People v. Sharp

• Decision Date: 07 July 1972
• Docket Number: Cr. 15540
• Citation: 7 Cal.3d 448,499 P.2d 489,103 Cal.Rptr. 233
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 499 P.2d 489 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jerome SHARP, Defendant and Appellant. In Bank

Page 233

103 Cal.Rptr. 233

7 Cal.3d 448, 499 P.2d 489

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jerome SHARP, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 15540.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

July 7, 1972.

Jerome Sharp, in pro. per., and Richard H. Levin, Los Angeles, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for defendant and appellant.

Thomas C. Lynch and Evelle J. Younger, Attys. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert F. Katz and Ellen B. Friedman, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

WRIGHT, Chief Justice.

Jerome Sharp was charged with a violation of Penal Code section 487, subdivision 1 (grand theft of personal property having a value in excess of $200). He and his court-appointed counsel waived trial by jury, and defendant was found guilty as charged and sentenced to prison. He appeals from the judgment of conviction. His principal contention is that the trial court committed prejudicial error in denying to defendant a constitutional right to represent himself at trial. We hold that there is no constitutional right to proceed pro se at trial and affirm the judgment.

Helen Zastrow owned two rings, each set with a diamond. One diamond had a value not less than $700, and the other a value not less than $200. Defendant, who was acquainted with Mrs. Zastrow, persuaded her to let him take possession of the rings on the pretext that he would have them cleaned by a jeweler friend at no cost. When he returned the rings the following evening Mrs. Zastrow noticed a difference in the appearance of the larger stone. She eventually had the rings appraised and discovered that they were no longer set with diamonds but rather with white spinels, which stones were 'as cheap as glass.'

After defendant was arrested and fully advised as to his constitutional rights, he stated to investigating officers that he knew nothing 'about the diamond rings.' He thereafter conceded that Mrs. Zastrow had delivered the rings to him and that he had personally cleaned the diamonds, but he denied he had told Mrs. Zastrow that he intended to take them to a jeweler friend. He testified at trial, however, that he told Mrs. Zastrow he would arrange to have the rings cleaned by a friend; that he gave the rings to his former fiancee for the purpose of having them cleaned; that when she returned the rings to him the following day he promptly delivered them to Mrs. Zastrow, and that he did not tell the investigating officers his former fiancee had taken possession of the rings as he wished to protect her.

Defendant contends, inter alia, that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. However, the court as trier of fact was persuaded to the contrary and, on the record presented, it cannot be said that 'upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support' the court's conclusion. (People v. Newland (1940) 15 Cal.2d 678, 681, 104 P.2d 778, 780.) We conclude, accordingly, that the judgment of conviction cannot be challenged for insufficiency of the evidence.

Defendant also contends that the trial court erred prejudicially in refusing to permit him to represent himself at trial. It appears that on the day of the trial the deputy public defender who then represented defendant advised the court of defendant's desire to represent himself. The court made an inquiry which disclosed that defendant was 48 years of age with an eleventh-grade education. Defendant also claimed to have 'some knowledge of the law.' ¹ When asked what the legal defenses During the course of the inquiry by the court defendant stated that he wished to explain, at the appropriate time, a 'lie' he told to an investigating officer. The public defender admonished defendant not to discuss his defenses at that time. However, defendant insisted that 'I did lie to the detective. I am trying to be fair to the court and to myself. I am being honest.'

[499 P.2d 491] to grand theft were, he responded that he had 'overwhelming evidence to show I am not guilty. That's all I need. . . . I know the facts better than anyone else.' It further appeared that defendant was aware petty theft was a lesser offense included in the charge of grand theft; that he wished to make some pretrial motion as to 'certain facts that I don't believe should be heard in open court'; that he believed he 'could make an opening statement that the court could recognize from a layman such as I am'; that he believed he could cross-examine witnesses and 'In fact, I have got briefs already made out to the witnesses that are involved in the case'; that he 'really did not intend to subpoena any witnesses to the court because I don't think I needed any because of the evidence I have on hand'; and that if any witnesses 'made a statement that is out of order, I believe I can object.' ²

In response to the court's advice that an attorney could better present all the evidence and defenses which defendant stated he hoped to present, defendant responded, 'I realize an attorney really has more on the ball than I do. I will grant you that, your Honor; but there are certain questions that I am afraid that he might not ask certain witnesses that are very potent, important, in regard to the case itself. What I would like to do is have an attorney sit by me and give me a little advice, if it is possible, in regard to certain questions that I may ask. . . .' When defendant stated that an attorney could be 'positively' helpful to him, and that defendant had never before represented himself, the court denied defendant's motion to appear in propria persona.

The right to appear pro se in a criminal trial has presented increasingly difficult problems for the courts. Its correlative right, the constitutional right to representation by an attorney in a criminal trial, has, in recent years, been subjected to closer scrutiny and the limits of that right have now been well defined by judicial pronouncements. The difficulties experienced in defining the limits of the right of self-representation are due in large part to the absence of language or clear inference in either the federal or state Constitution according to that right constitutional stature. Reliance is nevertheless placed upon language which grants the right to appear and defend with counsel as also constituting a grant of the opposite of that right, that is, the right to appear and defend without counsel. We conclude, for the reasons hereinafter appearing, that neither the federal nor the California Constitution confers such a right.

There can be no denial that, traditionally, a person accused of wrong-doing was and is entitled to defend against such charges, and that the right to so defend is a necessary element of those fundamental rights which are included within concepts of due process and a fair trial. The issue In England in precolonial times an accused was as a practical matter, required personally to present his defense if any was to be offered. ³ Later he was entitled to representation by counsel in all cases except those involving treason, but counsel's functions were limited. The right to put on a full defense through counsel, whatever the nature of the charge, did not become available until 1836 in England. (Radin, Anglo-American Legal History, p. 230.) The emphasis during this period of the English law was on the right to counsel and, apparently because self-representation was so commonplace, the courts were not called upon to make pronouncements as to whether the right was fundamental.

[499 P.2d 492] presented, however, is a narrower one. Although the right to defend is fundamental, our concern is with the manner in which that fundamental right is to be exercised. We are also concerned with the corollary issue of whether a particular manner of exercising the right is itself so fundamental as to require unconditional protection.

In American colonial times self-representation was also commonplace. The early declarations of rights in this area were principally concerned with the right to counsel, and did not deal directly with the right of self-representation. Perhaps the pronouncement most nearly declaring a right of self-representation is the following appearing in the Pennsylvania Frame of Government (1682): 'That, in all courts all persons of all persuasions may freely appear in their own way, and according to their own manner, and there personally plead their own cause themselves; or, if unable, by their friends. . . .' (See 1 Schwartz, The Bill of Rights, p. 140.)

The Georgia Constitution of 1777, in declaring unauthorized persons who practiced law to be guilty of malpractice, indirectly dealt with the right of self-representation in the following language: 'This is not intended to exclude any person from that inherent privilege of every freeman, the liberty to plead his own cause.' (See 1 Schwartz, The Bill of Rights, p. 300.) There is language in other colonial declarations of rights which indicate that the concern was not so much the right of self-representation as it was the right not to be compelled to employ and pay counsel in defense of criminal charges. Chapter XXII of the Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey (1677) provided: '. . . and that no person or persons shall be compelled to fee any attorney or counciller to plead his cause, but that all persons have free liberty to plead his own cause, if he please: And that no person or persons imprisoned upon any account whatsoever within this Province, shall be obligated to pay any fees to the officer or officers of the said prison, either when committed or discharged.' ⁴ (See 1 Schwartz, The Bill of Rights, p. 129.)

We are able to discern from our examination of the early declarations only vague notions of a fundamental right of self-representation which predated the federal Constitution. We now examine the federal Constitution in an effort to determine whether it guarantees such a right.

The Sixth Amendment of the United States...