People v. Mitchell

• Citation: 727 N.E.2d 254,245 Ill.Dec. 1,189 Ill.2d 312
• Decision Date: 27 January 2000
• Docket Number: No. 83281.,83281.
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Anthony MITCHELL, Appellant.
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

727 N.E.2d 254
189 Ill.2d 312
245 Ill.Dec. 1

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee,
v.
Anthony MITCHELL, Appellant

No. 83281.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

January 27, 2000.

Dissenting Opinion Upon Denial of Rehearing April 3, 2000.

727 N.E.2d 259

Marshall J. Hartman, Deputy Defender, Anna Ahronheim, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Chicago, for Appellant

James E. Ryan, Attorney General, Springfield (Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, William L. Browers and Michael M. Glick, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

Justice RATHJE delivered the opinion of the court:

A jury convicted defendant, Anthony Mitchell, of two counts of first degree murder.

727 N.E.2d 260

The same jury also determined that defendant was eligible for the death penalty and that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death penalty. Accordingly, the circuit court of St. Clair County sentenced defendant to death

On direct review, we affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. People v. Mitchell, 152 Ill.2d 274, 178 Ill.Dec. 354, 604 N.E.2d 877 (1992) (Mitchell I). The United States Supreme Court denied defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari. Mitchell v. Illinois, 508 U.S. 962, 113 S.Ct. 2936, 124 L.Ed.2d 685 (1993). On December 7, 1993, defendant filed a petition for post-conviction for relief, and on May 16, 1996, defendant filed an amended petition. The State moved to dismiss the amended petition without an evidentiary hearing. Defendant then filed three additional claims for post-conviction relief, based on this court's decisions in People v. Brandon, 162 Ill.2d 450, 205 Ill.Dec. 421, 643 N.E.2d 712 (1994), and People v. Nitz, 173 Ill.2d 151, 218 Ill.Dec. 950, 670 N.E.2d 672 (1996). The court allowed the State's motion to dismiss to stand against the additional counts. The court granted the State's motion to dismiss, and this appeal followed. Because the judgment challenged in defendant's petition imposed a sentence of death, the appeal was taken directly to this court. 134 Ill.2d R. 651(a).

BACKGROUND

Defendant's convictions arose from the stabbing deaths of teenagers David and Dawn Lieneke in July 1989. The facts detailing the crime and the investigation leading to defendant's arrest are set out in our original opinion, and we provide only a brief summary here. Additional facts will be noted where necessary to address the particular arguments defendant raises.

David and Dawn lived with their grandparents. On the evening of July 4, 1989, their grandparents were out playing bingo. The grandparents returned home at approximately 10:30 p.m. and found David's and Dawn's dead bodies. Eighteen-year-old David was lying in a pool of blood in the hallway. He had been stabbed seven times. The wounds were large and deep, and David had died from blood loss caused by a stab wound to the liver and from the collapse of both lungs, due to a stab wound to his chest. Thirteen-year-old Dawn was lying in a pool of blood on her grandmother's bed. She also had seven stab wounds in her body, including one that went through the right temple and penetrated her brain. Dawn bled to death from knife wounds to the aorta and liver.

The police located defendant by tracing the license plate number of his sister's car. Defendant had been driving that car on the night of the murders. Witnesses had spotted the car at the scene. Defendant confessed to the crime, explaining that he had gone to the Lienekes' house looking for Viroon Williams, whom defendant claimed had tried to run him down with a car the day before and who had stolen a VCR, radio, and video game from defendant's mother's house. Williams sometimes stayed with the Lienekes. Defendant went into the house and stabbed David, and then killed Dawn when she screamed his name and ran into the bedroom. David was still alive and was threatening to tell Williams, so defendant stabbed him again.

In addition to defendant's confession, the State relied upon the testimony of Maurice Douglas, who was with defendant on the night of the murders. Defendant showed the bloody knife to Douglas and told him that he had just killed two persons. The police recovered the murder weapon-a survival knife-from defendant's basement. The knife had blood on it, and the blood was consistent with a mixture of David's and Dawn's blood. The police also recovered black clothes and a pair of two-toed shoes. Blood on a pair of pants recovered from defendant's basement was consistent with Dawn's blood. One of the two-toed shoes matched a shoe print that was left in the mud near where defendant's

727 N.E.2d 261

sister's car was seen parked in the victims' neighborhood

Defendant testified and denied any involvement in the crime. Defendant's testimony suggested that Williams was the murderer. Defendant denied owning the clothes or the knife, but said that Williams had an outfit like the one recovered and that he had seen Williams with the knife. Defendant denied showing the knife to Douglas or saying that he killed two persons. Defendant testified that the police made him sign the confession by raising their voices.

Defendant was convicted of the murders and sentenced to death. After his convictions and sentence were affirmed by this court and his petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was denied, defendant filed a post-conviction petition. As twice amended, defendant's post-conviction petition contained 28 counts. Eleven counts, however, restated constitutional arguments that were rejected on direct appeal. In dismissing the petition without an evidentiary hearing, the trial court ruled that the majority of defendant's claims were barred by waiver and res judicata. As to defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court ruled that defendant had not made a substantial showing that his constitutional rights had been violated.

The trial court found merit to one of defendant's claims based on Brandon and Nitz. Defendant argued that at the time of his trial and sentencing he was taking two medications to control his epilepsy-Depakote and phenobarbital-and that these medications were psychotropic. Defendant contended he was denied due process when he did not receive a fitness hearing and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial and appellate attorneys failed to invoke his right to such a hearing. The trial court agreed that Depakote was psychotropic medication and that defendant therefore would have been entitled to a fitness hearing. See Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 38, par. 104-21(a); Brandon, 162 Ill.2d 450, 205 Ill.Dec. 421, 643 N.E.2d 712. However, the trial court ruled that defendant could not prevail on this claim because he was seeking to benefit from the retroactive application of a "new rule" announced in Brandon.¹ The court based its analysis on Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989); and People v. Flowers, 138 Ill.2d 218, 149 Ill.Dec. 304, 561 N.E.2d 674 (1990), which held that, except in certain limited situations, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure are not applied retroactively to cases pending on collateral review. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed defendant's petition without an evidentiary hearing. Defendant raises six issues on appeal.

ANALYSIS

Standard of review

A petition filed pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (the Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 1998)) is a collateral attack on a prior conviction and sentence. People v. Mahaffey, 165 Ill.2d 445, 452, 209 Ill.Dec. 246, 651 N.E.2d 174 (1995). To obtain relief under the Act, a defendant must establish a substantial deprivation of federal or state constitutional rights in the proceedings that produced the judgment being challenged. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a) (West 1998); People v. Tenner, 175 Ill.2d 372, 378, 222 Ill.Dec. 325, 677 N.E.2d 859 (1997).

An evidentiary hearing on the petition is required only when the allegations of the petition, supported by the trial record and the accompanying affidavits, make a substantial showing of a violation of a constitutional right. People v. Hobley,

727 N.E.2d 262

182 Ill.2d 404, 428, 231 Ill.Dec. 321, 696 N.E.2d 313 (1998). For the purpose of determining whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, all well-pleaded facts in the petition and in the supporting affidavits are to be taken as true. People v. Caballero, 126 Ill.2d 248, 259, 128 Ill.Dec. 1, 533 N.E.2d 1089 (1989). If the circuit court determines that the petition should be dismissed without an evidentiary hearing, its judgment is subject to de novo review. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill.2d 366, 388-89, 233 Ill.Dec. 789, 701 N.E.2d 1063 (1998).

Psychotropic Medication

Defendant argues that he was denied due process when he did not receive a hearing to determine his fitness for trial while under medication. The statute in effect at the time of his trial provided, in part, as follows:

"A defendant who is receiving psychotropic drugs or other medications under medical direction is entitled to a hearing on the issue of his fitness while under medication." Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 38, par. 104-21(a).

Defendant further argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial attorney failed to invoke his right to a fitness hearing and when his counsel on direct appeal failed to raise the due process and ineffective assistance of counsel arguments as they related to his failure to receive a section 104-21(a) fitness hearing.

The factual basis for defendant's claim, as provided in his post-conviction petition and the accompanying affidavits, is as follows. Defendant has suffered from epilepsy since the age of six, when he suffered a head injury. To control his seizures, defendant has been taking medications for many years. During his trial and sentencing, defendant's epilepsy medications were Depakote and phenobarbital. The trial court was aware that...