People v. Seastone

• Decision Date: 29 December 1969
• Docket Number: Cr. 728
• Citation: 82 Cal.Rptr. 907,3 Cal.App.3d 60
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Richard Allen SEASTONE, Sr., Defendant and Appellant.

Page 907

82 Cal.Rptr. 907

3 Cal.App.3d 60

PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Richard Allen SEASTONE, Sr., Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 728.

Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California.

Dec. 29, 1969.

[3 Cal.App.3d 63] Richard M. Grossberg, Sacramento, for defendant and appellant.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., Edsel W. Haws and Talmadge R. Jones, Deputy Attys. Gen., Sacramento, for plaintiff and respondent.

OPINION

COAKLEY, Associate Justice.

This appeal is taken from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County entered upon a verdict of guilty of violation of Penal Code section 187, murder, in the first degree.

A grand jury indictment was filed on March 20, 1968, in which appellant was accused of murder, allegedly committed on February 16, 1968, in Sacramento County. Appellant, represented by the public defender, entered a plea of not guilty. Following trial by jury, a verdict of murder, first degree, was returned. The penalty phase was tried by the same jury which, three days earlier, had returned the guilty verdict. The jury was unable to reach a verdict as to the penalty to be imposed. The court thereupon declared a mistrial as to the penalty phase, and discharged the jury. The court continued the matter for four days for the purpose of making its determination as to whether to impose a penalty of life imprisonment or to order a new penalty trial before another jury. On the day appointed for making the determination, the court fixed the penalty at life imprisonment.

The appellant does not question the sufficiency of the evidence establishing that he killed his nine-and-one-half-month old son. To do so would be futile. The reporter's transcript reveals one of the most brutal and sadistic killings which has come to the attention of the members of this court in their many years of experience as trial and appellate court judges. Because no useful purpose will be served by recounting the brutal and revolting acts which resulted in the infant's death, we shall limit our discussion of the facts to those necessary to an understanding and disposition of the issues raised on this appeal.

I. Admission of Photographs of the Child's Bruised Body as Tending to Inflame the Jurors.

Over objection of defense counsel, photographs were admitted in evidence showing the terribly bruised condition of most of the infant's body, including face and private parts; and the infant's bloodstained garments. Appellant contends that the testimony of the physician who examined the child at the emergency hospital, and of the pathologist who later examined the child, so thoroughly described the child's bruised body, both externally and internally, that the photos served only to inflame the passions and emotions of the jurors, and, thus, unnecessarily prejudiced them against the appellant. Granted that the photographs were gruesome, that fact does not render them inadmissible. The fact that gruesome photos may prejudice a defendant in the eyes of a jury does not, alone, render them inadmissible. Oral testimony can, and frequently does, stir a sense of revulsion and contempt for the one responsible for the battered condition of a victim's body, yet, such testimony is not inadmissible for that reason alone. There is a proverb attributed to the Chinese that 'One picture is worth more than 10,000 words.' (Familiar Quotation by John Bartlett (14th ed. 1968), published by Little, Brown & Co., p. 149.) It is as true today as when written by the ancients. The trial judge believed it to be so. In overruling an objection to the photographs, he said in part:

'The jury will be much better able to understand this case, I am sure. I know that I am much better able to understand this case by observing these pictures than I would be listening to the doctor discuss the problems of the child in technical terms. * * *

'I get a much better impression of the testimony by looking at the pictures. I'm sure that will be true of the jury.'

The question, therefore, is whether the photos have probative value and are offered and admitted for that purpose, or whether their primary purpose is to inflame the jury against the defendant. The question is one for the trial court, and, in the absence of a clear abuse of that court's discretion, the admission of such evidence will not be disturbed on appeal.

In People v. Carter, 48 Cal.2d 737, 751, 312 P.2d 665, 673, the court expressed the rule in these words:

'If the principal effect of demonstrative evidence such as photographs is to arouse the passions of the jury and inflame them against the defendant because of the horror of the crime, the evidence must of course be excluded. (Citations.) On the other hand, if the evidence has probative value with respect to a fact in issue that outweighs the danger of prejudice to the defendant, the evidence is admissible even if it is gruensome and may incidentally arouse the passions of the jury. (Citations.) It is primarily for the trial court in the exercise of its discretion to weigh the importance of putting before the jury all that may reasonably assist them in the determination of guilt against the danger that they will substitute emotion for reason as the basis of their verdict.'

(See also People v. Mathis, 63 Cal.2d 416, 46 Cal.Rptr. 785, 406 P.2d 65.)

In the recent case of People v. Bradford, 70 A.C. 347, 355, 74 Cal.Rptr. 726, 730, 450 P.2d 46, 50, we find this observation:

'It has been repeatedly held to be within the trial court's discretion to determine whether the inflammatory effect such exhibits might have upon the jury outweighs their probative value.'

In People v. Adamson, 27 Cal.2d 478, 486, 165 P.2d 3, 7, the court said:

'Moreover, except in rare cases of abuse, demonstrative evidence that tends to prove a material issue or clarify the circumstances of the crime is admissible despite its prejudicial tendency. (Citations.)'

A material, indeed the principal, issue in the case was whether the killing was with malice.

'Such malice may be shown by the extent and severity of the injuries inflicted upon the victim and by the condition in which the victim was left by her attacker. This is what the People sought to establish by these photographs. * * *

'* * *

'Although the pictures of the body were admittedly gruesome, our examination of them convinces us that they not only were relevant but that they added something to the testimony of the pathologist. Whether the probative value of these photographs outweighed any possible prejudicial effect was a question to be resolved by the trial court in the exercise of its judicial discretion. In the instant case an able and experienced trial judge ruled that their probative value outweighed any possible prejudicial effect upon the appellant and also denied appellant's motion for a new trial. We are convinced that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photographs.' (People v. Taylor, 189 Cal.App.2d 490, 495--496, 11 Cal.Rptr. 480, 483--484.)

Here, the photographs not only revealed injuries so brutally inflicted as to show an abandoned and malignant heart, a test for determining implied malice (Pen.code § 188), but the injuries to the child's penis and anus tended to support the prosecution's theory of sexual motivation for the crime. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photos. The same is true with respect to the child's bloodstained garments.

II. Examination of a Witness After Oral Arguments Have Commenced.

After the prosecution and the defense rested, and the district attorney had made his opening argument and counsel for the defendant had made his argument, but before the district attorney commenced his closing argument, the trial was adjourned for the weekend. Before the trial resumed on Monday, the district attorney brought to the court's attention, for the first time, the fact that the appellant's wife had said that she, not the defendant, had inflicted the bites found on the infant's body. When the court convened, the judge informed the jury that a matter of importance had come to his attention during the adjournment, which he wished to bring to the jurors' attention. He then directed the district attorney to examine the appellant's wife. She had previously been called and had testified for the prosecution and for the defense. Upon being recalled at the court's direction, she testified that she, and not the appellant, inflicted the bites. Appellant, outside the presence of the jury, moved for a mistrial. The district attorney explained that he had known of the witness's statement previously and had assumed that defense counsel knew of it and that he, the defense counsel, had not examined her on the point for reasons of strategy. He stated that the information was contained in the supplemental report of the coroner, which, based on past experience, he assumed had been furnished defense counsel as a routine matter. The motion for mistrial was denied, the court observing that the testimony should remove the inference that appellant inflicted the bites. The jury then returned to the courtroom, and the court admonished them that:

'I suggest to you, ladies and gentlemen, that the testimony you just heard is to be considered and weighed and evaluated the same as you would weigh and evaluate any testimony which is received in this case and by the same standards. The fact that it has been brought in out of context, as it were, should not cause you to weigh it differently. Thank you.'

Appellant contends that he was prejudiced by the court's calling his wife and permitting her to testify after both sides had rested with respect to the introduction of evidence. We disagree for these reasons: (1) Had this testimony not been brought to the jurors' attention, and, after conviction, had the appellant learned that only the prosecution and its witnesses knew of the pretrial statement of appellant's spouse, appellant unquestionably...