People v. Shah

• Decision Date: 18 January 2018
• Docket Number: 2016–1123 N CR
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Mahboob SHAH, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Term

58 Misc.3d 95

69 N.Y.S.3d 775

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Mahboob SHAH, Appellant.

2016–1123 N CR

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, New York, Second Department, 9th and 10th Judicial Districts.

Decided on January 18, 2018

Steven D. Kommor, Esq., for appellant.

Nassau County District Attorney (Jason Richards and Brian Witthuhn of counsel), for respondent.

PRESENT: ANTHONY MARANO, P.J., JAMES V. BRANDS, TERRY JANE RUDERMAN, JJ

ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

Defendant was charged with three counts of endangering the welfare of a child ( Penal Law § 260.10 [1 ] ) and three counts of assault in the third degree ( Penal Law § 120.00 [1 ] ). The charges were based on allegations that defendant had assaulted the complainant, his ex-wife, on three separate occasions; that two of the assaults had occurred in front of their minor son; and that defendant had intentionally left the son unattended in a vehicle.

At a jury trial, the People introduced into evidence the testimony of the complainant as to the alleged incidents, as well as a recording of a 911 call that the complainant had made following the last alleged assault. The People also introduced the testimony of the complainant's mother, who testified, among other things, that the relationship between defendant and the complainant was "not good" and that, on the day when the first assault had allegedly occurred, she had observed injuries on the complainant's nose and hands. Following the trial, defendant was convicted of one count of assault in the third degree ( Penal Law § 120.00 [1 ] ), the count based on the last assault, and was acquitted of the remaining charges. On appeal, defendant challenges the admission of the 911 recording and the complainant's mother's testimony.

A 911 recording is generally inadmissible on grounds both of hearsay if "admitted for the truth of the matter asserted" ( People v. Buie , 86 N.Y.2d 501, 505, 634 N.Y.S.2d 415, 658 N.E.2d 192 [1995] ) and improper bolstering of a testifying witness's in-court testimony (see People v. Smith , 22 N.Y.3d 462, 465, 982 N.Y.S.2d 809, 5 N.E.3d 972 [2013] ), unless it falls under an exception to the hearsay rule as, for example, an excited utterance (see People v. Buie , 86 N.Y.2d at 511, 634 N.Y.S.2d 415, 658 N.E.2d 192 ; People v. Clarke , 101 A.D.3d 897, 898, 957 N.Y.S.2d 164 [2012] ; People v. McCray , 53 Misc 3d 19, 26, 38 N.Y.S.3d 682 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2016] ). The excited utterance exception applies where it is shown that the statement was "made under the stress of excitement caused by an external event, and not the product of studied reflection and possible fabrication" ( People v. Johnson , 1 N.Y.3d 302, 306, 772 N.Y.S.2d 238, 804 N.E.2d 402 [2003] ; see People v. Cantave , 21 N.Y.3d 374, 381, 971 N.Y.S.2d 237, 993 N.E.2d 1257 [2013] ; People v. Brown , 70 N.Y.2d 513, 519–520, 522 N.Y.S.2d 837, 517 N.E.2d 515 [1987] ; People v. Edwards , 47 N.Y.2d 493, 497, 419 N.Y.S.2d 45, 392 N.E.2d 1229 [1979] ).

In determining whether to admit a statement as an excited utterance, the trial court must assess the nature of the external startling event, the amount of time that has elapsed between the occurrence and the statement, and the activities of the declarant in the interim, to ascertain whether he or she was under the stress of excitement sufficient to still his or her reflective faculties, "thereby preventing opportunity for deliberation which might lead the declarant to be untruthful" ( People v. Edwards , 47 N.Y.2d at 497, 419 N.Y.S.2d 45, 392 N.E.2d 1229 ; see People v. Gantt , 48 A.D.3d 59, 64, 848 N.Y.S.2d 156 [2007] ). With respect to the amount of time elapsed, "there can be no definite or fixed period of time within which the declaration must have been made, and each case must depend upon its own circumstances[; t]he test is whether the utterance was made before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent, i.e., while the nervous excitement may be supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance" ( People v. Johnson , 1 N.Y.3d at 306, 772 N.Y.S.2d 238, 804 N.E.2d 402 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see People v. Brown , 70 N.Y.2d at 521, 522 N.Y.S.2d 837, 517 N.E.2d 515 ). "Above all, the decisive factor is whether the surrounding circumstances reasonably justify the conclusion that the remarks were not made under the impetus of studied reflection" ( People v. Edwards , 47 N.Y.2d at 497, 419 N.Y.S.2d 45, 392 N.E.2d 1229 ; see People v. Brown , 70 N.Y.2d at 519–520, 522 N.Y.S.2d 837, 517 N.E.2d 515 ). Ultimately, the trial court's decision on the admissibility of a statement should not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion (see People v. Carroll , 95 N.Y.2d 375, 385, 718 N.Y.S.2d 10, 740 N.E.2d 1084 [2000] ; People v. Soriano , 121 A.D.3d 1419, 1422, 995 N.Y.S.2d 387 [2014] ; People v. Gantt , 48 A.D.3d at 64, 848 N.Y.S.2d 156 ; People v. McCray , 53 Misc 3d at 26–27, 38 N.Y.S.3d 682 ).

In the case at bar, the 911 recording was admitted into evidence under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. During the 911 call, the complainant told the 911 operator that defendant "was abusing" her and asked the operator to send "someone right away." Throughout the recording, the complainant can be heard breathing heavily. The tenor of the call reflected that the complainant was in an agitated state and was still operating under the stress of the excitement caused by defendant's assault (see People v. Leak , 129 A.D.3d 745, 746, 11 N.Y.S.3d 209 [2015] ). The lapse of approximately 30 minutes between defendant's alleged assault and the 911 call "is not, as a matter of law, too long" ( People v. Brown , 70 N.Y.2d at 521, 522 N.Y.S.2d 837, 517 N.E.2d 515 ). Although the complainant's activities in the interim cannot be determined, the evidence—including the complainant's testimony that she had previously undergone an open-heart...