People v. Sawyer
| Decision Date | 02 July 1982 |
| Citation | 453 N.Y.S.2d 418,57 N.Y.2d 12,438 N.E.2d 1133 |
| Parties | , 438 N.E.2d 1133 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Robert E. SAWYER, Respondent. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Once again we face sensitive questions associated with an indigent defendant's pro se representation in a criminal case.
After trial by jury, defendant, Robert Earl Sawyer, was convicted, and thereafter sentenced to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life imprisonment on two counts of murder arising out of the fatal shooting of a grocery clerk in Stow, Chautauqua County. Upon arraignment, the County Court, on March 2, 1978, advised him of his right to counsel and gave him a week in which to secure one.
On the adjourned date, March 9, Charles Fagan, Esq., who until shortly prior thereto had occupied the post of Public Defender, in which he apparently had developed some familiarity with the charges against the defendant, appeared with him, but only at the instance of the defendant's family and solely, as he explained to the County Judge, for the purpose of pursuing the representation matter. In particular, anticipating that defendant's indigency would require the County Judge to assign counsel, he advanced the argument that a conflict of interest might render the Public Defender's office ineligible for such an assignment. This he premised on the fact that Fagan's successor as Public Defender, Richard V. Slater, Esq., had come to his new office from service as Chief Assistant District Attorney, thus, in turn, creating a vacancy which was filled when an Assistant Public Defender, Ronald J. Gibb, Esq., shifted his employment to the District Attorney's office. The Trial Judge, who, in his position, of course, had to have been aware of these personnel changeovers in the relatively well-knit legal community of nonmetropolitan Chautauqua County, rejected Fagan's contention with the observation that the court earlier made a disassociation order which separated Slater from the case. Without further exploration of the subject, the court then adjourned the case to March 16, so that defendant could determine whether Fagan was to be his lawyer.
When, on this date, Fagan again appeared but only to give the court formal notification that the defendant lacked sufficient funds to retain private counsel, the court announced the appointment of Bruce K. Carpenter, Esq., in his official capacity as Assistant Public Defendant under Slater, to represent him. The defendant promptly protested, "I don't want the Public Defender, Your Honor." Four days later, the court notified the defendant that, after further consideration, it had decided that he was not entitled to counsel of his choice, and therefore would either have to stay with Carpenter or proceed pro se. Defendant responded that he was not capable of defending himself, but still refused to be represented by the Public Defender. In the course of the colloquy, Carpenter informed the court that he had been unable to receive any co-operation from the defendant and suggested the appointment of alternate counsel to follow the case and be present at all proceedings. The court refused to do so or to appoint Fagan in place of Carpenter.
This as prelude, we move to March 22, when the case again appeared on the calendar, this time for pleading. There ensued the following:
On March 27, defendant was denied bail. At that time, he again refused the services of the Public Defender, who thereupon was formally relieved of further responsibility to the defendant in this exchange:
On at least three subsequent occasions before the trial proper eventually got under way, the court offered to make the Public Defender's office available, but the defendant was unswerving in his insistence that, while he desired counsel, he would not accept one from the Public Defender's office. 1 When his counsel-less defense did take place, the defendant proved the truth of his protestation that he was not competent to represent himself; neither disrespectful nor disorderly, he simply showed no comprehension of the applicable evidentiary or substantive law. In effect, the trial was an inquest.
It was essentially on this record that a sharply divided Appellate Division reversed and granted a new trial. In a writing by Justice Schnepp, the majority reasoned that, granted that an indigent did not have the right to select his assigned counsel, the Trial Judge had properly denied defendant's request, but that, when he relieved Carpenter from further responsibility, the Trial Judge improperly deprived the defendant of a continuing choice of either relying on counsel or proceeding on his own. In contrast, the two dissenting Justices opined that the defendant effectively waived the right to counsel (83 A.D.2d 205, 443 N.Y.S.2d 296). Though on a somewhat different rationale than the one it adopted, we believe the result the majority reached is the one that should be upheld.
Our analysis begins with the observation that it was incumbent upon the defendant to show "good cause" for the desired substitution. For, while it is true that an indigent defendant is guaranteed the right to assistance of counsel by both our Federal and State Constitutions, 2 this is not to be equated with a right to choice of assigned counsel. Thus, while Trial Judges have a duty to carefully evaluate complaints concerning court-appointed counsel and, when appropriate, effect a change of counsel, "this is far from suggesting that an indigent's request that a court assign new counsel is to be granted casually" (People v. Medina, 44 N.Y.2d 199, 207, 404 N.Y.S.2d 588, 375 N.E.2d 768; see People v. Brabson, 9 N.Y.2d 173, 180-181, 212 N.Y.S.2d 401, 173 N.E.2d 227).
Therefore, though a defendant's confidence in appointed counsel is most desirable, as it is in any client-attorney relationship, a bald profession that it is lacking is not controlling. Good cause for such an opinion must be demonstrated before a substitution need follow. It goes without saying, for instance, that most compelling would be a showing that counsel is unable to provide the defendant effective assistance, as, for example, by reason of professional incompetence or the existence of a personal impediment which handicaps his or her professional performance. Surely, a genuine conflict of interest would entitle a defendant to relief.
In the case before us now the only objection raised was the one broadly uttered under the conflict of interest rubric but at no time was there anything to even...
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