People v. Sheets

• Decision Date: 13 June 1967
• Docket Number: Cr. 4227
• Citation: 59 Cal.Rptr. 777,251 Cal.App.2d 759
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Walter Louis SHEETS, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 777

59 Cal.Rptr. 777

251 Cal.App.2d 759

The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Walter Louis SHEETS, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 4227.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

June 13, 1967.

Hearing Denied Sept. 7, 1967.

Walter Louis Sheets, in pro. per.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., by Raymond M. Momboisse and Nelson Kempsky, Deputy Attys. Gen., Sacramento, for respondent.

PIERCE, Presiding Justice.

Defendant Walter Louis Sheets was convicted by a jury May 16, 1966, of the crime of first degree robbery. In addition to an appeal, defendant has submitted a writ of error coram vobis petition to this court.

A series of arguments are made, the principal one of which is that certain physical evidence was improperly admitted in evidence over objection, to wit: a revolver, ammunition and a stocking-type mask: that the admission of this evidence was prejudicial error. We discuss this contention at length below and disallow it. Other contentions are devoid of merit. Some we discuss briefly: others require no discussion. The petition for a writ of error coram vobis is not properly brought.

On January 29, 1966, a Speedee Mart store was robbed in Sacramento County. The market is one of at least two Speedee Marts located in the suburban area of the county. The robbery occurred at approximately 9:30 at night. At the time of the robbery there were two occupants of the store, the clerk 17 and a customer. The robber, having selected an item from a shelf, went to the checking station, had the sale rung up, then displayed a revolver to the clerk and demanded the contents of the cash register which he had the clerk put into a bag (approximately $200) and then departed. Before he left he warned the clerk not to follow him, that a confederate was waiting outside and 'He just said not to try anything.'

The same clerk had been robbed by someone else shortly before. He gave this as a reason for a close observation of this robber. His identification included the fact that defendant had a missing tooth and a freckle above one eye. The gun displayed had had a wooden butt. In the courtroom the clerk unhesitatingly described defendant as his assailant. The customer, a boy approximately 13 years of age, was also a prosecution witness. He described the circumstances of the robbery substantially as they had been described by the clerk. He noticed that one of defendant's teeth was missing. He did not note the freckle. He also noticed the pistol with the wooden handle. He, too, positively identified the defendant in the courtroom. Defendant has a missing tooth. Both boys also had identified the defendant prior to trial in a lineup at the police station. Their identification was positive. A photograph of the men in the lineup is in evidence. A man identified as defendant is shown as one of the persons in the lineup. A composite drawing made from the description given to the officers by the clerk is in evidence. It bears a striking resemblance to the picture of defendant as shown in the lineup photograph.

On March 3, 1966, defendant was arrested under the following circumstances. Late in the evening two deputy sheriffs in a patrol car observed a car parked in a closed service station at an intersection in Sacramento County. At that intersection there was a single business establishment open, another Speedee Mart market. The officers drove over and questioned the two men standing behind the car. One was defendant, the other a companion named Biggs. Biggs stated he was the owner of the car and gave the officers permission to search it. They did so and found nothing. The officers then radiophoned headquarters and found that defendant was 'wanted.' They made a second search of the vehicle. This time they found a revolver, ammunition and a navy watch-type cap with two holes cut in it. The gun was 'stuck between the back seat and the back seat rest with just the handle exposed.' It was 'also under a coat.' The mask was 'between the driver's seat and the front console.' Other ammunition was found in the pocket of the jacket. Both officers testified positively these items had not been there at the time of their first search. In the meantime, after the first search and while the officers were engaged in the radio call, the men had gotten back into the car. Biggs told the officers the jacket was defendant's. Both men denied any knowledge of the other items.

Defendant took the stand in his own defense. He denied guilt and claimed an alibi. He testified that at the approximate time of the robbery he was with a girl friend at a bar 12 minutes by auto away from the scene. The girl corroborated defendant's testimony. As to time her testimony is somewhat questionable. The girl, however, on recross-examination testified that defendant owned a tan jacket thus impeaching a statement which defendant had made on the witness stand that he did not possess one.

Admission of the pistol, ammunition and homemade mask into evidence was over the objection that these items did not indicate the defendant's 'modus operandi' and were therefore inadmissible. The argument is made that the gun and ammunition were not identified as being those used in the first robbery; also that at that time the robber had not worn a mask. We hold the items were properly admitted.

The case most often cited in the discussion of the rules applicable in cases of this type--where proof of another crime committed by a defendant is sought to be admitted into evidence or where evidence of the propensity of a defendant for the commission of crimes generally is offered--is People v. Peete, 28 Cal.2d 306, 169 P.2d 924. There the court said at pages 314--315, 169 P.2d at page 929: 'It is settled in this state * * * that except when it shows merely criminal disposition (People v. Cook, 148 Cal. 334, 340, 83 P. 43; People v. Glass, 158 Cal. 650, 658, 112 P. 281), evidence that is relevant is not excluded because it reveals the commission of an offense other than that charged. 'The general tests of the admissibility of evidence in a criminal case are: * * * does it tend logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference, to establish any fact material for the people, or to overcome any material matter sought to be proved by the defense? If it does, then it is admissible, whether it embraces the commission of another crime or does not, whether the other crime be similar in kind or not, whether it be part of a single design or not.' (Citations.)'

The court also holds at page 315, 169 P.2d at page 930, citing People v. Walters, 98 Cal. 138, 141, 32 P. 864: "It is true that in trying a person charged with one offense it is ordinarily inadmissible to offer proof of another and distinct offense, but this is only because the proof of a distinct offense has ordinarily no tendency to establish the offense charged; But, whenever the case is such that proof of one crime tends to prove any fact material in the trial of another, such proof is admissible, and the fact that it may tend to prejudice the defendant in the minds of the jurors is no ground for its exclusion.' (Citations.)'

In the rule stated, evidence which Merely proves a disposition on the part of a defendant to commit crimes is excluded. (People v. Kelley, 66 A.C. 225, 232--233, 57 Cal.Rptr. 363, 370, 424 P.2d 947, 955.) And even where the word 'merely' can be excluded it is settled that 'the relevancy of evidence of other crimes, and therefore its admissibility, must be examined with care. (Citation.) The evidence should be received with 'extreme caution,' and if its connection with the crime charged is not clearly perceived, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused.'

There are 'guidelines.' Evidence is admissible which tends to show guilty knowledge, motive, intent, modus operandi, or the presence of a common scheme or plan. (Idem., p. 233; 57 Cal.Rptr. 363, 424 P.2d 947; People v. Hill, 66 A.C. 531, 552, 58 Cal.Rptr. 340, 426 P.2d 908.) We recognize these as guidelines but not as inflexible, all-inclusive rules. The general rule is relevancy as stated in Peete, supra. Here, it is true, the items of evidence introduced showed criminal proclivities on the part of defendant. But they showed more than that. They were a part of a chain of circumstantial evidence which had relevancy to prove that defendant, although he had not yet 'hit' the second Speedee Mart was about to do so. Defendant, with a companion, was discovered in an automobile parked in an unlikely spot for persons with peaceful pursuits. Defendant was a person 'wanted' by the authorities. In the back of the car were the tools of the holdup man. Nearby was an open market, not a part of a large shopping center, but of a small more or less isolated intersection-compound of service stations and a market. It was late at night. The service stations were closed, the market was the only place open. A month earlier a robber identified as defendant had, in committing his crime, found that only a 17-year-old clerk was in charge of a similar Speedee Mart market.

The facts related, although very relevant, do not readily fall within the guidelines mentioned. They do not prove knowledge. They do not prove intent or motive. Cases usually come within the latter category when an act has admittedly been committed by a defendant who denies a criminal motive or intent. (See People v. Claborn, 224 Cal.App.2d 38, 44, 36 Cal.Rptr. 132.) With reference to two of the items of evidence admitted--the gun and ammunition--there is at least a suggestion that a common scheme, plan, or modus operandi was present, although most robberies are committed with weapons, and it is only because of the association of the time and place that these items have very much significance.

People v. Baskett (Oct. 1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 712, 47 Cal.Rptr. 274 (hearing by Supreme Court denied) a lewd conduct case, considered the admissibility of the testimony of a sister of the...