People v. Sanchez

• Decision Date: 09 June 1950
• Docket Number: Cr. 4997
• Citation: 219 P.2d 9,35 Cal.2d 522
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ.

Page 9

219 P.2d 9

35 Cal.2d 522

PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ.

Cr. 4997.

Supreme Court of California, in Bank.

June 9, 1950.

James E. Walker, Santa Ana, for appellant.

Fred N. Howser, Attorney General, and William E. James, Deputy Attorney General, for respondent.

SCHAUER, Justice.

Appellant Sanchez (hereinafter sometimes called defendant) and one Noble were jointly charged with (count 1) assault with a deadly weapon (knife) on one Rodriguez (count 2) assault with a deadly weapon (knife) on one Maldanado, (count 3) robbery of Rodriguez, and (count 4) violation of section 503 of the Vehicle Code in taking the automobile of one Perez with intent to deprive the owner of possession thereof. A jury found defendant guilty on counts 1, 3 and 4, and guilty of the included offense of simple assault on count 2. Noble was acquitted on counts 1 and 4 and convicted of the included offense of simple assault on count 2; on count 3, although the jury found that he was armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the commission of the robbery, it determined that the offense was of the second degree. A motion for new trial was made and denied and judgment sentencing defendant to the state prison on all four counts was rendered by the court on November 16, 1948, but two days later that judgment was vacated as to count 2 and a new judgment was pronounced, sentencing defendant to the county jail for one day. Defendant's notice of appeal, filed November 24, 1948, recites that he appeals from the 'judgments of conviction made and entered * * * on the 16th day of November, 1948, and from the order * * * denying * * * motion for new trial.' Since the November 16 judgment as to count 2 had been vacated before the notice of appeal was filed, and since no appeal has been taken from the judgment of November 18, we interpret this appeal as applicable only to the felony convictions on counts 1, 3 and 4. We have concluded that the judgment on count 1 can be sustained but that the judgments on counts 3 and 4 must be reversed because of errors which relate to (1) Sanchez' sole defense (that he was too intoxicated to have the 'particular purpose, motive, or intent' necessary to constitute the particular crimes of which he was convicted on such counts (Pen. Code, § 22)); (2) misconduct of deputy district attorney in referring to an asserted prior conviction of defendant, although there was no evidence of such conviction before the jury; (3) comment of the prosecution and lack of instruction by the trial court as to the effect of Sanchez' failure to take the witness stand.

Defendant called no witnesses and, as indicated, did not testify on his own behalf. To support his defense he relied upon the testimony of the victims of the alleged crimes (prosecution witnesses), the testimony of his co-defendant Noble, and a statement made by defendant to police officers the day following his alleged commission of the offenses. The statement, transcribed by a shorthand reporter, was read into evidence by the prosecution. In it defendant declared that he had been drinking liquor for a period of time just prior to the alleged occurrence of the crimes charged, and had no recollection concerning them.

The record discloses that on a Sunday morning in September, 1948, one Perez delivered his automobile to Maldanado, in Santa Ana, for the purpose of having Maldanado paint it. Later in the morning Maldanado, Rodriguez, Noble, and defendant Sanchez met by chance at a cafe in Santa Ana, 'had a beer,' and thereafter left for San Juan Capistrano in Perez' automobile. A bottle of gin was purchased en route. After consuming the gin and drinking more beer the four went to the beach near San Jaun Capistrano, where another bottle of gin, a fifth of a gallon, was purchased. They then started back to Santa Ana, with Maldanado driving. On the way defendant spilled or poured some gin on Maldanado; Maldanado stopped the car and an altercation arose. Defendant told Noble to 'take care of' Maldanado; defendant cut Rodriguez on the face and left arm with a pruning knife; and both defendant and Noble held knives against, but did not cut, Maldanado. The knife held by Noble was a pocket knife which belonged to defendant Sanchez. Noble and Sanchez together took $20 and a wrist watch from Rodriguez. Sanchez then drove Perez' automobile from the scene, taking Noble with him and leaving Rodriguez and Maldanado by the road.

Maldanado testified that all four persons in the group had been drinking and that he 'imagined' defendant was intoxicated. Rodriguez testified that he himself drank very little of the gin. Noble testified that he drank none of the gin but that 'Sanchez drank a considerable quantity' of it. According to the statement of Sanchez which was read into evidence, 'I remember something * * * about (Noble) taking care of Maldanado and I would take care of (Rodriguez) * * * I don't remember getting mad or spilling gin or anything like that. But I do remember I saw blood on (Rodriguez') hand, but I don't remember cutting him * * * It is all a blank after that because I don't remember * * * I don't remember driving.'

In every crime there must be a joint operation of act and intent. (Pen. Code, § 20.) In addition to this general criminal intent, two of the crimes with which this appeal is concerned require proof of a specific intent: An element of the crime of robbery is the intent to steal (People v. Crowl (1938), 28 Cal.App.2d 299, 308, 82 P.2d 507; 22 Cal.Jur., Robbery, § 5); and an element of the crime denounced by section 503 of the Vehicle Code is the 'intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the owner (of the vehicle taken) of his title to or possession of such vehicle.' It is code law that 'No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication is less criminal by reason of his having been in such condition. But whenever the actual existence of any particular purpose, motive, or intent is a necessary element to constitute any particular species or degree of crime the jury may take into consideration the fact that the accused was intoxicated at the time, in determining the purpose, motive, or intent with which he committed the act.' (Pen. Code, § 22; 7 Cal.Jur., Criminal Law, § 26.)

Defendant requested and the trial court refused to give the following instruction (numbers in brackets are inserted for convenience of discussion):

'(1) You are instructed that our law provides that 'no act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication is less criminal by reason of his having been in such condition.' This means that such a condition, if shown by the evidence to have existed in the defendant at the time when allegedly he committed the crime charged, is not of itself a defense. It may throw light on the occurrence and aid you in determining what took place; but when a person in a state of intoxication, voluntarily produced in himself, commits a crime, the law does not permit him to use his own vice as a shelter against the normal, legal consequences of his conduct.

'(2) However, when the existence of any particular motive, purpose or intent is a necessary element to constitute a particular kind or degree of crime, the jury, in determining whether or not such motive, purpose or intent existed in the mind of the accused, must take into consideration the evidence offered to prove that the accused was intoxicated at the time when the crime allegedly was committed.

'(3) Thus in the crime of assault with a deadly weapon with which the defendant * * * is accused in this case, in Count 1 of the information, the specific intent to commit an assault with a deadly weapon, towit, a knife, is a necessary element of the crime. * * *

'(4) Thus in the crime of robbery of which the defendant * * * is accused in this case in Count 3 of the information, the specific intent to steal property from the possession of the owner by means of violence, force or fear with the intention of permanently depriving the owner of his property is a necessary element of the crime.

'(5) Thus in the crime of driving and taking the * * * automobile as charged in Count 4 of the information * * *, the specific intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive said owner thereof of his title to, or possession of such vehicle is a necessary element of the crime.

'(6) As to any Count in which it is found that the defendant * * * did not have the required intent to commit the crime charged, he must be acquitted.'

The substance of paragraph (1) of the refused instruction was covered by other instructions which were given. However, the trial court erroneously failed to give any instruction covering the rule correctly stated in paragraph (2). The People urge that refusal of the entire instruction was correct because paragraph (3) thereof is erroneous in declaring that a specific intent is a necessary element of the crime of assault with a deadly weapon. However, assuming that under the circumstances of this case proof of a specific intent in the use of the knives was not essential (see People v. McCoy (1944), 25 Cal.2d 177, 188-194, 153 P.2d 315; see also People v. Marseiler (1886), 70 Cal. 98, 100, 11 P. 503; 3 Cal.Jur., Assault and Battery, § 14; cf. People v. Raner (1948), 86 Cal.App.2d 107, 112-113, 194 P.2d 37; People v. Crowl (1938), 28 Cal.App.2d 299, 305, 82 P.2d 507) nevertheless, because of the charges in counts 3 and 4, respectively, of robbery and violation of section 503 (Vehicle Code), an instruction stating the rule of paragraph (2) was essential in relation to the trial on those counts. Explanatory paragraphs (4), (5) and (6) are correct and pertinent and the error of the requested instruction could easily have been cured by striking out paragraph (3). A trial court's duty is not always adequately performed by merely reading to the jury the wholly correct requested instructions; it is that court's duty to see to it that the jury are adequately informed...