People v. Singleton

• Decision Date: 11 October 1977
• Citation: 42 N.Y.2d 466,398 N.Y.S.2d 871,368 N.E.2d 1237
• Parties: , 368 N.E.2d 1237 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Paul SINGLETON, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 871

398 N.Y.S.2d 871

42 N.Y.2d 466, 368 N.E.2d 1237

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Paul SINGLETON, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 11, 1977.

Martin L. Schmukler, New York City, for appellant.

Denis Dillon, Dist. Atty. (William C. Donnino, Mineola, and Anthony J. Girese, New York City, of counsel), for respondent.

JONES, Judge

We hold that the trial court properly determined that defendant was entitled to a disclosure of the identity of the informer in the circumstances of this case and that the indictment was properly dismissed in the interest of justice when the People elected not to make such disclosure. Additionally the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy would mandate reinstatement of the order dismissing the indictment.

With the assistance of a confidential informer, two undercover police officers set up a prearranged meeting for the purchase of $1,000 of heroin from one Gregory Bruce, known to the police to be a seller. As arranged, the meeting took place at a shopping center at 9:00 p. m. When the police and the informer met Bruce at the appointed place, defendant and Bruce's cousin were also found to be present. Neither defendant nor the cousin had previously been known to either undercover officer or to the informer, and the prearrangements had not contemplated their participation or presence. One of the officers asked Bruce whether he had the heroin. It was the officer's testimony that when Bruce responded in the affirmative defendant removed his hat and held it out across his chest toward Bruce, whereupon Bruce reached in and took a package (later proved to contain heroin) out of defendant's hat. Bruce immediately took off his own ski cap and placed the package in the ski cap. Bruce then proceeded with the two undercover officers and the informer to the informer's car to make delivery and to close the transaction. Defendant told Bruce to get the money while he went to call a cab. The police officer tasted a bit of the white substance in the package and then told his fellow officer to get the money from the trunk of the car. The insertion of the key in the trunk was the prearranged signal on which detectives staked out nearby closed in, took possession of the package of heroin, and arrested both undercover officers, the informer, Bruce, his cousin and defendant.

At trial much attention and controversy focused on the undercover officers' testimony on the witness stand that defendant had removed his hat and held it out to Bruce and that Bruce had withdrawn the heroin package from that hat. The notes made by one of the officers the night of the arrest contained no mention of any hat, or that defendant had taken his hat off or held it out to Bruce, or that Bruce had obtained the package of heroin from defendant's hat. The only other written report, prepared by the same officer some five weeks later, similarly included no reference to the events of the hat. The People offered no other evidence of any offer to sell on the part of defendant.

In these circumstances we conclude that it was not error as a matter of law under the rule enunciated in People v. Goggins, 34 N.Y.2d 163, 356 N.Y.S.2d 571, 313 N.E.2d 41, for the Trial Judge to have directed the disclosure of the identity of the informer. The informer was present and an eyewitness to the entire transaction on which the charge against defendant was based; indeed the transaction was closed in his automobile. It is true that the particular crucial factual issue in Goggins was the identification of the defendant. But it was not intended that the rule should be restricted to matters of identification only. The principle recognized is of broader import "the truly crucial factor in every case is the relevance of the informer's testimony to the guilt or innocence of the accused" (34 N.Y.2d at p. 170, 356 N.Y.S.2d at p. 576, 313 N.E.2d at p. 45).

In the case now before us defendant's guilt hinged on determination that the events of the hat had in fact occurred as the People claimed. Thus, whether defendant was merely a bystander or an active participant in the sale of the heroin depended entirely on acceptance of the undercover officers' testimony with respect to the events of the hat. This evidence was first elicited on the witness stand and had not been contained in either of the contemporaneous written police reports. There was no other proof of any conversations or nonverbal acts which might be deemed to constitute an offer to sell emanating from defendant. Nor was there any other evidence that defendant had provided the heroin. The particular issue with respect to the events of the hat could scarcely have been more crucial to a determination of defendant's guilt or innocence.

There are evident weighty considerations countervailing against disclosure of the identity of police informers (cf. People v. Goggins, 34 N.Y.2d 163, 176, 356 N.Y.S.2d 571, 581, 313 N.E.2d 41, 48 (dissenting opn.), supra; People v. Darden, 34 N.Y.2d 177, 181-182, 356 N.Y.S.2d 582, 585-86, 313 N.E.2d 49, 51-52). That this was so in this case must be concluded from the fact...