People v. Sansone
| Decision Date | 12 March 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 58310,58310 |
| Citation | 18 Ill.App.3d 315,309 N.E.2d 733 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Gerald SANSONE, Respondent-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Thomas J. Grippando of Chicago, for respondent-appellant.
Bernard Carey, State's Atty. of Cook County for petitioner-appellee; Kenneth L. Gillis, Linda West Conley, Chicago, of Counsel.
This appeal arises from an order finding respondent, Gerald Sansone, in need of mental treatment and ordering his commitment to the Madden State Hospital pursuant to the Illinois Mental Health Code. 1 Respondent contends on appeal:
1. A determination that a mentally ill person is likely to injure others or himself requires proof of prior dangerous behavior; and in the absence of proof of prior dangerous behavior, civil commitment is preventive detention, and violative of due process;
2. The petition for emergency commitment was inadequate in that it did not meet the requirements of the Mental Health Code, and failed to meet the notice requirement of due process;
3. The standard of proof for civil commitment must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt, not preponderance of the evidence;
4. Respondent was unlawfully placed in former jeopardy in that he was found not to be in need of mental treatment in a prior civil commitment proceeding; and
5. Respondent was not certified within 24 hours after his admission to the hospital to be in need of treatment.
In an emergency petition 2 signed by Mrs. Mary Fleming, the assistant director of Social Services, Psychiatric Institute of the Circuit Court of Cook County, respondent was alleged to be in need of mental treatment. The petition stated that the facts may be established by the attached certificate of Dr. S. Lipkin. The space provided for the names of witnesses who would testify in support of the allegations in the petition was left blank. Petitioner based her belief that an emergency existed on '(h)istory of behavior and psychological and psychiatric examination done on August 18, 1972, at the Psychiatric Institute of the Circuit Court of Cook County.' 2
On August 18, 1972, respondent was admitted to the Chicago Reed Mental Health Center. Within 24 hours of his admission, respondent was examined by a psychiatrist, Dr. Vieland. this certificate does not appear in the record, but its contents were read into the record by the assistant State's Attorney:
On August 25, 1972, the State requested that the hearing on the petition be continued to allow a more thorough evaluation of respondent's condition.
On August 30, 1972, the hearing was held, and respondent moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds that petitioner failed to state adequate reasons for her belief that an emergency existed, that the petition placed respondent in former jeopardy, and that respondent was not certified as in need of mental treatment within 24 hours after his admission to the hospital. The petition was orally amended by stipulation of counsel to add that respondent demonstrated delusions, confusion and impaired judgment. The trial court then denied respondent's motions.
A psychiatrist, Dr. Sarma, testified that he examined respondent on two occasions prior to the hearing, and found him 'to be fairly orientated, but not completely orientated,' and that respondent 'showed quite * * * unrealistic thinking.' Dr. Sarma found respondent to be suffering from 'a thought disorder of a delusional nature.' Respondent had told Dr. Sarma in an interview that he had been a Senator and Speaker of the House, and had campaigned with John F. Kennedy for the vice-presidency. He also related that he was police chief of Berwyn for 2 days, and that he had been arrested by a 'cop who was crooked'; that people were always arresting him. He further related that his wife was shot on the White House lawn while he was a guard there, and that he had been shot through the head. At his first interview with Dr. Sarma, he stated that he had had an argument with him 'the last time.' He also stated that he had been arrested while he was ordering people from his property 'on a federal order,' and that persons were occupying his property illegally, and they were going to take his house, and that was the reason he was ordering them off his property. Dr. Sarma diagnosed respondent as a paranoid schizophrenic, and recommended hospitalization. He testified that respondent's statements concerning his arrests and his ordering people from his property strongly indicated that respondent believes 'people are after him.'
On cross-examination, Dr. Sarma testified that respondent was not dangerous to himself and was able to care for himself, but that he could be dangerous to others in that he 'might start a fight with someone telling them to clear off his property.' Respondent never stated to Dr. Sarma that he would fight or injure anyone. The doctor also stated that he had known delusional patients who were not dangerous to others, but 'not with this kind of a delusional material,' i.e., delusions regarding law enforcement and law officers. Dr. Sarma testified that he could not predict when respondent would become dangerous, and could not give any degree of probability of respondent's dangerousness.
On re-direct examination, Dr. Sarma testified that respondent would have difficulty functioning if he were released.
A social worker, Lynn Appelt, testified that she spoke to respondent during his first stay at the hospital (July 20, 1972 to July 28, 1972) after his arrest. Respondent was 'quite cooperative,' but did not remember the reason for his arrest. She stated that respondent told her that he had been shot in the eye 4 years ago, and that this occurred every 4 years, but that he did not know who the perpetrators were. After this interview respondent was returned to the House of Correction, and later readmitted to the hospital. On this occasion, he told the witness that one of his children had been shot, but he could not relate any facts of the shooting. He also stated that he had changed the title to his house three times because people were trying to take the house from him. Finally, he told the witness that Mary Fleming (who had signed the emergency petition) had murdered a person in his presence, and that there was a warrant out for her arrest.
On cross-examination, this witness testified that respondent was very cooperative in the hospital; that he never attempted to injure another patient. After an objection was sustained to a question regarding a prior commitment hearing, counsel made an offer of proof that the witness saw respondent in court earlier in the month, and that at that time respondent was found not to be in need of mental treatment.
Thereafter the State rested, and respondent offered no evidence. The court found respondent to be in need of mental treatment, and ordered his commitment for treatment.
The Mental Health Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 91 1/2, par. 1--11) defines persons 'in need of mental treatment':
§ 1--11. Person in need of mental treatment
'Person in Need of Mental Treatment,' when used in this Act, means any person afflicted with a mental illness, not including a person who is mentally retarded, as defined in this Act, if that person, as a result of such mental illness, is reasonably expected at the time the determination is being made or within a reasonable time thereafter to intentionally or unintentionally physically injure himself or other persons, or is unable to care for himself so as to guard himself from physical injury or to provide for his own physical needs. * * *
The provisions setting forth procedures in emergency admissions (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 91 1/2, pars. 7--1 to 7--6 provide in pertinent part:
§ 7--1. Petition--Certificate of physician
When any person is or is asserted to be mentally retarded or in need of mental treatment and in such a condition that immediate hospitalization is necessary for the protection from physical harm of such person or others, any person 18 years of age or older may, in the county where such person in need of mental treatment or mentally retarded person resides or is found, present to the superintendent of a hospital a petition stating the reasons for such conclusion. Such petition must also state the name and address of the spouse or other nearest relative or, if none, of a friend of such person asserted to be in need of mental treatment or mentally retarded, if known to petitioner and, if not known, that diligent inquiry has been made to learn the name of such persons; the name and address of the guardian, if any, of the person asserted to be in need of mental treatment or mentally retarded; and the names of the witnesses by which the facts asserted may be proved. The petition may be prepared by the superintendent of any hospital, as well as by other persons. Such petition must be accompanied by the certificate of a physician not an employee of, or financially interested either directly or indirectly in, any licensed private hospital in which hospitalization is sought, certifying that the person is in need of immediate hospitalization as in need of mental treatment or is mentally retarded and the reasons for such conclusion. * * * Such certificates must be based upon a personal examination of the person asserted to be in need of mental treatment or mentally retarded, made not more than 72 hours prior to admission. Upon representation of the petition and certificate to the superintendent, the patient may be admitted to or hospitalized...
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...which would be violative of due process rights. See Gomes v. Gaughan, 471 F.2d 794, 797 (1st Cir. 1973); People v. Sansone, 18 Ill.App.3d 315, 309 N.E.2d 733, 742 (1974). 8. After the stay had been granted (by another division of the court), a motion for reconsideration thereof was filed. T......
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...quotation marks omitted) ( Czyz , 92 Ill. App. 3d at 25, 48 Ill.Dec. 106, 416 N.E.2d 1 ) comes from People v. Sansone , 18 Ill. App. 3d 315, 323, 309 N.E.2d 733, 739 (1974), which was not even an NGRI case—it was a civil commitment under the then-Mental Health Code of 1967 (Ill. Rev. Stat. ......
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Stephenson, In re
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