People v. Shahideh

Decision Date29 December 2008
Docket NumberCOA No. 267961.,Docket No. 135495.
Citation758 N.W.2d 536,482 Mich. 1156
PartiesPEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Amir Aziz SHAHIDEH, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
Order

On order of the Court, leave to appeal having been granted and the briefs and oral arguments of the parties having been considered by the Court, we REVERSE the October 25, 2007 judgment of the Court of Appeals because the defendant waived his right to appellate relief by abandoning his insanity defense. The defendant sought a court order permitting a privately retained psychologist to examine him while he was in jail for the purpose of evaluating the merits of an insanity defense. The trial court denied the defendant's motion, holding that the defendant must first file a notice of intent to assert an insanity defense pursuant to MCL 768.20a(1) before he could obtain an evaluation by his privately retained expert. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that MCL 768.20a did not apply because "only a defendant who `plan[s]' or `intends' to raise the insanity defense at trial must comply with the procedures set forth in MCL 768.20a." People v. Shahideh, 277 Mich.App. 111, 116, 743 N.W.2d 233 (2007), quoting Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1997) for the definition of "propose."

The trial court's ruling did not prohibit the defendant from pursuing an insanity defense. The defendant was fully aware that he could file a § 20a(1) notice and continue pursuing an insanity defense. Defense counsel gathered sufficient information through his investigation to form a good-faith basis for filing a notice of intent under MCL 768.20a(1). Instead, the defendant elected to abandon an insanity defense in favor of a mitigation defense. "`[W]aiver is the "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right."'" People v. Carines, 460 Mich. 750, 762 n. 7, 597 N.W.2d 130, quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). "`One who waives his rights under a rule may not then seek appellate review of a claimed deprivation of those rights, for his waiver has extinguished any error.'" People v. Carter, 462 Mich. 206, 215, 612 N.W.2d 144 (2000), quoting United States v. Griffin, 84 F.3d 912, 924 (C.A.7, 1996). Thus, regardless of whether the trial court erred in holding that MCL 768.20a applied, the defendant abandoned the insanity defense and cannot obtain appellate relief because his chosen defense strategy failed. "Counsel may not harbor error as an appellate parachute." Carter, supra at 214, 612 N.W.2d 144. Accordingly, we REINSTATE the defendant's conviction.

TAYLOR, C.J. (concurring).

I have signed the order reversing the Court of Appeals opinion and ruling that defendant waived the issue whether any error occurred. I write separately because the Court of Appeals opinion is published and I wish to explain why I conclude that the Court of Appeals analysis of several issues is erroneous.

The substantive issue in this case is whether an incarcerated defendant has a right to a court order requiring a county sheriff to allow a privately retained psychologist to evaluate the defendant well beyond normal jail visitation hours so defense counsel can decide whether to file a notice of intent under MCL 768.20a to present evidence that the defendant was insane when the crime was committed. The trial court denied defendant's motion for such an order, ruling that under the statute defendant would be entitled to an independent evaluation only after an evaluation by the Center for Forensic Psychiatry. The Court of Appeals, however, held that the statute did not apply to defense counsel's request. It further concluded that the trial court's denial of the request violated defendant's constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel.

I disagree with the Court of Appeals and would hold that an incarcerated defendant is not entitled to a court order requiring the sheriff to make the defendant available in the jail for a period beyond that allowed by existing jail visitation policies so that the defendant may be examined by a psychologist in order to help defense counsel decide whether a notice of intent under MCL 768.20a should be filed. An incarcerated defendant has no right to an independent evaluation under MCL 768.20a until a notice of intent has been filed, and then only after the defendant is first examined at the forensic center. I also would hold that the denial of defendant's motion did not violate defendant's constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel.

I. Facts and Proceedings Below

Defendant was charged with first-degree murder, MCL 750.316(1), after he confessed to killing his girlfriend, who was found bludgeoned and stabbed to death. He was held without bond pending trial. While awaiting trial, his privately retained attorney moved for a court order to permit a privately retained psychologist to evaluate defendant in the jail to determine whether it would be appropriate to pursue an insanity defense at trial. Defense counsel explained that a court order was necessary because such an evaluation would take more time than is allowed for visits at the jail.

The prosecutor's office opposed the motion but offered to stipulate to a referral to the forensic center for an insanity examination pursuant to MCL 768.20a. Defense counsel responded that, although defendant had been diagnosed as suffering from bipolar disorder, and had previously been prescribed Prozac, Xanax, and Ritalin, he did not have a basis for filing a notice of insanity defense. Rather, he only had enough information to further investigate a possible insanity defense.

The trial court denied defendant's motion, ruling that MCL 768.20a was applicable and that defendant could only obtain an independent psychiatric examination after filing the statutory notice of intent, and after he had been evaluated at the forensic center. Defense counsel did not file an interlocutory appeal. The case proceeded to trial with the prosecution contending that the killing had been premeditated and with defense counsel arguing that defendant's actions had been impulsive, not premeditated. Defense counsel specifically told the jury that defendant was "not claiming temporary insanity."

During its deliberations, the jury sent a message to the court asking whether defendant would have been able to propose a defense of temporary insanity. The trial court advised the jury to base its decision on the evidence that had been introduced during the trial and on the law as instructed. Thereafter, the jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder.

Defendant appealed in the Court of Appeals, raising only one issue: whether the trial court's denial of his motion to permit a psychologist to have access to him in the jail for an independent psychological evaluation denied defendant his statutory1 and constitutional rights.

The Court of Appeals majority concluded that the trial court had erred and remanded the case for further proceedings.2 In particular, the Court of Appeals held that MCL 768.20a did not apply because a mere request to investigate and examine the viability or feasibility of a potential insanity defense is not sufficient to trigger the statute. The panel also held that the trial court's denial of defendant's motion had violated defendant's constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel because it had deprived defense counsel of the opportunity to investigate a potential insanity defense.

The dissenting judge, however, agreed with the trial court that MCL 768.20a did apply and that defendant had no right to an independent psychological evaluation before giving notice of an insanity defense and being examined at the forensic center. The dissenter further indicated that, even if the statute did not control, defendant was not deprived of the right to pursue a defense or to have his own expert evaluate his mental condition. This was because defendant's right to pursue an insanity defense would have been satisfied, and he could have obtained an independent evaluation, if he had merely filed a notice of intent pursuant to MCL 768.20a.

The prosecution filed an application for leave to appeal in this Court. We granted leave to appeal and asked the parties to brief

(a) whether MCL 768.20a governs a request by an incarcerated defendant for an independent psychiatric evaluation to determine whether an insanity defense may be available where no notice of intention to assert an insanity defense has been filed; (b) if the statute governs, whether the subsections of MCL 768.20a are to be construed seriatim, such that an independent psychiatric evaluation may not be requested under subsection 3 without first complying with subsections 1 and 2; and, (c) if the statute does not apply, whether the defendant's constitutional rights were violated by the trial court's decision to deny access to the defendant for an independent psychiatric evaluation while he was in jail.[3]

II. Standard of Review

Whether MCL 768.20a applied is a question of statutory interpretation. We review de novo questions of statutory interpretation. People v. Davis, 468 Mich. 77, 79, 658 N.W.2d 800 (2003). Similarly, we review de novo questions of constitutional law. People v. LeBlanc, 465 Mich. 575, 579, 640 N.W.2d 246 (2002).

III. Principles of Statutory Construction

When interpreting a statute, the Court's primary goal is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Brown v. Detroit Mayor, 478 Mich. 589, 593, 734 N.W.2d 514 (2007). The first step is to review the language of the statute. Id. If the statute is unambiguous on its face, we presume that the Legislature intended the meaning expressed, and judicial construction is neither required nor permissible. Id. It is also the case that "when construing a statute, a court must read it as a whole." Apsey v. Mem. Hosp., 477 Mich. 120, 130, 730 N.W.2d 695 (2007)....

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