People v. Singh, E041484 (Cal. App. 2/29/2008)

Decision Date29 February 2008
Docket NumberE041484
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesTHE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MANJIT SINGH, Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from the Superior Court of Riverside County, No. RIF119918, Douglas E. Weathers and Dallas Holmes, Judges. Affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded with directions.

John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Peter Quon, Jr., Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Marvin E. Mizell and Stephanie H. Chow, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION

McKINSTER, J.

Defendant and appellant Manjit Singh appeals his conviction of one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm (count 1), one count of brandishing a firearm (count 2), and one misdemeanor count of obstructing a police officer (count 4). He contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to suppress evidence as a result of an unlawful search and seizure. We agree. Accordingly, the judgment must be reversed in part, as to counts 1 and 2.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The trial evidence established the following: On the morning of October 10, 2004, Martha Carrillo was in the front yard of her Riverside home, watering her lawn. The Singh family, including defendant and his parents, lived next door. As Carrillo was struggling with her water hose, she heard voices yelling angrily. Across the street on the corner, Carrillo saw a young Black girl with a stroller, a young boy, a White man and a teenage White girl. In addition, there were two young Black men in the middle of the street; the young men were yelling at defendant, who was standing in the driveway in front of his residence.

Carrillo saw defendant reach into his right front pants pocket. Defendant withdrew a silver-colored handgun and held it at chest level. When defendant brought out the gun, the two young men backed off and ran away. The young woman with the stroller also turned around and ran away, saying, "I'm calling the police." Carrillo herself retreated inside her own home. Soon, she heard police cars. Eventually, she came out and told one of the officers that she had seen defendant with a gun.

Officer Karla Beler of the Riverside Police Department received a dispatch call about a person with a gun at approximately 10:00 a.m. on October 10, 2004. The subject was described as a Hispanic male, wearing a white tank top, a white straw hat, blue jeans and white shoes. The subject was also seen to have a leaf blower and a rake. The dispatcher reported that the subject allegedly had taken a gun from his pants pocket and pointed it at some passersby on the street.

Officer Beler proceeded in her marked patrol car to the address broadcast on her radio. She saw a man, later identified as defendant, in front of the house. Although defendant is not "Hispanic," the investigating officers testified that he "matched the description" of the suspect in the dispatch report. Defendant was wearing a white straw hat, blue jeans and shoes, but no shirt. (No tank top was recovered at the scene.) A rake and a leaf blower were lying nearby in a flower bed, however.

Officer Beler stopped her patrol car, alighted, and accosted defendant. Trying to keep things low key, she called to him, "Hey, bud, come here," when she initially contacted him. Defendant, whose lower body was already oriented toward the house, made split-second eye contact with the officer, and walked away. Defendant walked around the side of the house, through the gates, toward the open garage of the residence. Officer Beler never saw defendant's hands because his hands were in front of him, i.e., his body was between his hands and the officer as he walked away.

As defendant left the officer's line of sight, she drew her weapon and called for backup. A short time later, approximately 45 seconds to one minute, defendant reemerged from around the side of the house. Officer Beler ordered defendant to show his hands and walk toward her. Defendant complied. As defendant walked toward the officer, she could see that his pants pockets were bulging. She ordered defendant to kneel and then to lie face down on the ground.

Another officer arrived. Officer Beler was then able to approach defendant, handcuff him, and search his pockets and waistband. She asked defendant if he had a gun; he said no. In defendant's pockets, Officer Beler found leather gloves, combs, and keys, but no gun. After four or five minutes, defendant was placed in the back of a patrol car.

Officer Beler asked if there was anyone else in the residence; defendant said no. He stated that the residence was his parents' house, but they were at church. Officer Beler asked defendant what had happened earlier that morning, but defendant did not specifically answer the question. Instead, he made random general statements, saying, "Those f***ing n*****s. I was minding my own business. This is my house."

Other police units arrived. "[B]ecause of the open garage and because of where [defendant] went when [Officer Beler] arrived," the other officers conducted a "protective sweep" of the area "for other suspects or any victims." The "protective sweep" turned up nothing. It was then that Officer Beler had another officer stay with defendant, while she went to the garage to search for the gun.

Officer Beler's purpose was specifically to conduct a search for the suspected gun where she had last seen defendant. A flatbed truck was plainly visible parked inside the open garage. Some tree clippings and empty trash cans were on the bed of the truck. Officer Beler testified that, at some point, Officer Skipper got into the bed of the truck, searching through the trash cans and clippings. A trash can and a trash bag were removed from the bed of the truck during the search. Eventually, Officer Skipper stepped on a hard object in the bed of the truck. He found a gun under the branches in the truck bed, above the left rear wheel area.

After officers found the gun, they ran defendant's information through dispatch and discovered that he had previously been convicted of a felony. They then arrested defendant for being a felon in possession of a firearm.

In 1993, defendant had suffered a felony conviction for selling narcotics.

Defendant was charged with one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, §§ 12001.6, 12021, subd. (a)(1)); two counts of brandishing a firearm (Pen. Code, § 417, subd. (a)(2)), one count each as to John Doe No. 1 and John Doe No. 2, presumably, the two young Black men in the street who were yelling at defendant; and one misdemeanor count of obstructing a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)). A 1985 prior felony conviction for assault was also alleged as a strike prior.

Before trial, defendant had moved to suppress the gun recovered during Officer Beler's search of the garage, as an unreasonable warrantless search. The People opposed the motion. The opposition papers did not raise the issue of standing, but at the hearing, the People orally raised the contention that defendant lacked standing to object to the search. The prosecutor argued that the residential property belonged to defendant's parents, not to defendant, and that defendant lived in a separate portion of the residence premises. Additionally, defendant had stated that the garage was his parents' garage.

The trial court1 found that defendant lacked standing to contest the search of the garage.

The court also found, "[b]ased upon the totality of the circumstances," that "[w]hen the contact with the suspect [was] made, his hands [were] concealed from the officer[]." Defendant then went out of the officer's sight toward the open garage, and reemerged about a minute later. "[A]t that point in time he now becomes compliant, but there is nothing in his hand . . . . [¶] It seems reasonable . . . for the officer[] to suspect or consider that in all likelihood the defendant entered into the garage to dispose of a gun or some other form of contraband and a reasonable belief, based upon the brief amount of time that he was out of sight, that whatever contraband or objects he had were likely to have been disposed of in the garage." The court deemed the search reasonable "in the interest of public safety and officer safety as well as to avoid any loss or destruction of evidence." The court therefore denied the motion.

Defendant moved for reconsideration of the ruling, on the ground that the motion had been denied on an erroneous procedural issue (standing). Defendant argued that there had therefore been no substantive ruling on the merits of his suppression motion. The court denied the motion for reconsideration.

A jury found defendant guilty on count 1, felon in possession of a firearm; guilty on count 2, brandishing a firearm (against John Doe No. 1); and guilty on count 4, misdemeanor obstructing a police officer. The jury acquitted defendant on count 3, brandishing a firearm (against John Doe No. 2).

Defendant asked the court2 to exercise its discretion to dismiss his strike prior; the conviction was over 20 years old at the time of sentencing. Defense counsel argued that defendant should be admitted to probation. The court declined the request to dismiss the strike prior. The court sentenced defendant to the middle term of two years on count 1, doubled to four years as a second strike. He was sentenced to one year each on counts 2 and 4, to be served concurrently with the sentence on count 1.

Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

ANALYSIS
I. The Court Erroneously Denied Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence
A. Standard of Review

"`"An appellate court's review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is governed by well-settled...

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