People v. Shoukron

• Decision Date: 09 December 1996
• Citation: 234 A.D.2d 400,651 N.Y.S.2d 883
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc. Respondent, v. Saadi SHOUKRON, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 883

651 N.Y.S.2d 883

234 A.D.2d 400

The PEOPLE, etc. Respondent, v. Saadi SHOUKRON, Appellant.

Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division Second Department.

Dec. 9, 1996.

Spiros A. Tsimbinos, Kew Gardens, for appellant.

Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens (Steven J. Chananie, Linda Cantoni and Johnnette Traill, of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Buchter, J.), rendered March 30, 1995, convicting him of arson in the second degree, reckless endangerment in the first degree, assault in the second degree, and criminal mischief in the second degree (five counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress identification testimony.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant's contentions, the Supreme Court properly allowed the identification testimony. The notice pursuant to CPL 710.30, along with the documents furnished to the defendant at his arraignment in Supreme Court, provided him with adequate notice of the identification testimony to be offered at trial (see, People v. Ocasio, 183 A.D.2d 921, 584 N.Y.S.2d 156). We find no merit to the defendant's claim that the initial notice, which was served at his arraignment in Criminal Court, was untimely (cf., People v. Penasso, 142 A.D.2d 691, 531 N.Y.S.2d 291). Such an interpretation of the 15-day limitation provision of CPL 710.30(2) would contradict the statute's purpose of ensuring swift and efficient determination of pretrial motions (see, People v. White, 73 N.Y.2d 468, n. 1 at 474, 541 N.Y.S.2d 749, 539 N.E.2d 577; People v. O'Doherty, 70 N.Y.2d 479, 488, 522 N.Y.S.2d 498, 517 N.E.2d 213).

Moreover, the Supreme Court correctly denied suppression of testimony relevant to the identification of the defendant by a witness who flagged down a police car and directed the officers to the defendant, inasmuch as no police arranged identification procedure occurred (see, People v. Burgos, 219 A.D.2d 504, 631 N.Y.S.2d 336; People v. Gillman, 219 A.D.2d 505, 631 N.Y.S.2d 337).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review...