People v. Sanders
| Decision Date | 31 July 1950 |
| Docket Number | Cr. 4406 |
| Citation | 98 Cal.App.2d 703,220 P.2d 761 |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. SANDERS. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
William Henry Sanders, in propria persona.
Fred N. Howser, Attorney General, Norman H. Sokolow, Deputy Attorney General, for respondent.
In an information filed by the District Attorney of Los Angeles County, defendant was accused in Counts I and II of the crime of robbery; in Counts III and IV of the offense of kidnaping for the purpose of robbery; Count V charged a violation of section 288a of the Penal Code; and Count VI charged defendant with the crime of rape. It was also alleged that prior to the commission of the offenses charged, defendant was on or about September 7, 1948, convicted of a violation of section 503 of the Vehicle Code, a felony.
When the cause was called for trial, defendant personally, his counsel and the district attorney, stipulated that the case of the prosecution might be submitted on the transcript of the testimony adduced at the preliminary examination, with the added stipulation that all exhibits offers at said preliminary examination could be offered in evidence at the trial, and that both the prosecution and defendant could call any additional witnesses they desired. Defendant admitted the prior conviction pleaded in the information.
Following trial by the court defendant was found guilty of the offenses charged in Counts, I, II, V, VI, and not guily as to Counts III and IV. The court found the offenses charged in Counts I and II to be robbery of the first degree.
From the judgments of conviction defendant prosecutes this appeal.
Regarding the factual background which gave rise to this prosecution, the record reflects that about 2:00 o'clock on the morning of January 23, 1949, defendant came into a hotel in the city of Los Angeles, at which James Brown, 75 years of age was acting as night clerk. Defendant used the telephone and then obtained change from the clerk for use in the cigarette machine. He explained to Brown that he was telephoning in regard to his automobile which had broken down. He sat down in the lobby awhile and Brown sat at his desk, reading book. Subsequently Brown was approached by defendant who had a gun in his hand. He ordered the clerk to get on the floor and thereupon took $1.50 from Brown's person. With a key he had removed from Brown's clothing, he opened the hotel money drawer and took $20 therefrom.
At this time Mrs. Toby Barton, a tenant, came into the hotel. At gun point defendant compelled Brown and Mrs. Barton to go into the boiler room in the rear, some 10 feet away. There defendant compelled Brown to lie on his back and ordered Mrs. Barton to disrobe, with which directions she complied. He then ordered Brown to kiss Mrs. Barton's privates, which he did. Defendant himself also kissed Mrs. Barton's privates, copulating his mouth with her sexual organ, as well as compelling her to do the same with him. Defendant then compelled Mrs. Barton to have sexual intercourse with him. During all of this time defendant kept the gun in his hand. When they first entered the boiler room, defendant with the aid of the weapon he was carrying, took Mrs. Barton's purse which contained $27. The foregoing testimony of Mr. Brown and Mrs. Barton was contained in the transcript of the testimony taken at the preliminary examination. These witnesses also testified at the preliminary examination that they recognized certain exhibits including a green felt hat, a brown suede pair of shoes and a green tweed overcoat that defendant was wearing at the time of the alleged offenses. They also testified that it was their belief that a weapon introduced into evidence was similar to the one used by defendant.
At the trial defendant took the witness stand in his own defense, denied committing and of the crimes charged against him and stated that at the time in question he was in the home of a Mrs. Anderson in another part of the city. He denied seeing the hotel clerk prior to the preliminary hearing and denied seeing Mrs. Barton prior to the 'showup' at the San Francisco City Jail about February 10, in which locale he was apprehended. He admitted that the clothing introduced into evidence was his and that some years prior he had seen the gun. He testified that on the night in question he was wearing a garbardine raincoat and no hat. Another witness for the prosecution testified that the defendant had come to live at his place early in January and remained there a short time, and that he would come in at odd hours of the night. The witness testified that the gun introduced into evidence 'looks like' a gun belonging to the witness and which he had on the shelf in his closet at the time police officers obtained a gun therefrom.
In support of his contention that he was denied due process of law, appellant urges that the case against him was submitted on the transcript of the testimony taken at the preliminary examination. He concedes that such procedure was taken with his personal consent and that of his attorney and the district attorney.
Appellant relies upon the case of People v. Wallin, Cal.App.2d, 208 P.2d 400, reversing a judgment of conviction where the case in the trial court was submitted on the transcript of the preliminary examination. However, in the cited case, a hearing was granted by the Supreme Court and the judgment of conviction was by that tribunal affirmed. People v. Willin, 34 Cal.2d 777, 215 P.2d 1, 3. The Supreme Court held that the right of an accused to be confronted by witnesses at his trial, 'whether reserved in the Constitution or in statutes, may be waived.' That where, as here, the attorney for the accused cross-examined the prosecution's witnesses at the preliminary hearing in the defendant's presence, and thereafter, the latter waived his right of confrontation during his trial by stipulation that the people's case be submitted upon the transcript of the preliminary hearing, he 'has not been deprived of his rights under the United States Constitution.'
In urging the next ground for a reversal, appellant concedes that if the testimony of the prosecution witnesses at the preliminary hearing, in the case at bar, 'presented a true picture of the offenses charged, there was sufficient evidence to sustain the judgments of conviction.' However, he contends that the trial court failed to consider 'the difficulty encountered by white people in distinguishing one Negro from another * * *'. Appellant points out that he is colored and that the two white prosecution witnesses 'excited, badly frightened and in fear of their lives--would have...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Pruitt
...that the trial judge was simply attempting to clarify the testimony. This was not only his right but his duty (People v. Sanders, 98 Cal.App.2d 703, 708, 220 P.2d 761). Equally without merit is appellant's next contention that the court erred in admitting conflicting testimony by Mr. Tray a......
- Crane v. Livingston