People v. Sanchez
| Decision Date | 18 January 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 76616,76616 |
| Citation | 169 Ill.2d 472,662 N.E.2d 1199,215 Ill.Dec. 59 |
| Parties | , 215 Ill.Dec. 59 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Hector Reuben SANCHEZ, Appellant. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Jed Stone, Law Offices of Jed Stone, Ltd., Chicago, Debra A. Harvey, Asst. Corporation Counsel, Chicago, for Sanchez, Hector Reuben.
James E. Ryan, Attorney General, Springfield , for the People.
The defendant, Hector Reuben Sanchez, brings this appeal from an order of the circuit court of Lake County dismissing, without an evidentiary hearing, his petition for post-conviction relief. Because the defendant was sentenced to death for the underlying murder conviction, the present appeal lies directly to this court. 134 Ill.2d R. 651(a).
Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Lake County, the defendant was convicted of murder, attempted murder, aggravated kidnapping, rape, and deviate sexual assault and was sentenced to death for the murder conviction. This court affirmed the defendant's convictions and sentences on direct appeal (People v. Sanchez (1986), 115 Ill.2d 238, 104 Ill.Dec. 720, 503 N.E.2d 277), and the United States Supreme Court denied the defendant's ensuing petition for certiorari (Sanchez v. Illinois (1987), 483 U.S. 1010, 107 S.Ct. 3240, 97 L.Ed.2d 745). The defendant then instituted the present post-conviction proceeding. The circuit judge dismissed the defendant's petition without an evidentiary hearing, and this appeal followed.
The defendant's convictions stem from his role in the abduction, assault, and murder of Michelle Thompson and the attempted murder of Thompson's male companion, Rene Valentine. At the defendant's trial, Valentine identified the defendant as one of two men who forced their way into the car in which Valentine and Thompson were sitting outside a nightclub in Gurnee around 12:30 a.m. on February 4, 1983. After the intruders pulled the couple from their car, the defendant shot Valentine, and the defendant and the second man then drove off with Thompson.
Further evidence against the defendant was provided by his codefendant, Warren Peters, who testified on behalf of the prosecution at the defendant's trial. Peters stated that he and the defendant took Thompson to the defendant's home in Zion, where the defendant sexually assaulted the victim. A neighbor, Gene Gonyo, testified that he heard pounding on his back door around 1:30 a.m. on February 4 and saw a man and woman outside his house. Although the weather was wintry and there was snow on the ground, the woman was naked below the waist. Shortly after that, Gonyo saw the man and woman walk toward the defendant's house. The defendant soon appeared at Gonyo's door alone and apologized for the earlier disturbance. Warren Peters testified that the defendant later strangled the victim with a nylon strap, wrapped a coat hanger around her neck, and slammed her head against the basement floor. After the defendant burned the victim's clothing and jewelry in his fireplace, Peters and the defendant transported the body to Wisconsin and left it along a road.
The jury found the defendant guilty of murder, attempted murder, aggravated kidnapping, rape, and deviate sexual assault. The defendant waived his right to a jury for the first stage of the capital sentencing hearing, and the trial judge found the defendant eligible for the death penalty under the murder-in-course-of-felony aggravating circumstance. The defendant elected to have a jury for the second stage of the sentencing hearing. In aggravation, the State presented evidence of the defendant's murder of Sharon Egerer in Milwaukee in May 1975. According to this testimony, the defendant killed Egerer because she had filed a paternity action against him. In mitigation, the defense presented testimony from family members, who described the defendant's personal history and acts of kindness. Testifying in his own behalf at the sentencing hearing, the defendant denied committing either the Thompson murder or the Egerer murder.
On direct appeal, this court affirmed the defendant's convictions and sentences. (People v. Sanchez (1986), 115 Ill.2d 238, 104 Ill.Dec. 720, 503 N.E.2d 277.) Consolidated with the case was the appeal from a separate proceeding the defendant had initiated pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 110, par. 2-1401), and at that time we remanded for an evidentiary hearing on one of the contentions raised in the section 2-1401 petition. We later affirmed the trial court's denial of the claim. People v. Sanchez (1989), 131 Ill.2d 417, 137 Ill.Dec. 629, 546 N.E.2d 574.
The defendant instituted the present matter in 1990 by filing a pro se petition for post-conviction relief in the circuit court of Lake County. Counsel was appointed to assist the defendant in the preparation and presentation of his claims, and counsel subsequently filed an amended petition, raising numerous allegations of constitutional error in the proceedings that resulted in the defendant's conviction and death sentence. The State moved to dismiss the defendant's amended post-conviction petition. Following argument by the parties, the judge took the matter under advisement and later dismissed the petition. Before this court the defendant raises more than 25 separate allegations of error, which may be divided among three principal groups: those concerning the defendant's fitness following a suicide attempt, those alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, and those challenging the post-conviction court's denial of certain defense motions.
A proceeding under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, pars. 122-1 through 122-7) represents a collateral challenge to the underlying conviction, not an appeal from the conviction. (People v. Free (1988), 122 Ill.2d 367, 377, 119 Ill.Dec. 325, 522 N.E.2d 1184.) To gain post-conviction relief, a defendant must establish a deprivation of Federal or State constitutional rights. (People v. Thompkins (1994), 161 Ill.2d 148, 157, 204 Ill.Dec. 147, 641 N.E.2d 371.) Considerations of res judicata and waiver limit the scope of post-conviction review "to constitutional matters which have not been, and could not have been, previously adjudicated." (People v. Winsett (1992), 153 Ill.2d 335, 346, 180 Ill.Dec. 109, 606 N.E.2d 1186.) With these principles in mind, we now turn to the defendant's post-conviction claims.
The first group of issues raised by the defendant in the present appeal concerns his suicide attempt just prior to the start of the sentencing hearing and the trial court's failure to conduct a fitness hearing at that time. The defendant attempted to commit suicide the morning that the sentencing hearing was scheduled to begin. Following the defendant's treatment and release from the hospital, the sentencing hearing commenced later that day. The defendant now argues that he was not fit to proceed with the penalty hearing and that the trial court erred in failing to conduct a fitness hearing on its own motion.
Facts and circumstances of the defendant's suicide attempt were noted of record on the morning of the scheduled sentencing hearing. The trial judge stated that upon arriving at court he learned that jailers had discovered around 8:30 that morning that the defendant had attempted to commit suicide. The judge said that he had been told that the defendant had broken the lenses in his eyeglasses and had used the broken pieces of glass to cut his arm. The judge also said that the defendant had been released from a local hospital after treatment there for his injuries. The court noted that the defendant was then in a witness room in the courthouse and that defense counsel had had an opportunity to speak with him.
Defense counsel added that the defendant was distraught and had instructed the attorneys to send home the mitigation witnesses whom the defense had planned to call. Counsel also related that the defendant had said that he attempted to take his own life because he thought society was going to do so. Defense counsel requested that the jury be discharged and the hearing postponed until the defendant had "gotten a hold of himself" and was able to cooperate more fully with counsel. Asked by the judge whether the defendant was unable to communicate with his attorneys, counsel replied that the defendant seemed different from when he had spoken to him the preceding night. As evidence of the defendant's inability to communicate and cooperate, counsel said that the defendant had ordered the attorney to do the opposite of what counsel had intended to do. Following this colloquy, the trial judge concluded that there was no bona fide doubt of the defendant's fitness for sentencing and denied the defense motion for postponement of the penalty hearing.
With the post-conviction petition the defendant presented additional evidence documenting the circumstances of his suicide attempt. Medical records submitted by post-conviction counsel showed that the defendant inflicted eight separate wounds on his arms, and these injuries are depicted in photographs that accompany the petition. Other photographs show the condition of the defendant's cell after he was removed from it. The post-conviction petition also includes written reports made by personnel of the county jail. According to one report, during the suicide attempt the defendant located an artery in his left arm and told an inmate, "I can pull it out but I can't cut it." The defendant also consumed sleeping pills that he had hidden from the guards. It took the efforts of several jailers to subdue the defendant following the discovery of the suicide attempt.
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