People v. Schrader, 32912

• Decision Date: 20 January 1954
• Docket Number: No. 32912,32912
• Citation: 2 Ill.2d 212,117 N.E.2d 786
• Parties: PEOPLE v. SCHRADER.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 786

117 N.E.2d 786

2 Ill.2d 212

PEOPLE v. SCHRADER.

No. 32912.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 20, 1954.

Rehearing Denied March 15, 1954.

Ray Schrader, pro se.

Latham Castle, Atty. Gen., and Bernard J. Moran, State's Atty., Rock Island (Robert A. Klockau, Champaign, Fred G. Leach, Decatur, and Robert L. Burns, McLeansboro, of counsel), for the People.

SCHAEFER, Chief Justice.

The defendant, Ray Schrader, was indicted in the circuit court of Rock Island County for the crimes of burglary and larceny. A jury found him guilty of burglary and he was sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years. Appearing pro se, he prosecutes this writ of error. No bill of exceptions has been filed.

The indictment consisted of three counts. The first charged burglary, with force, on August 22, 1949, of a storehouse of the Moline Royal Crown Bottling Company with intent to steal its property. The second count also charged burglary, but differed from the first in alleging entry of the building without force. The third count charged defendant with the larceny, on August 22, 1949, of three ball point pens, 'two Sheaffer Eversharp pencils' and one Shaeffer pen having an aggregate value of eighteen dollars, belonging to Ann Kolifitis.

The first alleged error requiring consideration goes to the legal sufficiency of the indictment. Defendant made a motion to quash it upon the grounds that it did not describe a crime and that it was fatally defective in charging separate, distinct and unrelated offenses. The motion was denied. Defendant concedes that the first two counts of the indictment properly charged him with the crime of burglary and that these two counts were properly joined. He insists, however, that the third count alleges a separate, distinct and unrelated offense, asserting that the first two counts charge a crime against a corporation; the third, a crime against an individual, and that there is nothing in any of the three counts showing that the occurrences involved were part of a single transaction.

To support his contention, defendant points out that the indictment does not allege that any property was removed from the building of the Moline Royal Crown Bottling Company, nor does it charge that the personal property of Ann Kolifitis was in the building or in the possession of the company, or that she was associated with or employed by the company. Since no connection between the company and the named individual was alleged, defendant argues that the indictment shows on its face that the offenses were separate, distinct and unrelated.

It is settled that counts for burglary and larceny may be joined in the same indictment. People v. Griffin, 402 Ill. 247, 83 N.E.2d 746; People v. Fitzgerald, 297 Ill. 264, 130 N.E. 720; People v. Goodwin, 263 Ill. 99, 104 N.E. 1018. If the two crimes are separate and distinct felonies committed in separate transactions, they should not be joined in the same indictment. People v. Fitzgerald, 297 Ill. 264, 130 N.E. 720. But if there is involved but a single transaction, the fact that the transaction may have involved both burglary and larceny does not preclude the charging of both crimes in the same indictment or even in the same count. People v. Fitzgerald, 297 Ill. 264, 130 N.E. 720; People v. Jones, 291 Ill. 52, 125 N.E. 711. And where, as here, there is nothing to show the contrary, it is presumed that the charges in each count relate to the same transaction. People v. McElvain, 341 Ill. 224, 230, 172 N.E. 131. As pertinently observed in West v. People, 137 Ill. 189, 198, 27 N.E. 34, 35, 34 N.E. 254: 'In prosecutions for felony, * * * the defendant cannot be placed on trial for separate and distinct felonies; but he cannot insist that he shall not be put upon trial on an indictment containing counts charging separate felonies, unless it affirmatively appears that they are not parts of one and the same transaction, but are separate and distinct in law and in fact.' And in People v. Dougherty, 246 Ill. 458, 463, 92 N.E. 929, 930, the court said: 'Even if it were not apparent upon the face of each of these indictments that the several counts relate to the same transaction, in the absence of anything...