People v. Samuels

• Decision Date: 15 January 1980
• Citation: 424 N.Y.S.2d 892,49 N.Y.2d 218
• Parties: , 400 N.E.2d 1344 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Willie M. SAMUELS, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 892

424 N.Y.S.2d 892

49 N.Y.2d 218, 400 N.E.2d 1344

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Willie M. SAMUELS, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Jan. 15, 1980.

Shirley Werner, Matthew Muraskin and Michael J. Obus, Mineola, for appellant

Denis Dillon, Dist. Atty. (William C. Donnino, Anthony J. Girese, Mineola, and Scott N. Fein, Hempstead, of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

WACHTLER, Judge.

On this appeal the defendant seeks to suppress oral and written statements which he claims were obtained in violation of his right to counsel. The question is whether a defendant can waive his rights in the absence of counsel after a felony complaint has been filed in court.

On September 4, 1975 two men robbed a store in Nassau County. Several days later the investigating officer filed a felony complaint in the District Court charging the defendant with the crime. Based on the complaint an arrest warrant was issued. On October 5, 1975 the police arrested the defendant at his mother's home. Prior to bringing the defendant before the court for arraignment, the police transported him to the local precinct "for processing". At the police station he was advised of his rights and questioned about the robbery in the absence of counsel. He made oral and written statements admitting participation in the robbery but claiming that he had been coerced into assisting the robber.

The defendant made a pretrial motion to suppress the statements on the ground that he had not been advised of his rights and had been "forced" by the police into making the statements. After a hearing the trial court found that the facts did not support these contentions. The motion was denied. Subsequently the defendant went to trial and was found guilty of the robbery.

On appeal to the Appellate Division the defendant argued that the confession should have been suppressed because it was obtained in the absence of counsel after a felony complaint had been filed in court. He urged that his right to counsel attached when the felony complaint was filed and that he could not thereafter waive his rights without the assistance of counsel. The Appellate Division affirmed, without opinion.

On appeal to this court, the defendant presents the same issue argued before the Appellate Division. The prosecutor notes that this point was not raised at the trial court and urges that it therefore was not preserved for appellate review. It is settled, however, that a claim that a defendant was deprived of his right to counsel during police questioning may be raised for the first time on appeal (see, e. g., People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 329, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663, 666, 239 N.E.2d 537, 539; People v. Ermo, 47 N.Y.2d 863, 419 N.Y.S.2d 65, 392 N.E.2d 1248; People v. Dean, 47 N.Y.2d 967, 419 N.Y.S.2d 957, 393 N.E.2d 1030).

The defendant is entitled to counsel at all critical stages of the criminal prosecution (People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154, 165, 412 N.Y.S.2d 874, 880, 385 N.E.2d 612, 617). The right to counsel attaches, of course, once the criminal action has been commenced (see, e. g., People v. Blake, 35 N.Y.2d 331, 339-340, 361 N.Y.S.2d 881, 890-891, 320 N.E.2d 625, 631-632). But it may also attach at an earlier stage if there has been significant judicial activity. Thus, for instance, a court order permitting the police to bring the defendant to the scene of the crime (People v. Sugden, 35 N.Y.2d 453, 461, 363 N.Y.S.2d 923, 929, 323 N.E.2d 169, 173) or directing that he appear in a lineup (People v. Coleman, 43 N.Y.2d 222, 401 N.Y.S.2d 57, 371 N.E.2d 819) may be sufficient to trigger the right to counsel even though the criminal action may not have formally commenced.

By statute a criminal action now commences with the filing of an accusatory instrument (CPL 1.20, subd. 17), which includes a felony complaint (CPL 1.20, subds. 1, 8). Thus in this case the defendant's right to counsel attached when the felony complaint was filed and the arrest warrant issued (cf. People v. Blake, 35 N.Y.2d 331, 339, 361 N.Y.S.2d 881, 890, 320 N.E.2d 625, 631, Supra; People v. Sugden, 35 N.Y.2d 453, 461, 363 N.Y.S.2d 923, 929, 323 N.E.2d 169, 173 Supra ). This represents a departure from prior law which traditionally regarded arraignment on the warrant as the " 'first stage of a criminal proceeding' " (People v. Stockford, 24 N.Y.2d 146, 149, 299 N.Y.S.2d 172, 174, 247 N.E.2d 141, 142-143). We have previously indicated that this rule became obsolete when the CPL was adopted (People v. Blake, supra, p. 339, 361 N.Y.S.2d p. 890, 320 N.E.2d p. 631).

The question then is whether the right, which attached upon the filing of the felony complaint, could be waived in the absence of counsel. In People v. Coleman (supra), where the right to counsel was triggered by a court order directing the defendant to appear in a lineup, we held that a waiver in the absence of counsel was possible. There, however, the crime was still under investigation and the defendant had not been formally charged. Later in People v. Settles (supra), where the defendant had been indicted for the crime, we held that the right to counsel had "indelibly attached" and could only be waived in the presence of a lawyer.

The defendant claims that Settles is controlling here because the filing of a felony complaint, like the filing of an indictment, formally commences the criminal action. The District Attorney notes, however, that unlike an indictment, a felony complaint may not serve as a basis for a prosecution (CPL 1.20, subd. 8). It must be superseded by an indictment or a superior court information before the defendant may be convicted of a felony...