People v. Sanders
Decision Date | 21 February 2012 |
Docket Number | No. B225024.,B225024. |
Citation | 137 Cal.Rptr.3d 830,203 Cal.App.4th 839,12 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2134,2012 Daily Journal D.A.R. 2283 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Tyrone SANDERS, Defendant and Appellant. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Rudy Kraft, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Robert David Breton, and Robert M. Snider, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Tyrone Sanders appeals from a judgment committing him to a two-year term as a sexually violent predator. ( Welf. & Inst.Code, § 6600 et seq.) 1 The judgment was entered based upon a stipulated agreement. Appellant contends that the judgment must be reversed because his constitutional right to due process was violated by the excessive delay involved in resolving the matter, and also because the agreement was invalid. We conclude that because he admitted to the allegations contained in the petition seeking his commitment, he is foreclosed from seeking appellate review of any due process violation based on delay. Further, we reject appellant's contention that the agreement was invalid. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
On July 8, 2005, the Los Angeles County District Attorney filed a petition seeking commitment of appellant as a sexually violent predator (SVP). Later that month, appellant personally waived his right to a probable cause hearing and stipulated that there was probable cause to proceed on the petition based on the doctors' reports. The court ordered defendant transported to Atascadero State Hospital forthwith.
On September 20, 2006, the Governor signed into law Senate Bill No. 1128, a piece of urgency legislation that, among other things, amended section 6604 to lengthen the term of an SVP commitment from two years to an indeterminate period. (See People v. Castillo (2010) 49 Cal.4th 145, 150, 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 346, 230 P.3d 1132 ( Castillo ).) During the November 2006 General Election, the voters of California adopted Proposition 83 (known as “Jessica's Law”), which enacted the same changes. ( Id. at pp. 150, 152, 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 346, 230 P.3d 1132.)
On October 31, 2006, the parties in this matter filed a stipulation with the court in which they agreed that appellant would receive a two-year commitment following his trial on the 2005 petition, notwithstanding the change in the law occasioned by legislative amendment of the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA) providing for imposition of an indeterminate term of commitment. This stipulation was originally entered into on October 11, 2006, by the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office, the Los Angeles County Public Defender, and the Los Angeles County Superior Court, and indicated it was to be filed in every SVP case in which a petition was pending prior to the effective date of the legislation. As relevant here, the stipulation stated as follows:
The matter then remained pending for a substantial period of time, during which defense counsel requested continuances to file pretrial motions and to prepare for trial. In addition, appellant filed two Marsden3 motions, the second of which was granted in November 2008. In May 2009, appellant also filed a motion to dismiss the petition, contending the SVPA violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection, and was an illegal ex post facto law. On numerous occasions, appellant unsuccessfully objected to the delay in bringing the matter to trial, and argued the petition should be dismissed.
Eventually, on May 11, 2010, the parties informed the court they had reached a stipulation under which appellant admitted the allegations of the petition, and agreed to receive a two-year commitment. The stipulation provided as follows:
Appellant and his attorney stipulated to a factual basis for appellant's admission of the allegations of the petition based upon all the police reports, probation reports, psychologists' reports, and the records of appellant's prior convictions. Appellant admitted having suffered forcible oral copulation and rape convictions in 1979, 1987, and 1990, within the meaning of section 6600. He admitted that he had a currently diagnosed mental disorder that predisposed him to commit sexually violent, predatory crimes, that as a result of the diagnosed mental disorder it was likely that, if released, he would engage in sexually violent, predatory criminal behavior, and that he agreed to be committed as a sexually violent predator.
At the hearing on May 11, 2010, at which appellant was present, defense counsel acknowledged that although it was a civil matter, some criminal procedures applied and he therefore asked the court to issue “something like a certificate of probable cause with regard only to the issue of speedy trial.” The court replied, However, the court added: “Even though it may not be a valid issue.”
Defense counsel explained that appellant had become aware of an unpublished opinion recently filed by the Court of Appeal in which an individual was found to be a sexually violent predator by a jury, and the trial court ordered appellant to be committed for two years, but the Court of Appeal modified the commitment to an indefinite term based on its conclusion that the change in the SVPA rendered a two-year commitment unauthorized by law. Appellant felt it was in his best interest to agree to the two-year commitment to avoid any possibility of going to trial and receiving a two-year commitment, only to have it be converted to an indeterminate term. Counsel continued:
The court clarified: “What I am agreeing to do is sign something that indicates that he has not waived his right to file an appeal based on the speedy trial issue.” “I am certainly not stating he is going to prevail or that he has a speedy trial right, because I think that's an issue in controversy.” Defense counsel responded,
The prosecutor stated: She added:
The court found that appellant had knowingly, willingly, and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights, and that he understood the nature of the petition and the consequences of his admission. The...
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