People v. Scott
| Decision Date | 07 May 1859 |
| Citation | 6 Mich. 287 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | The People v. Samuel Scott |
Heard May 4, 1859 [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material]
On exceptions from the Recorder's Court of the city of Detroit.
The prisoner was tried at the December term of said court, on an information for assault with intent to murder one McDonald. Several witnesses were examined, as well for the government as for the prisoner, whose testimony established the following facts:
The prisoner and McDonald are both sailors, and met for the first time on the dock, where their respective vessels were lying on the night of the assault. They had both been drinking, and the latter was very much intoxicated. The prisoner was visiting the captain of the schooner Swan, and while on board this vessel, and at about the hour of 9 o'clock P. M., McDonald came alongside on the dock, and, in a loud and threatening tone, dared the persons on board to come off and fight him, saying, among other things, with an oath, that he could whip any of them. The captain of the Swan and McDonald had some talk about fighting, but the captain finally refused to fight, when McDonald took up a board, three or four feet long, and three or four inches wide, and said it would be a good thing to knock his brains out with, attempting at the same time to get on board the vessel. His friends now came up and took him on board his own schooner, a short distance off. McDonald's manner was such as to induce the captain to anticipate further trouble during the night, and at his request the prisoner remained on board. About 12 o'clock, McDonald came back to the Swan, and, in a wild and threatening manner, boarded her. So far as appeared by the evidence, he was unarmed at the time, but was warned by the captain not to come on board. The prisoner and the captain were forward of the main mast when McDonald came on board the vessel. The prisoner had a double-barrel gun in his hand, with which he shot McDonald in the face. The ball entered the left cheek, cutting the tongue nearly off, and passed out on the right side. The only injury done was the hole in the cheeks and wound on the tongue. The cook of the vessel swore he was in the cabin below deck, and that the prisoner called to him to hand up the gun, which he did. The gun was loaded, and the cook so informed the prisoner when he gave it to him, telling him at the same time he had better let it alone. The captain also testified that, before the prisoner fired the gun, he advised him to put it away, and that the latter replied, "Mind your own business;" at the same time cocking both barrels. The prisoner, after cocking the gun, pointed it at McDonald, and said to the captain, "Louis, give the word of command;" at the same instant firing. He was within a few feet of McDonald at this time. McDonald fell, and the witness supposed he was killed.
The testimony and argument of counsel being closed, the recorder proceeded to charge the jury, and, after commenting on the evidence, proceeded as follows: "At the common law, all killing was either murder, manslaughter, or excusable or justifiable homicide; but the humanity of modern legislation has subdivided the first into murder in the first degree and murder in the second degree. This is the subdivision under our statute; and were you trying the prisoner for the crime of murder, it would be your duty to ascertain in your verdict of which, if either of these, the prisoner was guilty. The statute under which the prisoner is informed against, reads as follows: 'If any person shall assault another with intent to commit the crime of murder, every such offender shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life, or any number of years. My view of the proper construction of this section, and of the duty of a jury in finding a verdict under it, makes it necessary that I should briefly define what constitutes murder, in either of the degrees, under our statute.
To this charge, the counsel for the prisoner excepted.
They requested the recorder to charge the jury that, in order to convict the prisoner of the crime charged in the information, they must find that, had death ensued, it would have been murder in the first degree; and if they do not so find, the prisoner must be acquitted.
The recorder refused so to charge, and the counsel for the prisoner also excepted to this refusal.
The substance of all the evidence in the case was set forth in the bill of exceptions, and there was no controversy respecting it.
New trial denied.
Ross & McEntee, for defendant:
Malice prepense or aforethought, either express or implied, is an essential element in the crime of murder under the statute, and should have had a place in the recorder's definitions. One might rightfully shoot down the burglar or the assassin, and yet the act come within the definition given of murder in the first degree.
The intent to murder is not an ingredient of murder of the second degree: 1 Ashm. 298; 2 Ibid. 231; Whart. L. of Hom., 385; and see 5 Mich. 9; 18 Ala. 532.
D. E. Harbaugh, Prosecuting Attorney for Wayne county, for the people:
The jury might convict of an assault with intent to murder, whether the crime, if consummated, would have been murder of the first or of the second degree: 19 Ohio 387; 3 Fos. 321; 5 Yerg. 340.
The respondent, having been convicted of an assault with intent to commit the crime of murder, alleged exceptions before sentence, and these are certified up for our opinion under the statute.
The first exception was taken to so much of the charge of the court as defines the various classes of homicide, and instructs the jury what facts must exist to render the accused guilty of the offense charged.
As abstract definitions, we are of opinion that the definitions given are wanting in preciseness, and would not, in many cases, be as accurate as they should be to guide a jury. But it would be very unsafe, in practice, to construe the language of a charge without reference to the facts upon which it is given. In this case, the bill of exceptions sets forth the whole facts; and in determining the legal propriety of the charge, we must bear these in mind. If the whole facts were not before us, it might perhaps be necessary to look solely at the general correctness of the rules laid down, as universal propositions.
The facts show that there was no evidence in any way tending to prove that if death had ensued, the homicide would have been either excusable or justifiable. Neither do they tend to show that it would have come within the terms of voluntary manslaughter, for there are none of the elements in the case which would reduce an intentional killing to that grade. Involuntary manslaughter was excluded, because the charge expressly informed the jury that an intention to take life was a necessary ingredient of the offense charged. The facts relating entirely to a case which, if death...
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