People v. Sather, 97SA91
| Decision Date | 21 April 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 97SA91,97SA91 |
| Citation | 936 P.2d 576 |
| Parties | 21 Colorado Journal 573 The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Complainant, v. Larry Douglas SATHER, Attorney-Respondent. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Linda Donnelly, Disciplinary Counsel, James S. Sudler, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Denver, for Complainant.
George S. Meyer, Denver, for Attorney-Respondent.
The assistant disciplinary counsel and the respondent entered into a stipulation, agreement, and conditional admission of misconduct. See C.R.C.P. 241.18. The conditional admission recommended discipline in the range of a public censure to a six-month suspension from the practice of law. An inquiry panel of the supreme court grievance committee approved the conditional admission with the recommendation that the respondent be publicly censured. We accept the conditional admission, but conclude that suspension for thirty days is warranted.
The respondent was admitted to practice law in Colorado in 1976. The conditional admission states that on October 27, 1993, Kim Eygnor and Amy Pelz were seriously injured in an automobile accident caused by the admitted negligence of another driver. Pelz was pregnant at the time of the accident. As a result of the accident, Pelz's baby was born prematurely and died two days later.
Eygnor and Pelz contacted Joseph Lazzara who had been admitted to the Colorado bar on October 21, 1993. Pelz's parents were acquainted with Lazzara, who was then working at the respondent's law office. Eygnor executed a contingent fee agreement with the respondent's firm in November 1993 to represent Eygnor regarding the accident. The next month, Pelz and her parents executed a contingent fee agreement with the respondent to also represent Pelz in matters related to the accident.
On December 23, 1993, Eygnor received payment on her insurance claim for property damage to her vehicle under PIP benefits. The respondent kept about $1,225 of the payment made to Eygnor, or one-third. In the conditional admission, the respondent admits that he should not have taken a one-third contingent fee for his services related to Eygnor's PIP benefits, but should have based his fee the PIP claim as determined by the number of hours customarily charged by lawyers for resolving PIP issues. The respondent therefore stipulated that by charging Eygnor the one-third contingent fee with respect to the PIP benefits, he violated R.P.C. 1.5(a) (). Cf. People v. Calvert, 915 P.2d 1310, 1311 (Colo.1996) (). In November 1996, the respondent voluntarily refunded to Eygnor the amount he had retained plus interest.
The relationship between Lazzara and the respondent deteriorated to the point that Lazzara terminated his affiliation with the respondent on April 4, 1994. Their parting of the ways was abrupt and acrimonious and Lazzara filed an action against the respondent for amounts Lazzara claimed the respondent owed him.
Three days later, the respondent filed a complaint in district court on behalf of Eygnor, Pelz, and Pelz's deceased infant. While the question was raised whether the respondent had the authority to file the complaint, and his clients did not expect him to file the action when he did, the assistant disciplinary counsel contends that this issue is better treated as a failure of the respondent to properly communicate with his clients. The respondent admits that he did not adequately discuss the filing of the complaint with his clients, thereby violating R.P.C. 1.4(a) (), and R.P.C. 1.4(b) ().
After terminating his employment with the respondent, Lazzara associated himself with another lawyer with the intention of handling the Eygnor and Pelz cases. The other lawyer sent a letter by facsimile transmission to the respondent on April 29, 1994, advising the respondent that Eygnor and Pelz had retained his law firm as co-counsel with Lazzara, and that Eygnor and Pelz had discharged the respondent. The lawyer requested immediate delivery of the files. On the same date, Pelz and her father faxed a letter to the respondent confirming the termination of the respondent's representation and asking for the return of the file; Eygnor did the same on May 3. The respondent made the files available to the other lawyer about two weeks later.
On May 16, 1994, the respondent filed two notices of claims for attorney's liens in the district court, one lien concerning Eygnor and one concerning Pelz. See § 12-5-119, 5A C.R.S. (1991). The total lien against Eygnor's recovery amounted to $7,331.65; that pertaining to Pelz was $10,498.77.
The respondent's lien statements included billings for work performed by the respondent and by Lazzara. The respondent charged $200 per hour for Lazzara's services. The respondent has stipulated that this rate was unreasonable and that a reasonable hourly fee for Lazzara, who had just been admitted to the bar, would have been $75 to $100. While this excessive hourly rate did not significantly affect Eygnor's charges, the fees attributable to Lazzara's time added $1,300 to Pelz's bill.
Moreover, the respondent admits that he changed ten entries of Lazzara's time from 0.25 to 0.30 hours, resulting in an additional $80 in charges to the clients. Further, he charged the clients $200 an hour for Lazzara to pick up a police report, and now agrees that it was unnecessary to have a $200 per hour lawyer do this. The respondent has stipulated that the foregoing charges contained in his claim for...
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