People v. Sanchez

• Citation: 2021 NY Slip Op 33669 (U)
• Decision Date: 06 October 2021
• Docket Number: Indictment No. 18-1213
• Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK v. LUIS SANCHEZ, Defendant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (New York)

2021 NY Slip Op 33669(U)

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
v.
LUIS SANCHEZ, Defendant.

Indictment No. 18-1213

Supreme Court, Westchester County

October 6, 2021

Unpublished Opinion

DECISION & ORDER

Honorable Barry E. Warhit Supreme Court Judge

Defendant filed a counseled motion seeking to vacate his conviction pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law ("CPL") §220.60[3] for permission to withdraw his previously entered plea of guilty to criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (PL 265.02[1]). The People oppose this application in its entirety. In contemplation of this motion, the Court read and considered the following papers:

Motion to Withdraw Plea of Guilty Affirmation and Annexed Minutes of the Plea Proceeding; and Affirmation in Opposition and Memorandum of Law

Relevant Procedural Background

Luis Sanchez ("Defendant") is charged, under the within indictment, with attempted robbery in the first degree (PL § 110/160.15[3]), criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (PL § 265.02[1], obstructing governmental administration in the second degree (PL § 195.05) and harassment in the second degree (PL § 240.26[1]). The matter proceeded to jury trial. On or about October 8, 2019, a jury convicted defendant of the latter two charges but hung as to the two felony counts. Accordingly, Defendant's bail status was continued, and the matter was returned to the Trial Assignment Part ("TAP") for the purpose of scheduling a re-trial.

On November 22, 2019, Defendant's trial counsel was relieved and attorney Sam S. Coe was assigned in his stead. On January 1, 2020, the New York Bail Reform Act took effect. On January 6,2020, attorney Coe filed a motion seeking Defendant's release on his own recognizance. On January 10, 2021, Defendant appeared in TAP personally and by counsel. The Court denied the defense motion, inter alia, on grounds that under the newly enacted statute, attempted robbery in the first degree is a bail qualifying offense (Transcript of Plea Proceeding, January 10, 2020 ("Plea Minutes"), pp. 2-3). On this same date, the Court conducted a sidebar attorney's conference (Id., p. 3). The matter was adjourned for a second call (Id.)

During Defendant's second appearance on January 10, 2020, the Court advised him that the People had expressed willingness to offer him a sentence of 2 to 4 years in state prison in exchange for a plea (Id., pp. 4-5). Upon defense counsel's request, an additional attorneys'

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sidebar conference was held before the Court permitted an additional adjournment for a third call (Id., p. 5, lines 9-12).

On the occasion of the case being called for a third time on January 10, 2020, the Court advised Defendant, "because your lawyer has asked, that you want to get out, you have some business to take care of, ...", that in the event Defendant elected to accept the negotiated plea deal, under which he would be required to enter a plea of guilty to criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree in exchange for an indeterminate sentence of 2-4 years in state prison, the Court would be willing to release him on his own recognizance pending sentence (Id., p. 5, lines 20-25 and p. 6, lines 1-2 and 22-24). The Court also informed Defendant that if he "wanted to surrender" prior to sentencing, he could do so to accrue additional local time prior to being sentenced to state prison (Id., p. 6, lines.3-7 and 12-17). Additionally, the Court explained, presumably in response to inquiries made by counsel during the sidebar conferences, that an offer of 1-3 years or 1^1/2 -3 years was not legally permissible (Id., p. 7, lines 9-11). Upon Defendant's counsel having indicated Defendant was "interested in" and "willing to take the offer", the Court clarified that the two misdemeanor counts of which Defendant had already been convicted would "merge" with the negotiated sentence (Id., p. 7, lines 12-25).

Significantly, after the details of the negotiated plea had been set forth upon the record, the Court informed Defendant "I'm not asking you to take the offer, I'm not urging you to take the offer" (Id., p. 8, lines 16-19). Defendant interjected to inform of his intention to proceed (Id., p. 8, lines 20 and 23). In response, the Court encouraged him to speak to his lawyer and noted, the sentence would include orders of protection and fees (Id., p. 8, lines 24-25 and p. 9, line 1).

The Court then placed Defendant under oath, confirmed his English language proficiency and that his interest in pleading guilty to the class D, non-violent felony, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (Id., p. 9, lines 2-17). Under oath, Defendant acknowledged he had been given enough time to speak to his lawyer and professed to be happy with his work (Id., p. 9, lines 18-22). Of particular relevance to this motion, the Court informed Defendant: "I don't want you to ask for your plea back later blaming [your attorney] for your situation. Can I rely upon your statement that you are fully satisfied with his work?" (Id., p. 9, lines 18-25 and p. 10, line 1). Unambiguously, Defendant, who denied having used drugs, alcohol or medication, replied "Yes"(Id. p. 10, lines 2-5).

During the plea colloquy, the Court informed Defendant as to the Constitutional and other rights implicated by his decision to avail himself of the negotiated plea deal (see generally, Id., pp. 10-16). In particular, the Court advised Defendant, who acknowledged he understood, that by entering pleas of guilty he was giving up his right to a trial, whether by a judge or jury, and forfeiting his right to require the People to prove each and every element of each crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt (Id. at p. 10, lines 6-14). The Court also explained to Defendant that, by entering a plea of guilty, he was satisfying the People's burden of proof and absolving the prosecution of its obligation to call witnesses against him in addition to relinquishing his rights to cross-examine these witnesses, present evidence in his own defense, and remain silent (Id. at p. 10, lines 14-21). Defendant assured the Court he understood each of these concepts as well as the fact that his plea of guilty would result in a conviction just as if he had gone to trial and been convicted after verdict (Id., p. 10, lines 22-25 and p. 11, line 1).

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During the plea the allocution, Defendant specifically acknowledge he understood the Court's sentencing promise (Id., p. 11, lines 2-16). Importantly, Defendant categorically denied anyone made any other promise to get him to accept the negotiated plea deal or was forcing to plead guilty prior to his having freely and voluntarily admitted he possessed a knife with intent to use it unlawfully (Id., p. 11, lines 17-25, p. 12, lines 1-3 and p. 13, lines 5-9), As part of its comprehensive plea voir dire, the Court addressed that, as a condition of the negotiated plea deal, Defendant was being asked to waive his appellate rights to the extent permitted by law (Id., p. 13, line 25, p. 14, lines 1-25 and p. 15, lines 1-19). The Court detailed the review function of the appellate court,...