People v. Schuett

• Decision Date: 13 July 1992
• Docket Number: No. 91SC471,91SC471
• Citation: 833 P.2d 44
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Sherman SCHUETT, Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 44

833 P.2d 44

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Sherman SCHUETT, Respondent.

No. 91SC471.

Supreme Court of Colorado,

En Banc.

July 13, 1992.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 10, 1992.

Gale A. Norton, Atty. Gen., Raymond T. Slaughter, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Timothy M. Tymkovich, Sol. Gen., Clement P. Engle, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for petitioner.

Lowery, Lamb and Lowery, P.C., Philip E. Lowery, Timothy J. Lamb, Denver, for respondent.

Justice QUINN delivered the Opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision in People v. Schuett 819 P.2d 1062 (Colo.App.1991), which reversed the conviction of the defendant, Sherman Schuett, for second degree kidnapping and remanded the case for a new trial on that charge. The court of appeals held that the trial court committed plain error when, in response to a jury request during deliberations for a clarifying definition of the statutory term "without lawful justification," it stated that the jury "must give this term the common meaning that the words imply." In support of its holding, the court of appeals reasoned that the term "without lawful justification" is a term of art which means that "the actions of the defendant were committed 'in the pursuit or furtherance of an illegal purpose,' " and concluded that the trial court should have so defined the term for the jury. 819 P.2d at 1066. Because we determine that the trial court's response to the jury request did not constitute plain error, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case to that court with directions to reinstate the judgment of conviction for second degree kidnapping.

I.

The defendant was indicted for and convicted of second degree kidnapping, ¹ felony theft, ² and second degree forgery. ³ Because the issues before us relate solely to the defendant's conviction for second degree kidnapping, we summarize the evidence only as it pertains to that offense.

In 1979 the defendant, while employed as an insurance agent, befriended two elderly sisters, Gail Block and Merle Lewis. These sisters, who were widows in their late seventies, owned substantial assets and received trust income of approximately $70,000 annually, as well as income from other assets. The defendant helped the women with financial matters and over the years spent more and more time with them. In 1982 the two sisters purchased a luxury home with a down payment of $70,000, and the defendant and his wife moved into the home and lived with the sisters. During the next several years the defendant managed the sisters' assets and, according to the prosecution's evidence, spent much of the sisters' wealth to support a luxurious lifestyle for himself.

In 1984 Gail Block's mental health deteriorated, and she was placed in a nursing home. Because her nursing-home bills were not being paid, the Jefferson County Department of Social Services in March 1986 petitioned the court for an appointment of a guardian for Gail Block and a conservator for her estate. While these proceedings were pending, the mental health of Merle Lewis also began to deteriorate, and the Department of Social Services became concerned about her welfare. The defendant became apprehensive at this time and stated to a friend that "Jefferson County was after him" and "after the money" and that "he had to get Merle out of the state." In July 1987 the defendant took Merle Lewis to Guadalajara, Mexico, and placed her in a rest home there. The prosecution presented evidence tending to show that the defendant's purpose in moving Merle Lewis to Mexico was to maintain control over her assets. Three doctors, called as prosecution witnesses, testified that Merle Lewis suffered from senility and was incapable of consenting to the move or making a reasonable judgment as to the potential harm from the move. The defendant testified that he moved Merle Lewis to Mexico in order to provide for her own comfort and well-being.

In September 1987, upon learning that Merle Lewis was missing from her home, the Director of the Jefferson County Department of Social Services filed a petition in the Jefferson County District Court to appoint him as her guardian and to appoint a conservator for her estate. The district court appointed the Director as guardian and the Public Administrator as the conservator. Although the defendant was informed that a conservator had been appointed for Merle Lewis, he continued to sign Merle Lewis' name on checks and to take cash from her accounts. The prosecution's evidence showed that during the years preceding the appointment of guardians and conservators for the elderly sisters, checks for approximately $1,500,000 had been written on their accounts, most of which were written by the defendant. In November 1987 Jefferson County authorities discovered that Merle Lewis was in Mexico and arranged for her return to Colorado in December of that year.

At the conclusion of the evidence the trial court instructed the jury, without objection from the defendant, on the following elements of second degree kidnapping:

Jury Instruction No. 13

The elements of the crime of kidnapping in the second degree are:

1. That the defendant,

2. in the State of Colorado, at or about the date and place charged,

3. knowingly,

4. seized and carried any person from one place to another,

5. without that person's consent, and

6. without lawful justification.

During summation the prosecution argued that the defendant acted "without lawful justification" because his purpose in moving Merle Lewis to Mexico was to keep the Jefferson County Department of Social Services "from getting control over Merle and her money." The defense, in summation, did not quarrel with the proposition that the "without lawful justification" element would be satisfied if the defendant moved Merle Lewis to Mexico "so he could end up having her money," but contended that the defendant's purpose in moving her was to provide for her comfort and welfare.

After the jury retired to deliberate, it submitted to the court the following question regarding this instruction:

Re: Jury Instruction No. 13

Please define the term "lawful justification" in part 6.

Are the terms "legal authority" and "lawful justification" synonymous[?] If not, please explain the difference.

The court, without objection by the defendant, answered the jury's question as follows:

The term "without lawful justification" is not defined in the Colorado statutes. Therefore, you must give this term the common meaning that the words imply.

Since the term "legal authority" is not included in Instruction 13, the Court cannot define it for you.

The jury returned a guilty verdict to the charge of second degree kidnapping, and the trial court sentenced the defendant to a term of five years. ⁴

The defendant appealed his conviction to the court of appeals. Although the defendant did not raise any issue concerning the trial court's answer to the jury question, the court of appeals on its own motion reversed the judgment of conviction for second degree kidnapping because, in its view, the trial court's failure to provide the jury with a clarifying definition of "without lawful justification" constituted plain error. After remarking that the purpose of the element of "without lawful justification" is "to protect those who have legal authority, based on their relationship to the victim, to seize and carry a person from one place to another" and that the term constitutes a term of art, which is not within the knowledge of ordinary persons, the court of appeals ruled that the jury should have been told that "without legal justification" means that "the actions of the defendant were committed 'in the pursuit or furtherance of an illegal purpose.' " 819 P.2d at 1066. The court then elaborated on its definition by offering the following examples:

Examples of an illegal purpose would be an asportation with intent to commit a sexual assault, ... the violation of a court order, ... or, in this case, if the jury believes the prosecution's theory that placing the victim in the nursing home in Mexico was done in pursuance of the commission of a felony, for the purpose of gaining greater or easier access to deprive her of her money.

819 P.2d at 1066 (citations omitted).

We thereafter granted the People's petition for certiorari to consider whether the court of appeals properly defined the term "without lawful justification" for purposes of second degree kidnapping and also whether the trial court committed plain error in failing to offer the jury the same or a similar definition of the term.

II.

We first address whether the court of appeals correctly held that the term "without lawful justification" means that the defendant's actions must be "in the pursuit or furtherance of an illegal purpose." In challenging the court of appeals' reversal of the judgment of conviction, the People assert that the term "without lawful justification" has a commonly understood meaning--that is, without lawful or legitimate authority--and, hence, any further explanation of the term is unnecessary. The defendant, in contrast, argues that the term "without lawful justification" does not have a common meaning and that the trial court had the duty to clarify the term for the jury. For reasons hereinafter discussed, we disapprove of the court of appeals' definition of "without lawful justification."

A.

A court's primary task in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent. People v. Guenther, 740 P.2d 971, 975 (Colo.1987); People v. District Court, 713 P.2d 918, 921 (Colo.1986). A statute should be given that construction which will permit, if at all feasible, the accomplishment of the statutory objective in proscribing certain conduct as criminal. To ascertain legislative intent, we look first to the language of the statute itself with a view toward giving the statutory language its...