People v. Sedgeman

• Decision Date: 03 November 2022
• Docket Number: 356351
• Parties: PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSHUA ANTHONY SEDGEMAN, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JOSHUA ANTHONY SEDGEMAN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 356351

Court of Appeals of Michigan

November 3, 2022

UNPUBLISHED

Macomb Circuit Court LC No. 2015-003739-FC

Before: Rick, P.J., and O'Brien and Patel, JJ.

PER CURIAM

Defendant appeals as of right his convictions, following a jury trial, of armed robbery, MCL 750.529, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, MCL 750.157a; MCL 750.529, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony ("felony-firearm"), MCL 750.227b. The trial court sentenced defendant as a third-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.11, to concurrent prison terms of 225 to 600 months each for the armed robbery and conspiracy to commit armed robbery convictions, and a consecutive two-year term of imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. We affirm defendant's convictions and sentences, but vacate the portion of the judgment of sentence requiring defendant to pay attorney's fees and remand for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant's convictions arise from a robbery on July 21, 2015, in Warren, Michigan. Defendant was originally convicted of the same offenses in December 2016. In a prior appeal, this Court vacated defendant's convictions and sentences and remanded for a new trial because defendant was allowed to represent himself at trial and "the record [did] not support a conclusion that defendant validly waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel . . . ." People v Sedgeman, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued September 11, 2018 (Docket Nos. 336996 & 336997), p 5.

At defendant's second trial, Ronnie Moore and Sean Neumann both testified that they, along with Justin Woodley and defendant, planned to rob someone for money and marijuana. Moore and Neumann both pleaded no contest to armed robbery and conspiracy to commit armed

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robbery and agreed to testify at defendant's trial. According to Moore and Neumann, the four of them lured the victim, a medical marijuana caregiver, to their residence under the pretext of purchasing marijuana.

After the victim arrived at the house, Moore invited her inside. Woodley and defendant confronted her at gunpoint, and the two men then stole the victim's marijuana, money, and vehicle. Moore and Neumann testified that defendant was armed with a handgun and wore a full-face ski mask, and Woodley was armed with a shotgun and wore a half-face ski mask, which was consistent with victim's description of the two men who confronted her. Neumann testified that he too was wearing a ski mask and stood by in the kitchen during the offense. After the offense, the police recovered two ski masks, a half-face ski mask and a full-face ski mask, from Neumann's car. Neumann testified that he allowed Woodley to use the car after Moore had been arrested. Moore identified the two masks as the masks worn by Woodley and defendant during the robbery. Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing revealed that the DNA found on the half-face ski mask was consistent with Woodley's DNA profile. The full-face ski mask was also tested for DNA, but the sample was too complex to make any comparison because there were many contributors to the DNA sample. Therefore, defendant could neither be included nor excluded as a contributor to the DNA on the full-face ski mask. The defense theory at trial was that defendant did not commit the offense and that Moore and Neumann conspired to testify untruthfully against defendant in order to receive lighter sentences.

The jury found defendant guilty, and this appeal followed.

II. RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION

Defendant first argues that the trial court violated his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him by prohibiting him from cross-examining Moore and Neumann regarding the maximum possible prison sentences they faced for their plea-based convictions of armed robbery and conspiracy to commit armed robbery. We disagree.

Whether a defendant was denied his right to confront a witness is a constitutional question that this Court reviews de novo, without deference to the trial court. People v Jemison, 505 Mich. 352, 360; 952 N.W.2d 394 (2020).

The federal and state constitutions protect a criminal defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him. U.S. Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20. "A defendant is entitled to have the jury consider any fact that may have influenced the witness' testimony." People v McGhee, 268 Mich.App. 600, 619; 709 N.W.2d 595 (2005) (quotation marks, citations, and alteration omitted). In general, however, a jury should not be informed of a possible punishment for conviction. People v Allan, 299 Mich.App. 205, 220; 829 N.W.2d 319, (2013), overruled in part on other grounds by People v Cain, 498 Mich. 108, citing People v Mumford, 183 Mich.App. 149, 151; 455 N.W.2d 51 (1990). "The 'fear' is that such information may cause the jury to 'compromise its integrity and render a verdict based on factors other than the evidence.'" Mumford, 183 Mich.App. at 151 quoting People v Goad, 421 Mich. 20, 27; 364 N.W.2d 584 (1984). This prohibition against information about a possible sentence conflicts with the principle that "a limitation on cross-examination which prevents defendant from placing before the jury facts from which bias, prejudice or lack of credibility of a prosecution witness might be inferred constitutes denial of the

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constitutional right of confrontation." Id. at 153 (quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted). "Where an accomplice . . . has been granted immunity in order to secure his testimony, it is clear error for the court to deny the defendant the opportunity to elicit this information at trial." People v Minor, 213 Mich.App. 682, 684-685; 541 N.W.2d 576 (1995). However, "a claim that the denial of cross-examination has prevented the exploration of a witness' bias is subject to harmless error analysis." Id. at 688.

Defendant relies primarily on Mumford, in which the trial court denied the defendant's motion in limine to permit cross-examination of a prosecution witness, the defendant's former codefendant, on the sentencing consideration that the witness received as part of a plea bargain. Mumford, 183 Mich.App. at 150. This Court held that "the trial court abused its discretion when it denied defendant's motion to cross-examine [the witness] on all details of the plea bargain, including the sentencing consideration [the witness] received in return for his testimony." Id. at 154. The panel concluded that "[t]he sentencing consideration received in return for testimony is undeniably a fact which is relevant to a witness' credibility, because it is the crux of the plea agreement." Id. at 153 (citation, quotation marks, and alteration omitted).

In the instant case, the trial court permitted defense counsel to cross-examine the witnesses regarding their sentencing guidelines and sentences, but not the maximum penalty for the offenses of which they were convicted. Defendant's right of confrontation was not violated. Moore and Neumann both entered pleas to the offenses charged and both received a below-the-guidelines sentence. However, there was no evidence that their sentences were based on a plea agreement or charge reduction by the prosecution.^[1] Moreover, defendant was able to effectively cross-examine both Moore and Neumann regarding the details of their pleas, including any sentencing considerations they received for their pleas, without revealing the maximum penalty for the armed robbery and conspiracy to commit armed robbery charges. Both witnesses testified that they pleaded as charged, but received sentences at the lower end of their guidelines range in exchange for their truthful testimony. Neumann admitted that he agreed to testify in order to receive a lighter sentence, and Moore admitted that she was facing a minimum sentence of eight or nine years, but received a minimum sentence of 54 months, which was at the low end of her guidelines range, because of her cooperation.

In sum, the trial court did not err by limiting the cross-examination by refusing to allow defendant to cross-examine the witnesses about the maximum penalty for the offenses of which they were convicted where (1) the witnesses entered pleas to the offenses as charged, which remained subject to the same maximum penalty, (2) there was no evidence of any agreement related to the maximum sentence, and (3) defendant was otherwise permitted to cross-examine both Moore and Neumann regarding any sentencing considerations they received in exchange for their pleas to show their potential bias or interest in testifying against defendant. Id. at 154.

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III. FAILURE TO REQUEST JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Defendant next argues that defense counsel was ineffective for not requesting jury instructions in accordance with M Crim JI 5.4 (Witness as Undisputed Accomplice), M Crim JI 5.6 (Cautionary Instruction Regarding Accomplice Testimony), M Crim JI 5.13 (Agreement for Testimony), and M Crim JI 5.1 (Impeachment by Prior Conviction) with respect to Moore's and Neumann's testimony. Defendant raised this issue in a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied. But because the trial court did not hold a Ginther^[2] hearing, our review of this issue is limited to mistakes apparent on the record. People v Payne, 285 Mich.App. 181, 188; 774 N.W.2d 714 (2009).

"The denial of effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of fact and constitutional law, which are reviewed, respectively, for clear error and de novo." People v Schrauben, 314 Mich.App. 181, 189; 886 N.W.2d 173 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show "(1) that trial counsel's performance was objectively deficient, and (2) that the deficiencies prejudiced the defendant." People v Randolph, 502 Mich. 1, 9; 917 N.W.2d 249 (2018). "In...