People v. Sexton
| Decision Date | 10 September 1998 |
| Docket Number | 109143,108749,Nos. 3-5,Nos. 108195,s. 108195,s. 3-5 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Corey Edward SEXTON, Defendant-Appellee. PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Clifton DAVIS, Defendant-Appellee. PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Bryce W. YOUNG, Defendant-Appellee. Calendar |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, David Gorcyca, Prosecuting Attorney, Richard H. Browne, Chief, Appellate Division, and Kathryn G. Barnes, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Pontiac, for People in Sexton.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, John D. O'Hair, Prosecuting Attorney, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research, Training and Appeals, and Jeffrey Caminsky, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Detroit, for People in Davis and Young.
Robyn B. Frankel, Bloomfield Hills, for defendant-appellee Sexton.
Carolyn A. Blanchard, Northville, for defendant-appellee Davis.
State Appellate Defender by Valerie R. Newman and Tracey D. Weaver, Detroit, for defendant-appellee Young.
We granted leave to determine whether this Court's holding in People v. Bender, 452 Mich. 594, 551 N.W.2d 71 (1996), should be applied retroactively. 1 Finding that it should not, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals in each case and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Marchlones told the defendant that he was not under arrest and could leave at any time. In the defendant's first statement, taken about 2:23 p.m., defendant denied all culpability.
Sexton's statement was not consistent with those of the other men. Upon being confronted with the inconsistencies, he gave another statement about 4:00 p.m., claiming that the gun slipped through the victim's fingers, fell to the floor, and discharged. He testified that he asked to telephone his father before making the second statement and was told that he could do so "later."
Defendant agreed to take a polygraph test. Marchlones reminded him that he was not under arrest and reviewed the Miranda 4 warnings. Defendant indicated that he understood and agreed to waive his rights. Before going to Southfield for the polygraph test, defendant gave a third statement, claiming that the gun discharged accidently.
Defendant was taken to the Southfield police station for a polygraph examination. Before the test began at 7:10 p.m., the polygraph examiner reviewed the Miranda rights. Mr. Sexton again stated that he understood the rights and would waive them.
In the meantime, at approximately 4:45 p.m., the defendant's father arrived at the Hazel Park police station and attempted to see his son. His request was denied. At approximately 5:00 p.m., the senior Mr. Sexton contacted his attorney, Neil Miller. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Miller called the Hazel Park Police Department, identified himself as defendant Sexton's attorney, and left a message asking that "whoever was holding" the defendant to return his call. Mr. Miller first arrived at the police station at approximately 7:00 p.m., where he informed the desk officer that he represented the defendant, that he wanted to see his client, and that he wanted all questioning stopped. Mr. Miller was told that the defendant was not at the police station, but was not told where he was. The desk officer refused to contact Marchlones. Miller left the police station and wrote a statement reiterating that he was defendant Sexton's lawyer and that he wanted all questioning stopped. He returned to the police station at 10:20 p.m. and delivered the statement to the desk officer, who paged Marchlones and told him that there was a lawyer at the station who wanted to speak with Corey Sexton. 5
After the polygraph was completed, the examiner advised Sexton that in his opinion defendant's answers had not been truthful. Defendant's response was monitored and he admitted that he intentionally shot Phillips. Sexton was then placed under arrest and again advised of his constitutional rights. Defendant stated that he understood the rights and did not want to talk to a lawyer before further questioning. Defendant gave a recorded statement in which he again admitted that he intentionally shot his cousin. This final statement was given at 11:35 p.m.
The defendant was charged with first-degree murder, M.C.L. § 750.316(1)(a); MSA 28.548(1)(a), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, M.C.L. § 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). The defense filed a motion to suppress the defendant's inculpatory statements, but the trial court found that the statements were freely, knowingly, and voluntarily made, and denied the motion. 6
Defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, M.C.L. § 750.317; MSA 28.549, conditioned on a right to challenge the admissibility of the confessions on appeal. Sexton was sentenced to twenty to forty years for the offense, plus two years for the felony-firearm violation.
While defendant's appeal was pending, this Court decided People v. Bender, supra. In an unpublished opinion per curiam, issued December 20, 1996 (Docket No. 177061), the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, concluding that suppression was mandated regarding all statements made after 5:30 p.m. 7 We granted the prosecutor's application for leave to appeal.
Defendant Clifton Davis was charged with first-degree murder, M.C.L. § 750.316(1)(a); MSA 28.548(1)(a), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, M.C.L. § 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2), in connection with the shooting death of Allen Murriel on March 10, 1993. 8 When the police arrived, the defendant and his brother were arrested. Defendant's mother retained Elliot Margolis to represent her sons. Mr. Margolis and Mrs. Davis agreed to meet at police headquarters at 8:10 p.m.
According to testimony given at the suppression hearing, the defendant signed a waiver of his Miranda rights and agreed to be interviewed at 7:45 p.m. Sergeant Deborah Monti began questioning him at police headquarters.
Mrs. Davis and Mr. Margolis met at the front door of police headquarters at 8:10 p.m. Mrs. Davis paid Margolis the agreed retainer fee, and he immediately went upstairs to locate the defendant and his brother. Margolis told the desk officer that he had been retained to represent the Davis brothers. The officer told Margolis that he was not certain of the location of Sergeant Monti or the defendant.
According to the testimony of Sergeant Monti, she began taking defendant's statement at 8:20 p.m. and finished at 9:20 p.m. Mr. Margolis' version of the facts differs slightly. He testified that he saw Monti move Edward Davis from one room to another at 8:45 p.m. According to Margolis, Monti told Margolis at that time that she had already taken a confession from the defendant.
At trial, the defendant moved to suppress the confession, contending that suppression was required because the police failed to tell defendant that his counsel wanted to see him. The trial court granted the motion to suppress pursuant to People v. Wright, 441 Mich. 140, 490 N.W.2d 351 (1992). The trial court acknowledged the possibility that the defendant had given at least part of his statement before the attorney arrived, but suppressed the entire statement.
The Court of Appeals granted the prosecutor's interlocutory application for leave to appeal. While that appeal was pending, this Court decided Bender. The Court of Appeals issued a peremptory affirmance of the trial court order. We granted the plaintiff's application for leave to appeal.
James Curenton was with a group of friends on the evening of September 7, 1991. Dondrea Smith and Joseph Broom, two of Curenton's friends, testified that a man wearing a ski mask and carrying a gun came out of an alley. Mr. Smith testified that he thought nothing 9 of this pedestrian until the gunman started shooting. At that point, the witness and the rest of the friends ran. The gunman chased Curenton and shot at him. After Curenton was on the ground, the perpetrator took a gold chain from the victim's neck and rummaged through his pockets.
On September 9, 1991, defendant was arrested for the murder of James Curenton. Defendant was placed in a holding cell for the night.
At approximately 9:20 a.m. the next morning, Mr. Young was questioned about the shooting by Sergeant Lee Caudill of the Detroit Police homicide unit. According to testimony given at the evidentiary hearing, defendant was apprised of his Miranda rights and voluntarily agreed to waive them before questioning. At the initial interview, defendant denied all involvement in the killing.
At 2:00 p.m., defendant was taken from the police station to the police crime laboratory for a polygraph examination. The defendant was again advised of his Miranda rights, and agreed to take the polygraph examination. During the examination, Caudill received a telephone call indicating that an attorney was at the police station requesting to see Bryce Young. 10 The defendant was not notified of this and the examination continued. At 6:40 p.m., defendant confessed.
The defendant's motion to suppress the statement was denied. After a two-day bench trial, defendant was convicted of second-degree murder, M.C.L. § 750.317; MSA 28.549, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, M.C.L. § 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2...
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