People v. Sandoval

• Decision Date: 27 October 1966
• Docket Number: Cr. 10181
• Citation: 419 P.2d 187,65 Cal.2d 303,54 Cal.Rptr. 123
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 419 P.2d 187 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Rudolph Lujan SANDOVAL, Defendant and Appellant. In Bank

Page 123

54 Cal.Rptr. 123

65 Cal.2d 303, 419 P.2d 187

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Rudolph Lujan SANDOVAL, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 10181.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Oct. 27, 1966.

Dahlstrum & Walton, Jack A. Dahlstrum and Richard A. Walton, Hollywood, for defendant and appellant.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., Walter R. Jones, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

TOBRINER, Justice.

Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for possession of heroin in violation of Health and Safety Code, section 11500. Defendant's sole contention is that the heroin found on his person should not have been admitted in evidence against him because of the unlawfulness of the search and his subsequent arrest. Defendant challenges the search and arrest on three alternative and independent grounds: first, that his apprehension constituted the fruit of an incriminating telephone message which the arresting officers intercepted by illegally entering and searching a certain residence; second, that the officers improperly relied upon the statement of a previously untested informer in concluding that defendant was the person who had telephoned the residence; and third, that the officers lacked authority to arrest and search defendant outside the city which employed them.

For reasons which we set forth hereinafter, we have concluded that defendant's search and arrest should be upheld since the officers reasonably believed that persons inside the searched residence possessed heroin, the circumstances confronting the officers justified their reliance upon the informer's statement, and the officers retained their authority to arrest and search when their pursuit of defendant unexpectedly carried them beyond city limits.

The facts are substantially undisputed. Following a series of burglaries in Orange County, Officers Walker and Garrahan of the City of Los Angeles obtained warrants for the arrest of Oscar Jessie Coates and five other persons. The warrants were based on information obtained in part through an independent investigation and in part from a deputy district attorney; the deputy had been told that Coates concealed heroin and burglary loot in his house, that the house served as a narcotics headquarters, and that at least one narcotics 'connection' normally contacted Coates there by telephone.

Shortly before noon on June 2, 1964, Officers Walker and Garrahan saw Coates, accompanied by a woman, leave his house and enter a car parked in the driveway. Pursuant to one of the warrants, the officers arrested Coates some 30 feet from his house. Officer Garrahan observed puncture marks on the woman's hand, arrested her, and found heroin in one of her pockets.

Both officers then went to Coates' house and knocked at the door. When a woman opened it and stepped back, they entered, identifying themselves and explaining their presence. They there saw two other persons and, in plain view on the floor, a plastic bag containing narcotics. After arresting all the occupants the officers proceeded to search the premises.

During the search the telephone rang; when Walker picked up the receiver, a voice asked, 'Is this Jessie?' and Walker replied, 'Yes.' The caller said, 'Man, where have you been? I've been waiting for you a long time. You were supposed to meet me some time ago.' Officer Walker replied that he had been delayed and would be along in 'about ten minutes.' The caller then said, 'Well, hurry up, man, I can't stand around with this stuff in my pocket on the street. I might get picked up.' The conversation ended; Walker asked Coates what it meant. Coates explained that he had arranged to pick up an ounce of heroin from a tall Mexican named 'Rudy,' around 40 years old, weighing 190 to 200 pounds with a heavy moustache, driving a white 1956 or 1957 Oldsmobile. Coates said that Rudy was waiting for him on the 6800 block on Albany Street.

The officers immediately went to the designated location. To their surprise, they found it was in Huntington Park, several blocks outside of the City of Los Angeles. There they saw defendant standing on the sidewalk near a 1956 white Oldsmobile. The record contains no description of defendant, but we must assume, in support of the judgment, that the defendant fit the description supplied by Coates. Officer Walker identified himself and, upon Walker's inquiry, defendant said that his name was Rudolph and that he had previously been arrested for narcotics offenses. He could only explain his presence at that particular location by saying that he was 'looking for a job' and 'just walking around.' The officers conducted a cursory search of defendant and, upon finding a condom containing heroin, arrested him. Defendant now disputes the ruling of the trial court permitting the introduction of that heroin in evidence.

We turn first to defendant's argument that the officers obtained the telephonic information after unlawfully entering and searching Coates' residence and that the heroin found on defendant's person should therefore have been excluded as the fruit of official illegality. We hold that the entry and search of Coates' residence were lawful and that the telephonic information was not illegally obtained.

The entry and search, although not 'incidental' to Coates' arrest, ¹ could properly rest upon the officers' reasonable belief that persons in the residence were then committing a felony. The officers had been informed that Coates' house served both as a depository for burglarized loot and as a headquarters for an illicit narcotics trade. This information, although obtained from informers not known to be reliable, had already been corroborated in part by an independent investigation implicating Coates and five others in a burglary operation. Moreover, the officers had just discovered heroin on a woman whom they had seen leaving the premises with Coates. Under these circumstances, the officers could reasonably conclude that persons inside Coates' residence unlawfully possessed heroin. Since the officers therefore entered the premises lawfully (see People v. Diggs (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d 167, 171--172, 326 P.2d 194), we need not decide whether the woman who opened the door and stepped back to admit the officers validly consented to their entry.

Soon after the officers entered, they observed narcotics in plain view and thereby acquired 'reasonable cause to believe that (each of the occupants had) committed a public offense in (their) presence' (Pen.Code, § 836, subd. 1) as well as 'reasonable cause to believe that (each occupant had) committed a felony' (Pen.Code, § 836, subd. 3). The officers were thus justified on either of two theories in arresting all of the occupants and in conducting a search of the premises incidental to such arrest. (See In re Dixon (1953) 41 Cal.2d 756, 761--762, 264 P.2d 513.)

Because the officers were engaged in a lawful search, and because the information supplied by the deputy district attorney rendered incoming telephone calls reasonably suspect, the officers could justifiably answer the telephone and conceal their identity from the caller in order to learn of possible unlawful activities. (See People v. Malotte (1956) 46 Cal.2d 59, 63--64, 292 P.2d 517.) The officers thus lawfully learned that the caller intended to deliver narcotics to Coates, and we therefore conclude that the heroin found on defendant did not constitute the fruit of illegally obtained information.

We consider, second, defendant's argument that the officers could not reasonably believe that he was the person whose voice Walker heard over Coates' telephone. We hold that the officers had acquired reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant telephone Coates' residence and unlawfully possessed narcotics.

Although the officers acquired no information as to the caller's identity other than the statement made to them by Coates, who was at that time an informer of undetermined reliability, we must decide, not whether the information obtained by the officers emanated from a reliable source, but whether the officers could reasonably rely upon that information under the circumstances. (See Willson v. Superior Court (1956) 46 Cal.2d 291, 294--295, 294 P.2d 36.) In light of the facts confronting the officers when they apprehended the defendant, they could reasonably have relied upon the information which Coates had furnished.

First, the officers knew that a felony was presently being committed. The officers in other analogous cases (see e.g., People v. Gallegos (1964) 62 Cal.2d 176, 41 Cal.Rptr. 590, 397 P.2d 174; People v. Tovar (1966) 239 A.C.A. 709, 49 Cal.Rptr. 79; Ovalle v. Superior Court (1962) 202 Cal.App.2d 760, 21 Cal.Rptr. 385; People v. Amos (1960) 181 Cal.App.2d 506, 5 Cal.Rptr. 451) relied upon the statements of untested informers not only to furnish the identification of the supposed culprit but also to establish the fact that a crime had been committed. Here the conversation itself indicated that the caller was then committing various criminal offenses (possession of heroin, in violation of Health & Saf.Code, § 11500; possession of heroin for sale, in violation of Health & Saf.Code, § 11500.5; offering to sell, transfer, or deliver heroin, in violation of Health & Saf.Code, § 11501).

Second, the officers knew that their informer was aware of the identity and the whereabouts of the felon. The informer's conduct at the time of his arrest in starting to drive from his house accorded with his statement that he had arranged to meet the caller nearby; the content of the phone call presupposed such a prior arrangement; and the caller clearly assumed that the informer would know who he was and where and when to meet him. The information available to the informer thus rested on a foundation as firm as that of information gathered by an informer of unquestioned reliability.

Third, the officers had no reason to...