People v. Satz, B110754
Decision Date | 04 February 1998 |
Docket Number | No. B110754,B110754 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | , 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 965, 98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 1283 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Julie Gavina SATZ, Defendant and Appellant. |
Kevin G. DeNoce, for Defendant and Appellant.
Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Carol Wendelin Pollack, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Kyle S. Brodie, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Julie Gavina Satz was convicted by plea of possessing methamphetamine. (Health & Saf.Code, § 11377, subd. (a).) She appeals, contending that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress the evidence. (Pen.Code, § 1538.5.) 1 We affirm.
Appellant used a stolen credit card number to register as a guest at the Ventura Pierpont Inn. She checked into room 301 with no luggage and spent the night. The next day the manager, Cynthia McMahan, became suspicious of the manner in which the room was obtained. She called American Express and was expressly advised that appellant was not authorized to use the credit card number. McMahan called the police and asked them to assist in appellant's eviction. McMahan and a police officer went to room 301. McMahan knocked several times and announced that she was the manager. Receiving no response, she opened the door with a master key and announced, "Management." Appellant was in the room.
McMahan told appellant that the credit card number was stolen and asked how she intended to pay for the room. Appellant said that she had no money. Two other people were in the room who had not checked in as guests. McMahan asked the officer to come in but the officer did not immediately do so.
The officer, lawfully standing in a place she had a right to be, asked if she could "check out the room." Appellant answered, The officer asked appellant if she "could look through her things." Appellant responded: "Sure, you can check anything." The officer found .41 grams of methamphetaime in appellant's purse.
The trial court found that appellant lacked standing to challenge the search and denied the motion to suppress evidence. Citing Stoner v. California (1964) 376 U.S. 483, 490, 84 S.Ct. 889, 893, 11 L.Ed.2d 856, appellant contends that the Fourth Amendment protects hotel guests from unreasonable searches. Appellant, however, has no standing to challenge the search unless she had a possessory interest in the hotel room sufficient to support a reasonable expectation of privacy. (Rakas v. Illinois (1978) 439 U.S. 128, 141, 99 S.Ct. 421, 429, 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 399-400; People v. Madrid (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1888, 1896, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 798.)
In Rakas v. Illinois, supra, 439 U.S. 128, 143, 99 S.Ct. 421, 430, 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 401, the United States Supreme Court held that (Id., at p. 143, fn. 12, 99 S.Ct. at p. 430, fn. 12, 58 L.Ed.2d at p. 401, fn. 12.) The same principle applies to auto thieves (People v. Shepherd (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 825, 828-829, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 458 [ ]; People v. Melnyk (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1533, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 570) and trespassers. (E.g., People v. Thomas (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1334-1335, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 610 [ ].)
(People v. Thompson (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1265, 1269-1270, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 334.)
Although no California court has considered the issue, federal courts have held that a hotel occupant has no expectation of privacy if he or she fails to pay the room rent due. (United States v. Allen (6th Cir.1997) 106 F.3d 695, 699; United States v. Rahme (2d Cir.1987) 813 F.2d 31, 34 [ ]; United States v. Huffhines (9th Cir.1992) 967 F.2d 314, 318 [same].) Where the occupant stays beyond the occupancy period without paying the next day's rent, he or she loses the exclusive right to privacy in the room. (United States v. Larson (8th Cir.1985) 760 F.2d 852, 854-855.)
Applying the factors articulated in People v. Thompson, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at pages 1269-1270, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 334, we conclude that appellant failed to meet her burden to show standing to challenge the instant search and seizure. The only factor that points to standing is that she closed and locked the door to room 301. The crucial factor that militates against standing is her lack of a property or possessory interest in the room because she was not legitimately on the premises.
Appellant was confronted by the manager and admitted that she had no money to pay for the room. Having defrauded an innkeeper, she simply had no right to remain on the premises. It is a public offense for a person to obtain "... accommodations at a hotel, inn, ... [or] motel, ... without paying therefor, with intent to defraud the proprietor or manager thereof, or who obtains credit at an hotel, inn, ... [or] motel ... by the use of any false pretense ...." (§ 537, subd. (a); People v. Lewis (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 599, 608-609, 167 Cal.Rptr. 326.) Her continued presence on the premises was a trespass.
The defrauding occupant has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the room, or (People v. Thomas, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 1334, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 610; United States v. Wai-Keung (1994) 845 F.Supp. 1548, 1563 [] ) Moreover, even if appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy, it was waived when she voluntarily consented to the search of the room and her purse.
Appellant nonetheless claims that her constitutional rights were violated when the manager entered the room and asked the officer to assist in the ouster. The argument lacks merit. Appellant's reliance upon Stoner v. California, supra, 376 U.S. 483, 488, 84 S.Ct. 889, 892, 11 L.Ed.2d 856 is misplaced. The case did not involve a hotel occupant who failed to pay rent. Here appellant fraudulently gained access to the room by trick and device, was caught by the manager, and admitted that she...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
People v. Hoxter
...knock-notice rule does not apply. (People v. Peterson (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 627, 631, 88 Cal.Rptr. 597; see also People v. Satz (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 322, 327, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 433 [consent obviates the need for compliance with the rule].) However, in the context of section 844, "breaking" is a......
-
People v. Ayala
...635, 895 P.2d 877; People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1172, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146; People v. Satz (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 322, 324-325, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 433; People v. Hannah (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1335, 1340, 59 Cal. Rptr.2d 806; People v. Bell (1996) 43 Cal. App.4th 754, 765, ......
-
United States v. Diaz, s. 1998–42
...room by use of a stolen credit card lacked standing to challenge the validity of a search of that room. People v. Satz, 61 Cal.App.4th 322, 324, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 433 (Cal.Ct.App.1998). The court noted that the critical factor in its analysis was the defendant's lack of a legitimate possessory......
-
Garcia v. City of Santa Clara, C 10-2424 SI (pr)
...room because [he] was not legitimately on the premises" does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. See People v.Page 18Satz, 61 Cal. App. 4th 322, 326 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). There is no legitimate expectation of privacy where the guest's "continued presence on the premises was a tres......
-
Table of Cases null
...C, §2.2.2(3)(b) People v. Sattiewhite, 59 Cal. 4th 446, 174 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 328 P.3d 1 (2014)—Ch. 1, §4.5.1 People v. Satz, 61 Cal. App. 4th 322, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 433 (2d Dist. 1998)—Ch. 5-A, §5.1.3(1)(a) People v. Sauceda-Contreras, 55 Cal. 4th 203, 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d 271, 282 P.3d 279 (20......
-
Chapter 5 - §5. Procedure for excluding evidence
...when she paid for the room with a stolen credit card and admitted she had no money to pay the bill. See People v. Satz (2d Dist.1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 322, 325-26 (hotel occupants have no expectation of privacy if they fail to pay for room). • The defendants had no standing to challenge a sea......