Boynton v. Casey

• Decision Date: 23 July 1982
• Docket Number: Civ. 80-1055-B.
• Citation: 543 F. Supp. 995
• Parties: Ralph BOYNTON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Charles CASEY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maine

543 F. Supp. 995

Ralph BOYNTON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Charles CASEY, et al., Defendants.

Civ. 80-1055-B.

United States District Court, D. Maine.

July 23, 1982.

Norman S. Heitmann, III, Millinooket, Maine, for plaintiffs.

Richard H. Broderick, Lincoln, Maine, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

CYR, District Judge.

On March 18, 1980, plaintiffs brought this action in which they allege that the defendants, the principal and vice-principal of Mattanawcook Academy and the superintendent and 12 members of the Board of Directors of School Administrative District No. 67, denied due process of law to the student-plaintiff, Daniel Boynton, in connection with his suspension and expulsion from school. Defendants' first, second and third affirmative defenses contend that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; their fourth affirmative defense is that the action became moot upon Boynton's readmission to school. These defenses are considered motions to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and (6).¹

A. Summary of Allegations

Count I alleges that while attending public school at Mattanawcook Academy on December 11, 1979, Daniel Boynton was subjected to questioning by the school principal and vice-principal concerning the use of marijuana on school premises. During the questioning, which lasted more than an hour, Boynton was denied permission to leave and was not informed of "his right not to answer questions and to have his parents present at said questioning." Count I, ¶ 26. Boynton admitted using marijuana on school property and was immediately suspended from school. It is further alleged that these actions were undertaken with the intent and result of depriving Boynton of constitutional rights, including the right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Count II alleges that on or about January 2, 1980 the defendant School Committee met to consider the expulsion of Boynton from Mattanawcook Academy. At that meeting, Boynton and his parents appeared and informed the School Committee of their participation in various "substance abuse" programs since the date of the suspension. At the close of the meeting, the School Committee voted to expel Boynton, without specifically identifying the reason for the expulsion. On January 16, 1980 the School Committee met to reconsider the expulsion. The plaintiffs again appeared and informed the committee of their participation in various substance-abuse programs after December 11, 1979. The School Committee voted to reaffirm the expulsion, again without citing a specific reason. It is alleged that these committee actions were intended to and did in fact violate the constitutional rights of the student-plaintiff.

Count III alleges that the committee actions were "arbitrary, improper and an abuse of the discretion given to the Defendant School Committee" 20 M.R.S.A. § 473(5) (1964) (1975 amendment) which provided, in pertinent part, that:

Superintending school committees and school directors shall perform the following duties:

....

5. Scholars expelled. Expel any obstinately disobedient and disorderly scholar, after proper investigation of his behavior, if found necessary for the peace and usefulness of the school; and restore him on satisfactory evidence of his repentance and amendment. The school committee may authorize the principal to suspend students up to a maximum of 10 days for infractions of school rules.

Count IV alleges that on January 31, 1979² the student-plaintiff was placed on school probation, without notice or opportunity to be heard, in violation of his due process rights.

B. The Suspension (Count I)

Count I alleges that the principal and vice-principal questioned Boynton for an hour in the principal's office, during which they (1) denied him permission to leave, (2) failed to advise him of his right to remain silent, (3) failed to notify him he had a right to have his parents present, and (4) failed to notify his parents. The plaintiffs' theory appears to be that by their conduct the school officials denied Boynton the procedural due process to which he is entitled under Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975). The facts alleged by plaintiffs contradict their contentions. Boynton was given prior notice of the alleged infraction and an opportunity to be heard prior to the suspension. Instead, the thrust of the alleged denial of procedural due process seems to be that the questioning of Boynton by school officials in a restrictive atmosphere constituted a custodial interrogation which was not preceded by advice of a right to remain silent and to have his parents present.

The asserted right of the student-plaintiff to prior advice of a right to remain silent is predicated on Caldwell v. Cannady, 340 F.Supp. 835 (N.D.Tex.1972). The court in Caldwell, without citation of authority, expressed the opinion that the refusal of a student to testify before a school board concerning an alleged violation of school policy, requiring the expulsion of any student using or selling drugs, cannot be treated as an admission of guilt. Id. at 840-41 (dictum). In light of the later decision of the United States Supreme Court in Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976), the validity of the Caldwell dictum appears extremely doubtful.³

The due process violation asserted here consists not in the drawing of adverse inferences from any refusal of the student-plaintiff to answer the charges against him, but in the failure of school officials to advise him of an asserted right to remain silent. No authority is cited by the plaintiffs, and the Court can find none, supporting an extension of the Miranda rule, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), to interrogations conducted by school officials in furtherance of their disciplinary duties.⁴

Plaintiffs further allege that Boynton was "denied permission to leave" during the questioning, apparently intimating that the length (and perhaps other unalleged circumstances) of the questioning transformed it into a custodial interrogation. No authority is cited by plaintiffs and the only cases the Court has found on the point are to the contrary. See In re Brendan, 82 Misc.2d 1077, 372 N.Y.S.2d 473 (1975); People v. Shipp, 96 Ill.App.2d 364, 239 N.E.2d 296 (1966).

The third alleged impropriety in connection with the pre-suspension questioning is the failure to notify Boynton and his parents of a right to have the parents present during questioning. Plaintiffs cite no authority sustaining any such constitutional right and the Court has discovered none.

Absent special circumstances, such as where the student endangers the school or threatens academic disruption, Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975), requires that a school suspension of 10 days or less be preceded by notice of the charges and by an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 581, 95 S.Ct. at 739. The complaint alleges no lack of notice or opportunity to be heard. On the contrary, it appears from the pleadings that Boynton was notified of the alleged infraction and that he met with school officials for an hour. There is no allegation that Boynton did not understand the charges against him, or that he was coerced into an admission, or that he was not fully heard.

Plaintiffs argue that there were no special circumstances, such as threatened academic disruption, which would justify immediate suspension. But the complaint does not allege his immediate removal without notice or opportunity to be heard; rather it alleges that the suspension was imposed following the questioning and admissions. The Supreme Court held, in Goss, that:

There need be no delay between the time `notice' is given and the time of the hearing. In the great majority of cases the disciplinarian may informally discuss the alleged misconduct with the student minutes after it has occurred. We hold only that, in being given an opportunity to explain his version of the facts at this discussion, the student first be told what he is accused of doing and what the basis of the accusation is.

419 U.S. at 582, 95 S.Ct. at 740. The plaintiffs seem to suggest that school officials may not question a student in order to obtain an admission of misconduct and immediately suspend the student on the basis of the admission. Goss does not support this proposition and no other authority has been cited by plaintiffs or discovered by the Court.

C. The Expulsion Hearings (Counts II & III)

Count II of the complaint deals with the expulsion from school following School Committee meetings held on January 2 and January 16, 1980 at which plaintiffs informed the School Committee of their participation in substance-abuse programs following the December 11, 1979 school suspension. Plaintiffs allege that the school expulsion violated the student-plaintiff's "constitutional rights" by reason of the failure of the School Committee to assign reasons for the expulsion.⁵ No other procedural deficiency is alleged.

Although plaintiffs do not identify the "constitutional right" allegedly implicated, they appear to challenge the expulsion decision as a denial of substantive due process. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322-326, 95 S.Ct. 992, 1000-01, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975); McCluskey v. Board of Education, 662 F.2d 1263 (8th Cir. 1981), rev'd per curiam ___ U.S. ___, 102 S.Ct. 3469, 73 L.Ed.2d 1273 (1982); Petrey v. Flaugher, 505 F.Supp. 1087 (E.D.Ky.1981). Wood v. Strickland involved student challenges of school expulsions for violations of a regulation prohibiting the use or possession of intoxicating beverages during school activities. The Eighth Circuit held that the evidence produced at the school board disciplinary hearing was insufficient, rendering the expulsions violative of substantive due process. 485 F.2d 186, 190 (8th Cir. 1973)....