People v. Sciortino, 71

• Decision Date: 28 October 1959
• Docket Number: No. 71,71
• Citation: 175 Cal.App.2d Supp. 905,345 P.2d 594
• Parties: 175 Cal.App.2d Supp. 905 PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Sam Orlando SCIORTINO, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal Appellate Department, Superior Court, Fresno County, California
• Court: California Superior Court

Page 594

345 P.2d 594

175 Cal.App.2d Supp. 905

PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Sam Orlando SCIORTINO, Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal No. 71.

Appellate Department, Superior Court, Fresno County, California.

Oct. 28, 1959.

LaBowe & Ventress, Los Angeles, for appellant.

E. Clark Savory, Dist. Atty., Fresno County, Fresno (Richard T. Ford, Fresno, of counsel), for respondent.

GOLDSTEIN, Judge.

The defendant has appealed from a judgment of conviction of violation of Section 515, Vehicle Code after trial by the Court without a jury. The evidence was not transcribed and the case comes to this Court on a settled statement of facts.

On June 12, 1959, Vernon Hulsey, the arresting officer, observed the defendant traveling north on U. S. Highway 99 near Selma, California. The arresting officer kept the defendant under observation for a distance of approximately three miles during which time he traveled at a speed of approximately fifty-five miles per hour according to the officer.

At the time of his arrest, the defendant was operating a two-axle truck tractor to which a second partially dismantled truck tractor was attached. The front wheels of the rear truck tractor had been removed, the front axle then placed upon the rear of the bed of the front truck, with the rear wheels of the second truck supporting the rear thereof. A diagram of the arrangement of the two vehicles is as follows:

NOTE: OPINION CONTAINS TABLE OR OTHER DATA THAT IS NOT VIEWABLE

The issue of fact as to speed was clearly one to be determined by the Court on disputed evidence. It has been determined adversely to the defendant. The sole remaining question, therefore, is whether the two vehicles were being transported in violation of Section 515, California Vehicle Code.

The pertinent portion of Section 515, C.V.C. reads as follows:

'Speed of Motor Truck or Truck Tractor. Any motor truck or truck tractor having three or more axles or any motor truck or truck tractor with any trailer or semitrailer, or any combination thereof, shall not be driven on any highway at a speed in excess of 45 miles per hour.' (Emphasis added) A 'semitrailer' is defined by Section 37, C.V.C. as follows:

"Semitrailer.' A 'semitrailer' is a vehicle designed for carrying persons or property and having one or more axles and one or more wheels, used in conjunction with a motor vehicle and so constructed that some part of its weight and that of its load rests upon, or is carried by, another vehicle.' (Emphasis added)

The crucial question to be determined on this appeal is whether the second truck tractor came within the definition of the word 'semitrailer' employed in Section 515, C.V.C.

It is the contention of the appellant that the statute, being a criminal statute, should be strictly construed; that the word 'semitrailer' should, therefore, be given a narrow and restricted meaning; that the truck tractor transported in the manner above described was not a semitrailer as that word is defined by Section 37, C.V.C., and that, therefore, as a matter of law, no violation of the statute has been shown.

The respondent, on the other hand, contends that the second vehicle came within the definition of a semitrailer as defined in Section 37, C.V.C.; that the manner in which the two vehicles were attached together brought them within the provisions of Section 515, C.V.C.; that the statute should be construed in the light of the evil sought to be cured rather than in a restricted sense; that it was the purpose of the Legislature to make unlawful the operation at a speed in excess of forty-five miles per hour of two vehicles of the type here involved attached together in the manner shown on the above diagram. We believe that the respondent's contention is sound and that, therefore, the conviction should be affirmed.

While it is true that expressions can be found in some of the decisions reiterating the ancient rule of strict construction of penal statutes, nevertheless, it is equally true that in this State that rule has been modified by the provisions of Section 4, Penal Code, which reads as follows:

'Construed According to Fair Import.--The rule of the common law, that penal statutes are to be strictly construed, has no application to this code. All its provisions are to be construed according to the fair import of their terms, with a view to effect its objects and to promote justice. Leg. H. 1872.'

While at first blush, it would appear that Section 4 of the Penal Code is limited in its application to that particular code, the Courts have not adopted this narrow view, but have held that the rule set forth in Section 4 of the Penal Code extends to other criminal statutes. People v. Oviedo, 106 Cal.App.2d 690, 235 P.2d 612, was a case arising under the Health and Safety Code. It was there argued by the defendant that the Court should apply the rule of strict construction to its provisions, and that Section 4 of the Penal Code should be limited in its application to that Code alone. The Court, however, held to the contrary, stating at page 693 of 106 Cal.App.2d, at page 613 of 235 P.2d:

'The next argument is that since this section is a penal statute, under the common law, it must be strictly construed, citing United States v. Resnick, 299 U.S. 207, 57 S.Ct. 126, 81 L.Ed. 127. Defendant concedes that section 4 of the Penal Code abolished the common-law rule of strict construction of penal statutes, but contends that the section only applies to the criminal statutes found in the Penal Code. The courts have rejected any such a distinction. In re Mitchell, 1 Cal.App. 396, 398, 82 P. 347; In re Galivan, 162 Cal. 331, 122 P. 961.' (Emphasis added)

The basic rule of construction is set forth in 14 Cal.Jur.2d 312 as follows:

'A statute should be construed with reference to its purpose, and the evils to be cured thereby, except as this may be defeated by the language of the statute * * *.'

In People v. Ortiz, 86 Cal.App.2d Supp. 937, at page 940, 195 P.2d 82, at page 84, the Court stated:

'* * * 'It is fundamental that the objective sought to be achieved by a statute as well as the evil to be prevented is the prime consideration in its interpretation. * * *''

In People v. Rabe, 202 Cal. 409, 261 P. 30o the Court stated that in constructing a...