People v. Sandee, D070732

• Decision Date: 13 September 2017
• Docket Number: D070732
• Citation: 15 Cal.App.5th 294,222 Cal.Rptr.3d 858
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Megan Donna SANDEE, Defendant and Appellant.

15 Cal.App.5th 294

222 Cal.Rptr.3d 858

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Megan Donna SANDEE, Defendant and Appellant.

D070732

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Filed September 13, 2017

Benjamin P. Lechman, San Diego, Siri Shetty, and Michelle Rogers, under appointments by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette C. Cavalier, Teresa Torreblanca and Britton B. Lacy, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

IRION, J.

After the trial court denied a motion to suppress evidence, Megan Donna Sandee pled guilty to possession for sale of a controlled substance ( Health & Saf. Code, § 11378 ) and unauthorized possession of a controlled substance (id ., § 11377, subd. (a)). The trial court granted felony probation to the court for a period of three years.

Sandee challenges the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of her cell phone.¹ According to Sandee, although she was on probation at the time of the search and subject to a general search condition which allowed authorities to search her "property" and "personal effects" without a warrant, the scope of that search condition did not extend to a warrantless search of her cell phone. We conclude that the motion to suppress was properly denied, as a reasonable, objective person at the time of the search would understand a search of Sandee's cell phone to fall within the scope of the search conditions in her probation orders. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

I.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 23, 2015, San Diego County Sheriff's Department detectives were conducting surveillance on a house suspected of being a location for narcotics activity. Sandee and a male companion arrived at the house on bicycles, entered the house for a period of time and then rode away. A detective on the surveillance team observed that Sandee and her companion failed to stop at a red light on their bicycles after leaving the house, and he conducted a traffic stop in his sheriff's vehicle by activating his lights and yelling at them to stop. Sandee stopped her bicycle next to a large bush. In response to the detective's question, Sandee stated that she was on probation and subject to a search condition. By contacting dispatch, the detective confirmed that Sandee had a "valid [F]ourth [Amendment] waiver, good in all four areas," meaning that the waiver covered property in Sandee's residence, vehicle, person and place of work.² Relying on the waiver, the detective searched Sandee's backpack and found a hypodermic needle. He also conducted a search of Sandee's cell phone and found several text messages which he believed were indications that Sandee was involved in selling narcotics. The detective took photos of the text messages and noted them in his report. Near the area where Sandee had stopped her bicycle, the detective found a bag containing 6.9 grams of methamphetamine lying next to the bush.

Sandee was arrested, and a complaint was filed alleging three counts: transportation for sale of methamphetamine ( Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a) ); possession for sale of a controlled substance (id. , § 11378) and unauthorized possession of a controlled substance (id ., § 11377, subd. (a)).

Sandee filed a motion to suppress the evidence found on her cell phone. On April 29, 2016, after holding an evidentiary hearing with testimony from the detectives involved in Sandee's arrest, the trial court denied the motion to suppress. Specifically, the trial court concluded that the detective's search through Sandee's phone for text messages was within the scope of the Fourth Amendment waiver agreed to by Sandee as a condition of probation.³

Sandee entered a guilty plea to possession for sale of a controlled substance ( Health & Saf. Code, § 11378 ) and unauthorized possession of a controlled substance (id ., § 11377, subd. (a)). The People dismissed the remaining count. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence for a period of three years and granted felony probation to the court.

II.DISCUSSION

Sandee's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress the evidence found on her cell phone.

A. Applicable Legal Standards for Motions to Suppress Evidence

A defendant may move to suppress evidence on the ground that "[t]he search or seizure without a warrant was unreasonable." ( Pen. Code, § 1538.5, subd. (a)(1)(A).) "When a defendant raises a challenge to the legality of a warrantless search or seizure, the People are obligated to produce proof sufficient to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the search fell within one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. [Citations.] A probation search is one of those exceptions. [Citations.] This is because a ‘probationer ... consents to the waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights in exchange for the opportunity to avoid service of a state prison term,’ except insofar as a search might be ‘undertaken for harassment or ... for arbitrary or capricious reasons.’ ( People v. Bravo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 600, 608, 610, 238 Cal.Rptr. 282, 738 P.2d 336 ; accord, People v. Medina (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 1571, 1577 .)" ( People v. Romeo (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 931, 939, 193 Cal.Rptr.3d 96.) "A search conducted pursuant to a valid consent does not violate the Fourth Amendment unless the search exceeds the scope of the consent." ( People v. Bravo , supra , 43 Cal.3d at p. 605, 238 Cal.Rptr. 282, 738 P.2d 336 ( Bravo ).)

" ‘ "The standard of appellate review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is well established. We defer to the trial court's factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment." ’ " ( People v. Suff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1013, 1053, 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 130, 324 P.3d 1.) "Under California law, issues relating to the suppression of evidence derived from police searches and seizures must be reviewed under federal constitutional standards." ( People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 794, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 914, 3 P.3d 311.)

Following the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Riley v. California (2014) 573 U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 189 L.Ed.2d 430, it is firmly established that a law enforcement officer may not conduct a search of a person's cell phone without a warrant, even incident to arrest, unless an applicable exception to the warrant requirement applies. As Riley observed, "[c]ell phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from other objects that might be kept on an arrestee's person." ( Riley , supra , 573 U.S. at p. ––––, 134 S.Ct. at p. 2489, 189 L.Ed.2d at p. 435.) Riley explained that "[m]odern cell phones are not just another technological convenience. With all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many Americans 'the privacies of life,' [citation]. The fact that technology now allows an individual to carry such information in his hand does not make the information any less worthy of the protection for which the Founders fought." ( Riley , supra , 573 U.S. at p. ––––, 134 S.Ct. at p. 2495, 189 L.Ed.2d at p. 452.)

B. The Search of Sandee's Cell Phone Was Within the Scope of the Search Conditions in Her Probation Orders

As we have explained, as a condition of probation in several misdemeanor cases Sandee agreed to "[s]ubmit person, vehicle, place of residence, property, personal effects to search at any time with or without a warrant, and with or without reasonable cause," and the detective in this case relied on that probation search condition to conduct the warrantless search of Sandee's cell phone. Accordingly, the question presented here is whether the warrantless search of Sandee's cell phone was permitted under the probation search exception to the warrant requirement in that the search fell within the scope of the Fourth Amendment waivers in Sandee's probation orders.

As our Supreme Court explained in Bravo , supra , 43 Cal.3d 600, 238 Cal.Rptr. 282, 738 P.2d 336, when interpreting the scope of a Fourth Amendment waiver agreed to by the defendant as a condition of probation, the "waiver of [the defendant's] Fourth Amendment rights must be interpreted on the basis of an objective test." ( Bravo , at p. 606, 238 Cal.Rptr. 282, 738 P.2d 336.) Under this approach, "[t]he search condition must ... be interpreted on the basis of what a reasonable person would understand from the language of the condition itself, not on the basis of appellant's subjective understanding, or under a strict test in which a presumption against waiver is applied." ( Id . at p. 607, 238 Cal.Rptr. 282, 738 P.2d 336.) The reason for this rule is that "[l]aw enforcement officers who rely on search conditions in probation orders, the probationer himself [or herself], and other judges who may be called upon to determine the lawfulness of a search, must be able to determine the scope of the condition by reference to the probation order.

We cannot expect police officers and probation agents who undertake searches pursuant to a search condition of a probation agreement to do more than give the condition the meaning that would appear to a reasonable, objective reader. They can neither inquire into the subjective understanding of the probationer, nor analyze the condition in light of legal precedent drawing fine points based on minor differences in the wording of search conditions in other probation orders." ( Id . at pp. 606-607, 238 Cal.Rptr. 282, 738 P.2d 336.)

For the purpose of our analysis, it is important to determine the appropriate timeframe for determining the reasonable meaning of the search condition in Sandee's probation orders. We conclude that the proper inquiry...