People v. Satchell

• Decision Date: 04 November 1971
• Docket Number: Cr. N
• Citation: 50 A.L.R.3d 383,98 Cal.Rptr. 33,6 Cal.3d 28
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 489 P.2d 1361, 50 A.L.R.3d 383 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. John M. SATCHELL, Defendant and Appellant. o. 15533. In Bank

Page 33

98 Cal.Rptr. 33

6 Cal.3d 28, 489 P.2d 1361, 50 A.L.R.3d 383

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. John M. SATCHELL, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. No. 15533.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Nov. 4, 1971.

Brian M. Sax, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Gregory S. Jensen, Redwood City, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for defendant and appellant.

Thomas C. Lynch and Evelle J. Younger, Attys. Gen., Albert W. Harris, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert R. Granucci and Michael J. Phelan, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

SULLIVAN, Justice.

In a two count indictment defendant John M. Satchell was charged respectively with murder (Pen.Code, § 187) and assault with a deadly weapon upon a peace officer (Pen.Code, § 245, subd. (b)). As amended the indictment also alleged four prior felony convictions. Defendant entered pleas of not guilty to the two substantive counts and admitted the four prior convictions. The jury acquitted him of the aggravated assault charged in the second count of the indictment but found him guilty of murder of the second degree. Defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction.

For the reasons set forth below we have concluded that it was prejudicial error for the trial court to instruct the jury on the theory of second degree felony murder. Accordingly we reverse the judgment.

The facts relevant to our determination can be briefly stated. On July 2, 1969, defendant and the victim Jordan became engaged in a heated argument on a public street in San Francisco. The argument progressed beyond mere harsh language when defendant shoved Jordan. The latter then withdrew some distance down the street; defendant went to his automobile, which was parked nearby and got in. A few minutes later Jordan returned and walked over to defendant's car. The argument then resumed, but it was abruptly terminated when defendant emerged from the car holding a sawed-off shotgun, shot Jordan once in the chest, and then drove off. Jordan died of the shotgun wound.

At trial defendant took the stand and testified that he had shot Jordan, with whom he had had no prior acquaintance, in self-defense when the latter threatened him and made movements which defendant interpreted as efforts to draw a weapon. A defense witness testified that Jordan had a gun in his hand at the time of the shooting, which gun was taken from the victim after defendant had departed. ¹

The trial court instructed the jury on the definition of murder and malice (CALJIC No. 301 (supp.)) ² and the degrees of murder (CALJIC Nos. 302 and 302--A), but it eliminated first degree murder from the consideration of the jury by indicating that none of the felonies enumerated in section 189 of the Penal Code was here involved and by not instructing on premeditation. (See CALJIC No. 303 (supp.).) The jury was fully instructed on second degree murder, however, and the following instruction on second degree felony murder was given: 'The unlawful killing of a human being, whether intentional, unintentional or accidental, which occurs as a direct causal result of the commission of or attempt to commit a felony inherently dangerous to human life, namely, the crime of Possession of a concealable firearm by a felon, and where there was in the mind of the perpetrator the specific intent to commit such crime, is murder of the second degree. (Par.) The specific intent to commit The crime of possession of a concealable firearm by a felon and the commission of or attempt to commit such crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.' ³

The trial court went on to give a series of instructions ⁴ defining and explaining the crime of possession of a concealable firearm by a felon. (Pen.Code, § 12021; see Pen.Code, § 12001.) ⁵

Finally, the court gave instructions concerning manslaughter, heat of passion, and provocation, ⁶ and instructions concerning justifiable homicide and self-defense. ⁷ Among the manslaughter instructions given was CALJIC No. 310 (supp.), which provided in part: 'If a person While committing a felony causes another's death, malice is implied, and the crime is murder.' ⁸ (Italics added.)

The jury deliberated for two full days before reaching their verdict. Four times in the course of their deliberations the jury requested that the court reinstruct them on murder, manslaughter, and justifiable homicide. Questions put to the court by the jury foreman indicate that the jury's primary concern was the operation of the second degree felony-murder instruction in the context of the other homicide instructions. ⁹ At the end of the second day of deliberations the jury returned their verdict finding defendant guilty of second degree murder (and not guilty of the aggravated assault charged in the second count of the indictment).

Defendant moved for a new trial on the ground that the second degree felony-murder instruction should not have been given, but the motion was denied. He appeals from the judgment of conviction on the same ground among others. ¹⁰ We have concluded that his contention must be sustained.

In the case of People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, at page 783, 44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 446, 402 P.2d 130, 134, this court struck the keynote which has guided all our subsequent consideration of cases involving the felony-murder doctrine. Acknowledging the substantial body of legal scholarship which has concluded that that doctrine not only 'erodes the relation between criminal liability and moral culpability' but also is usually unnecessary for conviction, ¹¹ we went on to say of it: 'Althogh it is the law in this state (Pen.Code, § 189), It should not be extended beyond any rational function that it is designed to serve.' (Italics added.)

Applying this principle to various concrete factual circumstances, we have sought to insure that the 'highly artificial concept' (People v. Phillips (1966) 64 Cal.2d 574, 582, 51 Cal.Rptr. 225, 414 P.2d 353) of strict criminal liability incorporate in the felony-murder doctrine be given the narrowest possible application consistent with its ostensible purpose--which is to deter those engaged in felonies from killing negligently or accidentally (see People v. Washington, Supra, 62 Cal.2d 777, 781, 44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130, and authorities there cited.) Thus, for example, we have refused to apply the doctrine in cases wherein the killing is committed by persons other than the defendant or an accomplice acting in furtherance of a common felonious design (People v. Washington, Supra, 62 Cal.2d 777, 781--783, 44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130); in cases wherein the operation of the doctrine depends upon 'a felony which is an integral part of the homicide and which the evidence produced by the prosecution shows to be an offense included In fact within the offense charged' (People v. Ireland, Supra, 70 Cal.2d 522, 539, 75 Cal.Rptr. 188, 198, 450 P.2d 580, 590, fn. omitted; see People v. Wilson (1969) 1 Cal.3d 431, 437--442, 82 Cal.Rptr. 494, 462 P.2d 22, and People v. Sears (1970) 2 Cal.3d 180, 185--189, 84 Cal.Rptr. 711, 465 P.2d 847; cf. People v. Mattison (1971) 4 Cal.3d 177, 185--186, 93 Cal.Rptr. 185, 481 P.2d 193; People v. Calzada (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 603, 91 Cal.Rptr. 912,); and in cases wherein the underlying felony is not one of the six enumerated in section 189 of the Penal Code and is not inherently dangerous to human life (see People v. Phillips, Supra, 64 Cal.2d 574, 582--584, 51 Cal.Rptr. 225, 414 P.2d 353; People v. Williams (1965) 63 Cal.2d 452, 457--458, 47 Cal.Rptr. 7, 406 P.2d 647). ¹²

In the instant case it is clear that the victim was killed by defendant while he was engaged in the commission of a felony ^{13 13} other than the six enumerated in section 189 of the Penal Code. Thus, in determining whether the felony-murder doctrine is properly applicable the threshold inquiry is whether the felony in which defendant was engaged was a 'felony inherently dangerous to human life' within the meaning of People v. Phillips, Supra, 64 Cal.2d 574, 51 Cal.Rptr. 225, 414 P.2d 353, and People v. Williams, Supra, 63 Cal.2d 452, 47 Cal.Rptr. 7, 406 P.2d 647. If the felony in question was not such an inherently dangerous felony, the felony-murder instruction given was without legal foundation and the judgment must be reversed if the giving of that instruction was prejudicial. ¹⁴

At the outset it is clear that this court has unequivocally held on more than one occasion that the offense set forth in section 12021 is a felony (see fn. 13, Ante) capable of supporting a second degree felony-murder instruction. (See People v. Ford (1964) 60 Cal.2d 772, 795, 36 Cal.Rptr. 620, 388 P.2d 892 and (1966) 65 Cal.2d 41, 57, 52 Cal.Rptr. 228, 416 P.2d 132; People v. Schader (1965) 62 Cal.2d 716, 732, 44 Cal.Rptr. 193, 401 P.2d 665; People v. Robillard (1960) 55 Cal.2d 88, 98, 10 Cal.Rptr. 167, 358 P.2d 295.) It is equally clear, however--in light of our continuing concern that the felony-murder doctrine not be extended beyond its rational function--that those decisions cannot be invested with a vitality independent from the developing concept of inherent danger exemplified by our Phillips and Williams cases. (See fn. 12, Ante.) Rather, our task today is to assess the cited decisions as they relate to that concept and determine whether or not the conclusion announced by them is consistent therewith and should endure. '(T)he branch cannot bear fruit by itself, except it abides in the vine.' (John XV, 4.)

It is useful to consider the subject decisions within the chronological development of the principle of inherent danger. That principle, although it was foreshadowed in People v. Poindexter (1958) 51 Cal.2d 142, at page 149, 330 P.2d 763 was first stated as positive law in People v. Ford, Supra (1964), 60 Cal.2d 772 at page 795, 36 Cal.Rptr. 620 at page 635, 388 P.2d 892 at page 907: 'A homicide that is a direct causal result of the commission of A felony inherently...