People v. Shipp

• Decision Date: 28 June 1968
• Docket Number: No. 67--89,67--89
• Citation: 239 N.E.2d 296,96 Ill.App.2d 364
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Gary E. SHIPP, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 296

239 N.E.2d 296

96 Ill.App.2d 364

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Gary E. SHIPP, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 67--89.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.

June 28, 1968.

George E. Sangmeister, State's Atty., Joliet, for appellant.

Francis J. Loughran, Joliet, for appellee.

SCHEINEMAN, Justice.

This is an appeal by the People from a court order which had the effect of suppressing evidence offered by the prosecution during a bench trial of a misdemeanor charge. The appellee questions the right of the State to take this appeal, a point which deserves to be considered. It was the law in this state for many years that the state had no right of appeal in a criminal case. The history of this law is reviewed in People v. Petropoulos, 59 Ill.App.2d 298, 208 N.E.2d 323, aff. 34 Ill.2d 179, 214 N.E.2d 765. The amended article VI of the Illinois Constitution, S.H.A. effective January 1, 1964, provides: 'after a trial on the merits in a criminal case, no appeal shall lie from a judgment of acquittal.' This appears to leave open to the legislature or the Supreme Court, the regulation of other appeals, not thereby prohibited.

At the time of the trial in this cause, the State's right to appeal was subject to Supreme Court Rule 604, Ill.Rev.Stat.1967, c. 110A, § 604 (formerly Rule 27, Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, c. 110, § 101.27). Included therein is the provision that the State may appeal from an order or judgment 'arresting judgment because of a defective indictment, information or complaint; quashing an arrest or search warrant; or suppressing evidence.' The Supreme Court may provide by rule for appeals to the Appellate Court from other than final judgments of the Circuit Court. Const. Art. VI, Sec. 7, People v. Lerch, 34 Ill.2d 305, 215 N.e.2d 257.

Since the defendant is normally furnished with the names of State witnesses in advance of trial, it would seem to be better practice to require that an objection to the testimony of a particular witness should be made before trial. However, we assume the trial judge felt the circumstances justified his recognition of the objection during the trial. It appears that when he sustained the defense objection, the trial judge then suspended further proceedings in the trial, thus giving the State an opportunity to perfect this appeal.

Considering the application of the quoted rule to this order of the trial court, it did have the effect of 'suppressing evidence.' We do not believe that every order of the court sustaining an objection to evidence for the prosecution is, or should be, appealable. But when it appears to the trial judge that the effect of his ruling is likely to block the prosecution entirely, so it has an effect similar to dismissing an indictment, or in arrest of judgment, then he may properly suspend the trial, as was done in this case, thereby permitting the State's attorney to seek a review. We approve the procedure followed in this case, and hold that the appeal is properly taken. This procedure is now covered and regulated by the 1967 revision of the statute, Chapter 38 Ill.Rev.Stat. article 114 and various subparagraphs thereof.

The facts are the defendant, Gary E. Shipp, a high school student, was suspected of actuating a false fire alarm. He was called to the principal's office and interrogated. He was not warned or informed of any constitutional right to remain silent, and he made an oral confession.

A complaint was filed charging him with disorderly conduct. He entered a plea...