People v. Selga

• Decision Date: 22 April 2008
• Docket Number: No. C055082.,C055082.
• Citation: 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 453,162 Cal.App.4th 113
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Ronald Dean SELGA, Defendant and Appellant.

75 Cal.Rptr.3d 453

162 Cal.App.4th 113

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Ronald Dean SELGA, Defendant and Appellant.

No. C055082.

Court of Appeal, Third District.

April 22, 2008.

Law Offices of Allen G. Weinberg, Beverly Hills, and Derek K. Kowata, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorneys General, Charles A. French, and Robert C. Nash, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

SIMS, J.

Defendant Ronald Dean Selga pled guilty to stalking Christina Reyes, his ex-girlfriend and the mother of his child (Pen Code, § 646.9, subd. (a)),¹ possessing methamphetamine (Health & Saf.Code, § 11377) and misdemeanor disobeying a court order (§ 273.6). Five other counts were dismissed and defendant agreed to a stipulated sentence whereby he was granted five years probation including service of 360 days in jail. Defendant appeals from the imposition of a criminal protective order under section 1203.097, subdivision (a)(2),² issued to protect Reyes's current boyfriend, Julian Huck, contending Huck is not a person protected within that statute and therefore the criminal protective order is invalid. We agree. We shall strike the section 1203.097 protective order and shall remand the matter to the trial court to allow it to exercise its discretion whether to enter a protective order as a general condition of probation under section 1203.1.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Between November 20 and December 26, 2006, defendant threatened and harassed his ex-girlfriend, Reyes, and her current boyfriend, Huck. He threatened to physically harm them and vandalized both of their cars. On December 11, 2006, Reyes obtained a civil restraining order barring defendant from contacting her. Defendant repeatedly violated this restraining order. On December 20, 2006, defendant was found in possession of half a gram of methamphetamine.³

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 2, 2007, during the pendency of the proceedings, the court issued criminal protective orders, pursuant to section 136.2⁴ on behalf of both Reyes and Huck.

Reyes also obtained a permanent restraining order from the family law court. This order protected Reyes and her children. In light of this broader protective order, at sentencing, the court terminated the criminal protective order as to Reyes. The court also issued an order, as a condition of probation, requiring defendant to stay away from Reyes.

The court went on to modify the criminal protective order issued on behalf of Huck, changing it to a posttrial probation condition. Defense counsel objected to the imposition of this condition.

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends the imposition of a criminal protective order for Huck as a condition of probation was not authorized under sections 136.2 or 1203.097, subdivision (a)(2), and therefore must be stricken. The People claim that since the court has wide discretion under section 1203.1 the court was authorized to impose a stay-away order on behalf of Huck under this provision. While the People are right that the court enjoys wide discretion under section 1203.1 to impose a stay-away order as a condition of probation, the record demonstrates that was not the statutory basis for the court's actions in this case. Moreover, as we shall explain, violation of a section 1203.097 protective order carries sanctions not available for violation of a general condition of probation. Accordingly, we agree with defendant that the criminal protective order must be stricken and the matter remanded to the trial court.

1. Criminal Protective Order Under Section 136.2

Under section 136.2 (fn.4, ante), during the pendency of a criminal proceeding when the court has a "good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of, a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur," the court is authorized to issue a restraining order. However, section 136.2 is limited "to the pendency of [a] criminal action" because section 136.2 "is aimed at protecting only Victim[s] or witness[es].'" (People v. Stone (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 153, 159, 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 771 (Stone).)

The record demonstrates the January 2, 2007, protective orders issued on behalf of both Reyes and Huck were issued under section 136.2. In arguing against the orders, defense counsel expressly referenced section 136.2. In addition, the court utilized Judicial Council form MC-220, which expressly delineates section 136.2 as the basis for the orders pending trial. Huck qualified for protection under this section, because he was a victim of defendant's harassing and threatening conduct, and defendant had also vandalized Huck's car.

Because the only purpose of orders under section 136.2 "is to protect victims and witnesses in connection with the criminal proceeding in which the restraining order is issued in order to allow participation without fear of reprisal," the duration of such an order "is limited by the purposes it seeks to accomplish in the criminal proceeding." (Stone, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at pp. 159-160, 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 771.) That is, the protective orders issued under section 136.2 were operative only during the pendency of the criminal proceedings and as prejudgment orders. (Stone, supra, at p. 160, 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 771.)

2. Criminal Protective Order Under Section 1203.097

Under section 1203.097, subdivision (a)(2) (fn.2, ante), where defendant is convicted of a crime of domestic violence and placed on probation, the court is required to issue a criminal protective order. Because section 1203.097 is directed at the protection of victims of domestic violence, a protective order under this section may be issued for the protection of only persons identified in section 6211 of the Family Code. (§ 1203.097, subd. (a); fn. 2, ante.) These victims include cohabitants and spouses, as well as former cohabitants and spouses, those who have or have had a dating or engagement relationship, one with whom the defendant has had a child, the child of a defendant, or any other person related by consanguinity or affinity within the second degree. (Fam.Code, § 6211; fn. 2, ante.) Defendant and Huck had none of these relationships.

The record demonstrates the January 16, 2007, restraining order issued on behalf of Huck was issued under section 1203.097, subdivision (a)(2). The court again used Judicial Council form MC-220, which specifies that criminal protective orders which are issued as posttrial probation conditions are issued under section 1203.097, subdivision (a)(2). The clerk's minutes indicate one of the terms of probation was to "stay away as to Christina Reyes" and reflected the termination of the protective order for Reyes, but the minutes also reflect the requirement that defendant comply with all conditions of the modified criminal protective order. As the criminal protective order for Reyes was terminated, this could refer to only the protective order for Huck. In addition, the court indicated the existing criminal protective order for Huck would be modified from an order pending trial to a permanent posttrial probation condition.

While Huck qualified as a victim of the offenses for purposes of section 136.2, he did not qualify as a person, who could be protected under section 1203.097, subdivision (a)(2). Reyes qualified for protection under section 1203.097, as both a former girlfriend of defendant and the mother of his child. However, there is no provision in section 1203.097 for the protection of a current boyfriend of a person actually entitled to protection.

3. Protective Order Under Section 1203.097 Was Not Authorized

The People do not argue that the court could issue the order under sections 136.2 or 1203.097, subdivision (a)(2). Rather, the People contend the court was authorized to issue a stay-away order pursuant to its broad discretion under section 1203.1. It is certain that under section 1203.1, the trial court has broad discretion to impose reasonable probation conditions. [People v. Balestra (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 57, 65, 90 Cal.Rptr .2d 77.) Defendant does not claim otherwise. Defendant's claim is that the order was not issued under section 1203.1, but under section 1203.097, which was unauthorized. The People's argument is essentially that since the condition could have been imposed under section 1203.1, there is no prejudice.

We cannot accept the People's position. The criminal protective order itself advises that a violation of the restraining order may be punished as a contempt of court, a misdemeanor or a felony. By contrast, for conduct which is not otherwise criminal, as defendant points out, a stay-away order imposed as a condition of probation is not punishable as a separate offense. "The ramifications of a violation of a condition of probation are stated by the court and established by statute, i.e., that probation may be revoked. Following revocation of probation, a defendant is to receive no greater sentence than that he could have received at the time probation was granted, and the length of a sentence shall be based on circumstances as they existed at the time probation was granted." (People v. Johnson (1993) 20 Cal. App.4th 106, 112, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 628.)

We find the court abused its discretion in imposing probation conditions pursuant to section 1203.097, ordering defendant to have no contact with Huck and not come within 100 yards of him. However, we agree with the People that a stay-away order as to Huck may nonetheless be an appropriate condition of probation in light of the circumstances of the offense, which included defendant making threats to Huck and damaging his car. (See People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486, 124 Cal.Rptr. 905, 541 P.2d 545 [condition of probation that requires conduct is valid if conduct is reasonably related to crime of which defendant was convicted or future criminality].) Accordingly, we will remand the...