People v. Seals

• Citation: 263 Cal.App.2d 575,69 Cal.Rptr. 861
• Decision Date: 28 June 1968
• Docket Number: Cr. 6515
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Maurice SEALS, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 861

69 Cal.Rptr. 861

263 Cal.App.2d 575

PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Maurice SEALS, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 6515.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

June 28, 1968.

Frances L. Hancock, Hancock & Hancock, San Francisco, for appellant (under appointment of the Court of Appeal).

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen. of the State of California, Robert R. Granucci, Timothy A. Reardon, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for respondent.

ELKINGTON, Associate Justice.

Defendant appeals from a judgment of imprisonment in the state prison entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of violating Penal Code, section 12021. This section provides that one previously convicted of a felony who possesses a concealable firearm is guilty of a felony.

We state the facts in the light most favorable to the People as we are required to do following a guilty verdict. (People v. Sweeney, 55 Cal.2d 27, 33, 9 Cal.Rptr. 793, 357 P.2d 1049; People v. Caritativo, 46 Cal.2d 68, 70, 292 P.2d 513.)

Shortly after midnight, November 6, 1966, officers of the police prostitution detail were observing an apartment house in Oakland. They had information that some of its vacant rooms were being used by prostitutes in their business, and they had previously participated in prostitution arrests on the premises. They saw two known prostitutes enter the building with two men. The officers followed the four into the building, entering through double swinging doors at the front of the building. These doors were always kept unlocked. There were no 'keep out' signs. The officers apprehended the girls but the man could not be found. The officers looked into open vacant apartments. In one of these they saw a box spring and mattress on the floor; there were no other furnishings.

While the police were in the first floor hallway endeavoring 'to determine where these two people had disappeared,' defendant Maurice Seals entered through the front door. The officers recognized him and knew him to be a convicted felon. They had information that he was carrying a gun and that he was involved in allowing prostitutes to use the vacant rooms of the building. One of them called out, 'Maurice, I'd like to talk to you.'

Defendant turned into a vacant apartment. As he did the officers saw a revolver in his hand. The officers followed and saw him pushing a window open with the gun in his hand. The window opened and the officers saw defendant make a throwing motion. He was arrested and searched. The officers found seven rounds of ammunition in his pocket and two or three feet outside the window they saw a gun. The gun was loaded and its shells matched those found in defendant's pocket.

Defendant contends on this appeal, as he did below, that the entry and presence of the police officers in the apartment building were violative of the Fourth Amendment and that all evidence thereafter acquired by the police was tainted and inadmissible.

It appears to be settled that police officers in performance of their duty may, without doing violence to the Constitution, enter upon the common hallway of an apartment building without warrant or express permission to so do.

In United States v. St. Clair, D.C., 240 F.Supp. 338, federal agents had entered the 'common hallway' of an apartment house. It was contended that such an entry caused an ensuing search to be invalid under the Fourth Amendment. Ruling against the defendant the court stated (p. 340): 'The hallway, used by tenants and the public alike, was not part of the defendant's apartment. The fact that the door leading to it from the street was locked for the security of the tenants did not make the hallway part of the defendant's dwelling so that his constitutional privilege under the Fourth Amendment extended thereto. To hold otherwise would extend the protection under the Fourth Amendment beyond its purpose. Its essential aim is to protect the right of privacy in one's home and effects against arbitrary and unlawful invasion. Only unreasonable search and seizure is condemned; reasonable search is not. In urban centers--and most of the nation today is urbanized--the multi-family dwelling is the mode of life. Apartments in some structures number in the hundreds. It is not uncommon--indeed it is usual--that in some dwellings the entrance doors from the street to the common corridors leading to the apartments are locked for security reasons and entry is gained either by a key possessed by the apartment occupant, or by a buzzer system whereby one notifies the occupant who, if he desires to admit the caller, responds by releasing the locked door. In this circumstance, to hold that the common corridors, public hallways, landings and stairwells may be considered part of the tenant's home and that his right of privacy under the Fourth Amendment extends to such areas, would raise unreasonable barriers to law enforcement.

In Polk v. United States, 9 Cir., 314 F.2d 837 (cert. den. 375 U.S. 844, 84 S.Ct. 96, 11 L.Ed.2d 72) the court found no invasion of defendant's freedom from unreasonable search. There police officers, after rapping on a front door without response, 'attemped to carry out their mission by going to the rear door. They did so by proceeding through a passageway, pushing past a gate having no latch and standing ajar, and climbing an outside staircase, all of which were for the joint use of the residents of both flats in the house, and which, to all appearances, were open for the use of tradesmen and other persons having legitimate business with any of the residents.' (P. 838.) Evidence secured after the entry was held to be admissible.

United States v. Lewis, D.C., 227 F.Supp. 433, concerned narcotics agents who had followed defendant into her apartment building. They stationed themselves on a staircase where they could observe the hallway leading to defendant's apartment and from that position obtained evidence. The court held the evidence admissible stating (p. 436): 'The building with which we are concerned here was a six story elevator apartment house with a substantial number of tenants. There was nothing in the record indicating that it differed from other similar buildings in New York. In the absence of anything to the contrary, it must be assumed that, as in similar buildings, the elevators, stairs and hallways were open to anyone having business with any occupant of an apartment. * * * Whatever rights defendant had in these areas was simply to use them in common with other tenants and such members of the public as had business there. ( ) Defendant had no constitutionally protected rights of privacy in these areas which were invaded by the presence of the agents, * * *.'

In United States v. Buchner, D.C., 164 F.Supp. 836 (cert. den. 359 U.S. 908, 79 S.Ct. 584, 3 L.Ed.2d 573) police officers entered an apartment building and proceeded down the hallway to defendant's apartment where they obtained evidence. The court held that the 'protection guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment should not be extended to include 'relatively public corridors. " (P. 839.)

The Supreme Court of New Jersey in State v. Smith, 37 N.J. 481, 181 A.2d 761 (cert. den. 374 U.S. 835, 83 S.Ct. 1879, 10 L.Ed.2d 1055), held that the common hallway of a three-family dwelling was not a constitutionally protected area. There, investigating policemen observed criminal conduct while in the hallway looking through a crack of a door. The court said (p. 769): 'Whether the officers were technically 'invitees' of the owner of the house is of no moment. Rather the question is whether there was an invasion of the privacy of the owner or tenant as to which the...