People v. Singletary

• Decision Date: 25 October 1976
• Citation: 54 A.D.2d 767,387 N.Y.S.2d 878
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Ronald SINGLETARY, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 878

387 N.Y.S.2d 878

54 A.D.2d 767

The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Ronald SINGLETARY, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

Oct. 25, 1976.

Stephen H. Gersowitz, New York City, for appellant.

Eugene Gold, Dist. Atty., Brooklyn (Douglas Eric Grover, Brooklyn, of counsel), for respondent.

Before HOPKINS, Acting P.J., and MARTUSCELLO, COHALAN, DAMIANI and SHAPIRO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered February 13, 1974, convicting him of robbery in the first degree (2 counts), and possession of weapons, etc., as a felony, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Judgment affirmed.

On August 26, 1971 defendant, armed with a revolver and accompanied by three accomplices, entered a hardware store, drew a weapon on the store employees and announced that 'it's a stick-up'. A short while thereafter, defendant was arrested while cowering in a candy store telephone booth some blocks away and was taken to the station house, where he was identified by his victims. The weapon used by him in the robbery was found on a nearly street.

A mistrial was declared during defendant's first trial when counsel would not accede to the substitution of an alternate for a juror who could no longer continue deliberations. Defendant contends that the record of that aborted trial does not establish an intelligent waiver of his right not to be placed twice in jeopardy. However, in light of the extensive examination of the juror as to the necessity for his departure, and of defendant's express assent to the mistrial, he cannot complain that his decision was an involuntary or an unknowing one (CPL 270.35).

Defendant demanded a hearing on his claim that he was denied a speedy trial. However, the procedural history of this case establishes that the blame for the delay rests with defendant himself, who, throughout these proceedings, continually used tactics calculated to effect that end. Where the fault lies within defendant's control, where the gravity of the crime is unquestioned and where defendant, apprehended moments after the robbery, can establish no prejudice, the motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial has to be denied (see CPL 30.30, subd. 4, par. (a); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101; People v. Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 442, 373 N.Y.S.2d 79, 335 N.E.2d 303; People v. Timothy, 34 N.Y.2d 867, 359 N.Y.S.2d 114, 316 N.E.2d 580).

Defendant next contends that the introduction of testimony as to the method of identification employed by the police violated the prohibition against testimony which is introduced solely to bolster an eye-witness' identification (see People v. Trowbridge, 305 N.Y. 471, 113 N.E.2d 841). Trowbridge, however, does not bar such evidence when it is introduced for a legitimate purpose, as was the case here. The testimony elicited by the prosecutor as to the station house lineup was introduced to rebut matter raised by the defense in the first instance. This was not error. Matters raised by defendant may be pursued by the prosecutor even though, initially, the People may be barred from invoking an original line of inquiry as to the subject (cf. People v. Williams, 50 A.D.2d 911, 377 N.Y.S.2d 183; People v. Freeland, 45 A.D.2d 814, 356 N.Y.S.2d 912; People v. Ali, 29 A.D.2d 779, 287 N.Y.S.2d 899).

Defendant contends that his case was prejudiced by the...