8 (4-84-0300), and thereafter sought leave to file a late notice of appeal in 84-T-9, which was granted (4-84-0573). These cases have been consolidated for the purpose of this appeal.

Defendant raises three issues: (1) whether his stipulated bench trial was tantamount to a guilty plea on the DUI charge, and, if so, whether he was sufficiently admonished under Supreme Court Rule 402 (87 Ill.2d R. 402); (2) whether he was proved guilty of driving too fast for conditions; and (3) whether section 2-7(2) of the Juvenile Court Act (Act) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 37, par. 702-7(2)) violates Federal and State constitutional provisions on due process and equal protection.

Defendant was charged with the instant offenses on January 3, 1984, when he was 16 years old. At hearing on January 16, 1984, the State stipulated that in the event of a finding of guilt, incarceration would not be sought as part of the sentence. In consideration of defendant's age, the public defender was appointed to represent him. On February 7, 1984, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the criminal prosecution in 84-T-8, the DUI charge, as being in violation of his right to equal protection of the laws, and asked that section 2-7(2) of the Act be declared unconstitutional. This motion was argued and denied on April 9, 1984.

At hearing on April 11, 1984, the record shows the following transpired:

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: * * * We have agreed that this will be presented as a stipulated bench trial. [The prosecutor] will give a factual basis. The defendant will stipulate that the factual basis is, that the witnesses called would testify in conformity with what [the prosecutor] says they would say.

THE COURT: Is there a civil suit pending or anticipated?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No. There was a motion to dismiss based on an equal protection argument and we are preserving that issue. I think if the defendant comes in and pleads guilty, it would waive--

THE COURT: It's not a negotiated plea then?

[PROSECUTOR]: Not technically.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Assuming the court does find the defendant guilty on the basis of the stipulated facts, then we have an agreed recommendation to make to the court as far as sentencing goes.

THE COURT: All right, then don't show it as a negotiated plea. Show it as a bench trial on stipulated facts."

The court then ascertained that defendant voluntarily waived his right to jury trial, and proceeded with a stipulated bench trial on both charges. The factual basis was stated as follows:

"[PROSECUTOR]: This occurred on January 3, 1984 at 11:05 [p.m.]. Officer Thompson observed a red car off the road resting against a telephone pole in the 500 block of North Main, Sullivan, Moultrie County. He approached the driver, [defendant]. The driver stated he had lost control of the vehicle. While speaking with the defendant, Officer Thompson observed a strong odor of alcoholic beverage emanating from his breath as well as difficulty in speech and coordination. He performed a field test and was placed under arrest for DUI. Back at the jail he took a breath test and the result was .11. And he was also cited for driving too fast for conditions.

THE COURT: Do I understand the officer saw him strike the pole or just saw him parked there up against the pole?

[PROSECUTOR]: He came after the occurrence.

THE COURT: Anything you want to add to that?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No."

The court found the factual basis constituted sufficient evidence to find defendant guilty. Defense counsel stated the agreed disposition:

"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: He would be sentenced to six months' probation and attend the alcohol treatment program and pay his own tuition and he would pay court costs. On the too fast for conditions, he would pay over the counter fine of $50.00 which includes court costs.

[PROSECUTOR]: That's the agreement.

THE COURT: Is this a negotiated plea or not?

[PROSECUTOR]: Technically, I believe it's not.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No, because he has not entered a plea."

The court inquired into defendant's record and what transpired the night of the offenses. He then sentenced defendant and advised him of his right to appeal.

Defendant first argues that, as to the DUI charge, the stipulated bench trial was tantamount to a guilty plea and, therefore, he should have been admonished pursuant to Rule 402. The State contends the record shows that neither the State nor defense counsel considered the stipulated bench trial to be a guilty plea, and that the comments of defense counsel reflect an expectation that the court would find defendant guilty or not guilty based on the stipulated facts presented.

Both parties discuss People v. Smith (1974), 59 Ill.2d 236, 319 N.E.2d 760, People v. Russ (1975), 31 Ill.App.3d 385, 334 N.E.2d 108, and this court's decisions in People v. Fair (1975), 29 Ill.App.3d 939, 332 N.E.2d 51, and People v. Ford (1976), 44 Ill.App.3d 94, 2 Ill.Dec. 645, 357 N.E.2d 865, all of which involved entries of pleas of not guilty at stipulated bench trials and subsequent contentions on appeal that the procedure followed in the trial court was tantamount to pleas of guilty so that the Rule 402 admonitions should have been given.

In Ford, this court reviewed these cases, as well as the decisions in People v. Stepheny (1974), 56 Ill.2d 237, 306 N.E.2d 872, and People v. Young (1974), 25 Ill.App.3d 629, 323 N.E.2d 788. In both Stepheny and Smith, not only the evidence, but the outcome was stipulated and no defense, factual or legal, was presented or preserved. We note this passage in Smith: "Where the circumstances indicate that calculated efforts have been made which amount to the entry of a guilty plea, we hold that an accused must be afforded the protections set forth by Rule 402." (59 Ill.2d 236, 242-43, 319 N.E.2d 760, 764.) In Young, the defense of self-defense was raised. In Russ, the defendant to an arson charge raised the defense of accident or lack of specific intent. In Fair, this court concluded that the stipulation was not tantamount to a plea of guilty since the defendant retained a genuine defense (refusal to suppress purported confession) for purposes of appeal. In Ford, the stipulation was only as to what the evidence would be, and this court found that the defendant retained a legal defense, the denial of his motions to suppress statements and for leave to file a sexually dangerous petition.

Thus, Young, Russ, Fair, and Ford stand for the proposition that a stipulated bench trial is not tantamount to a guilty plea where a defense, factual or legal, is presented. The underlying rationale for this position is that a guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional defenses or defects. (People v. Jackson (1970), 47 Ill.2d 344, 348, 265 N.E.2d 622, 624.) Here it appears that defense counsel utilized the stipulated bench trial procedure to preserve the issue of the court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss based on his equal protection challenge to section 2-7(2) of the Act.

Defendant seeks to distinguish Ford on two bases. First, he maintains that (1) no court has jurisdiction over a juvenile unless there is compliance with the Act; (2) if section 2-7(2) is unconstitutional, other provisions of the Act must be complied with in order to assert criminal jurisdiction over a minor; and therefore, (3) his claim of error is in the nature of a "jurisdictional defense" or defect. We find this argument erroneous in several respects. The issue defense counsel evidently sought to preserve through the mechanism of the stipulated bench trial was constitutional, not jurisdictional. Further, we believe that defendant's argument misapprehends the nature of the jurisdiction of the circuit courts, which is not dependent on compliance with the Act. In In re Estate of Mears (1982), 110 Ill.App.3d 1133, 66 Ill.Dec. 606, 443 N.E.2d 289, this court pointed out that the jurisdiction of the circuit court is no longer dependent upon statutes and derives from the constitution itself. Under the Constitution of 1970 the circuit court has original jurisdiction "of all justiciable matters." (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, sec. 9.) See also In re Estate of Spaits (1984) 104 Ill.2d 431, 84 Ill.Dec. 647, 472 N.E.2d 784 (endorsing Mears as to jurisdiction in probate context); In re L.E.J. (1983), 115 Ill.App.3d 993, 996-97, 71 Ill.Dec. 574, 577, 451 N.E.2d 289, 292; In re Marriage of Bussey (1984), 128 Ill.App.3d 730, 84 Ill.Dec. 34, 471 N.E.2d 563, (lack of compliance with certain statutory procedures did not deprive trial court of subject matter jurisdiction of proceeding under Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (see Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 40, par. 101 et seq.)); Dilley v. Americana Healthcare Corp. (1984), 129 Ill.App.3d 537, 84 Ill.Dec. 636, 472 N.E.2d 596 (construing limitation posed by section 8-111(D) of the Illinois Human Rights Act (...