People v. Sanchez

Decision Date13 November 2003
Docket NumberNo. E032545,E032545
Citation113 Cal.App.4th 325,6 Cal.Rptr.3d 271
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesThe PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Carlos SANCHEZ, Defendant and Appellant.

Patrick J. Hennessey, Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, San Diego, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Anthony Da Silva, Erika Hiramatsu, and Peter Quon, Jr., Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION

RICHLI, J.

In a bifurcated trial, a jury found defendant guilty of operating a chop shop (Veh.Code, § 10801)1 and receiving stolen motor vehicle parts (Pen.Code, § 496, subd. (a)), and not guilty of vehicle theft (§ 10851, subd. (a)). The trial court thereafter found true that defendant had served a prior prison term (Pen.Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)) and that defendant had suffered a prior serious or violent felony strike conviction (Pen.Code, §§ 667, subds.(b)-(i); 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). As a result, defendant was sentenced to a total term of nine years in state prison.

On appeal, defendant contends (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for operating a chop shop within the meaning of sections 10801 and 250, and (2) his conviction for receiving stolen property must be set aside because that conviction is a necessarily lesser included offense of operating a chop shop.

I FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On December 18, 2000, Rakeeb Ali took his 1992 green Honda Accord to the San Bernardino MAACO Paint and Body Shop (MAACO) to have the vehicle repainted. On or about December 26, 2000, Ali received a telephone call, advising him that his car had been stolen from the MAACO lot.

Henry Romero was a manager at the MAACO shop. Defendant began working at the shop in November 2000. Romero recalled that on December 26 defendant engaged in behavior which he considered somewhat strange. Specifically, he recalled defendant coming into his office to show him a number of photographs of his family which had been taken over the holidays. Romero thought this was odd because defendant was standing in such a way that Romero's view of the parking lot at the MAACO shop was blocked by defendant. Romero also recalled that when Ali's car was placed outside for completion, defendant pulled his own car in front of the office window, blocking Romero's outside view. It was shortly after these photos were shown that Romero discovered Ali's car was missing. Romero had submitted defendant's name to the police as a suspect in the theft of Ali's car because, prior to the theft, Romero had received a telephone call advising him that Ali's vehicle was going to be stolen by defendant.

The following day, December 27, defendant called Romero and informed him that he would be late for work, and when he did arrive he seemed extremely tired. That same day, Ali was advised that his vehicle had been located a few blocks from defendant's sister's home. Defendant's sister was out of town for the entire month of December, but defendant had access to her garage.

Ali noticed that his vehicle had been severely damaged and stripped of many expensive custom after-market items he had added to the vehicle. He also noted that several engine components and the battery were missing. Among the custom items missing from Ali's Honda were a special spoiler on the rear of the car, custom taillights, custom-built speakers, an amplifier, a CD changer, the engine head, the engine block, the intake system, an Interstate brand battery, a silver and red sway bar, after-market headers, racing pedals, the stereo system, and the stick shift housing. Ali described the missing items and the details about them to Detective Donald Lewis of the San Bernardino County Auto Theft Task Force. Several of Ali's items had distinguishing characteristics, such as stickers he had applied or marks he had caused in installing the items. In addition, a faint "overspray" from painting Ali's car had landed on some parts located under the hood.

On January 5, 2001, Ali was shown defendant's blue Honda Accord, which was the same year and model as Ali's green Honda Accord. Ali identified numerous parts on defendant's vehicle as being identical to the parts removed from his car during the time it had been stolen. Ali recognized his pedals, sway bar, intake system, power wire to the amplifier, air filter, cooling for the intake system, battery, speaker box with speakers, amplifier, and distribution block on the amplifier. On the sway bar and the intake system, Ali noticed residue from his stickers, which had been removed. Ali also recognized his amplifier wire because he had spliced different colored wires to adjust the length. Ali stated that he recognized defendant as an employee of the MAACO shop.

Detective Lewis, who had substantial experience working with auto theft details and was familiar with "chop shops," searched defendant's sister's garage on January 6, 2001. At that time, he discovered other parts matching the descriptions of those missing from Ali's vehicle. He also noted two toolboxes, a scissor-type jack commonly found in Honda vehicles, a box of miscellaneous wiring, and other car parts. Detective Lewis, based on his training and experience in auto theft and chop shop organizations, opined that defendant was operating a chop shop in his sister's garage. He was unable to say, however, where the actual disassembly or dismantlement of Ali's vehicle took place from looking at the parts in the garage.

II DISCUSSION
A. Defendant's Conviction for Operating a Chop Shop

Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for operating a chop shop within the meaning of sections 10801 and 250. We disagree.

Our review of any claim of insufficiency of the evidence is limited. "`In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] Reversal on this ground is unwarranted unless it appears "that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction]." [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (People v. Parra (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 222, 225, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 541, quoting People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374; see also People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 413, 971 P.2d 618; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578, 162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738.)

Given this court's limited role on appeal, defendant bears an enormous burden in claiming there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for operating a chop shop. If the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we are bound to give due deference to the trier of fact and not retry the case ourselves. (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319, 326, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560; People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 23, 864 P.2d 103.) A reviewing court is precluded from making its own subjective determination of guilt. (Jackson, at p. 319, fn. 13, 99 S.Ct. 2781.) It is the exclusive function of the trier of fact to assess the credibility of witnesses and draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. (People v. Barnes (1986) 42 Cal.3d 284, 303, 228 Cal.Rptr. 228, 721 P.2d 110; People v. Hale (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 94, 105, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 904.) The standard of review applies even "when the conviction rests primarily on circumstantial evidence." (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68.) Here, the record discloses ample evidence to support the jury's verdict.

Section 10801 states: "Any person who knowingly and intentionally owns or operates a chop shop is guilty of a public offense." Vehicle Code section 250 defines a chop shop as "any building, lot, or other premises where any person has been engaged in altering, destroying, disassembling, dismantling, reassembling, or storing any motor vehicle or motor vehicle part known to be illegally obtained by theft ... in order to do either of the following: [¶] (a) Alter ... the identity, including the vehicle identification number, of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle part, in order to misrepresent the identity of the motor vehicle or motor vehicle part, or to prevent the identification of the motor vehicle or motor vehicle part. [¶] (b) Sell or dispose of the motor vehicle or motor vehicle part."

In the present matter, defendant contends that, because Detective Lewis was unable to conclude that Ali's car had specifically been stripped in defendant's sister's garage, there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of operating a chop shop out of the garage. We reject this contention, because several toolboxes, miscellaneous wiring and wiring assemblies, and numerous auto parts, including parts from vehicles other than Ali's Honda, were found in defendant's sister's garage. In addition, defendant had unmonitored access to the garage at the time, and the garage was located a few blocks from where Ali's stripped vehicle was recovered. Ali's numerous vehicle parts, which were missing from Ali's vehicle, were found to be installed in defendant's car.

Moreover, based on his training and experience in auto theft and chop shop organizations and the totality of circumstances in this case, Detective Lewis opined that defendant was operating a chop shop in his sister's garage. Based on the foregoing, the jury reasonably could have concluded that defendant utilized his sister's garage as a chop shop when he stripped the vehicle parts from Ali's vehicle and installed them in his own vehicle. We conclude the circumstances reasonably support the view that defendant was...

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