People v. Slaughter
| Decision Date | 07 May 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 79-222,79-222 |
| Citation | 39 Ill.Dec. 467,84 Ill.App.3d 88,404 N.E.2d 1058 |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
| Parties | , 39 Ill.Dec. 467 PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ernie SLAUGHTER, Defendant-Appellant. |
Charles Hoffman, Asst. Deputy Appellate Defender, Robert Agostinelli, Deputy Defender, Ottawa, for defendant-appellant.
Edward F. Petka, State's Atty., Joliet, Terry A. Mertel, John X. Breslin, State's Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, Ottawa, for plaintiff-appellee.
Following a jury trial in the Circuit Court of Will County, the defendant, Ernie Slaughter, was found guilty of escape and intimidation and was sentenced to concurrent terms of six years for escape and four years for intimidation. These sentences are to be served consecutive to a prior term imposed by the Circuit Court of Cook County.
On appeal, the defendant raises a number of issues: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to substitute counsel, or, in the alternative, in denying the defendant the right to proceed pro se ; (2) whether the prosecutor's remarks during opening and closing arguments were so improper as to deny the defendant a fair trial, and, thus, to constitute reversible error; more specifically, whether it was prejudicial error for the prosecutor to introduce statements concerning the nature of the defendant's earlier conviction and incarceration; (3) whether it was prejudicial error for the prosecutor to express his personal opinions regarding the defendant's guilt; and (4) whether the prosecutor's references to the defendant's absence from the courtroom during closing arguments was prejudicial. According to the State, the issues raised concerning the prosecutor's remarks during opening and closing arguments have been waived, because the defense counsel either failed to object to them during trial or to include them in his post-trial motion.
The defendant was an inmate at Stateville Penitentiary when, on April 12, 1978, he was charged by indictment with the offenses of escape and intimidation. The case proceeded to a jury trial on October 24, 1978. At that time, the defendant was represented by counsel from the public defender's office.
Following opening statements by the prosecutor and by the defense counsel, the State presented its case, consisting of the testimony of two witnesses. The first witness was Stateville Correctional Officer, William Buffington, one of two officers assigned to medical furlough on the date in question, May 19, 1978. Officer Buffington related how the defendant had broken free and started to run as he and another inmate were about to leave St. Joseph's Hospital in Joliet to return to Stateville.
The defendant managed to free one hand from the cuff of the security belt he was wearing as he ran from the hospital and into Joliet West High School. There the defendant entered a classroom and emerged holding a girl by the arm. The girl, Kristine De Salvo, was the other State witness.
She recalled that the defendant told the other people to stay away and then told her that if she did not tell them to get away that he would hurt her. After she did as she was told, the defendant whispered in her ear that he would not hurt her and that he would let her go. Then the defendant kissed her and pushed her away from him. Kristine testified that she was shaken but was not injured in any way.
At the end of the State's case, a certified copy of conviction and mittimus, demonstrating that the defendant had been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 100 to 300 years, was admitted into evidence. The jury was then released and the court adjourned until 1:30 p. m. that afternoon.
When the proceedings resumed that afternoon, the defense moved for a directed verdict. After the motion was denied by the court, the defendant addressed the court and asked that an attorney other than the public defender be appointed to represent him. The court inquired whether there was any specific reason for such a substitution and was informed that the defendant did not believe his counsel was "asking the witness precisely questions (sic )." The trial court denied the defendant's motion, indicating that it had not observed any impropriety or incompetence.
Because the series of exchanges which took place in the courtroom following the Judge's denial of the defendant's motion to substitute counsel are critical to the issues of whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant the right to be represented by other counsel or to proceed pro se, those exchanges are quoted below:
If you're still of that mind, the Court will probably allow that request, as to whether you can leave the courtroom. You better talk to him anyway, just so I know you at least have been instructed as to the law. Whatever you want to do, you may have that right. I don't know. Court's in a five minute recess.
(Brief recess.)
Based on the above-quoted passage, the defendant argues strongly on appeal that the trial court abused its authority in not allowing the defendant to proceed pro se following the denial of the defendant's motion for substitution of counsel. However, a careful reading of the record indicates that the defendant never made a request to proceed pro se. Rather, he persisted in his request for a substitution of counsel as a prerequisite to the presentation of any testimony on his behalf. The record reveals that the court several times offered to allow the defendant to take the stand and testify on his own behalf. The defense suggestion that the court denied him his right to proceed pro se is not well taken. The defense argues that the court ought to have clearly informed the defendant of his right to proceed pro se, explaining to him the disadvantages of such representation. Cf. Chapman v. United States, 553 F.2d 886 (C.A. 5, 1977). While a better procedure would have been for the court to expressly inform the defendant of his right to proceed pro se and explain the disadvantages of such a course, we do not find that a failure to do so, under the circumstances, constituted error. Faretta v. California (1975), 422 U.S. 806, 834-836, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2540-2541, 45 L.Ed.2d 562.
As to the defense argument that the court abused its discretion in denying the defendant a substitution of defense counsel, we find no abuse of discretion.
It is well established that an indigent defendant is entitled to counsel other than a public defender upon a showing of good cause (People v. Johnson (1st Dist. 1974), 24 Ill.App.3d 152, 320 N.E.2d 69), it is equally clear that, absent such a showing, it is within the trial court's discretion to deny such a request. (People v. Drew (1st Dist. 1976), 36 Ill.App.3d 807, 345 N.E.2d 45.) This is particularly true once the trial has begun with the defendant being represented by an appointed public defender. The defendant's right to discharge his appointed counsel and to substitute another attorney or to proceed pro se is sharply curtailed. There must be a showing that the prejudice to the defendant's interests in continuing with the same attorney overbalances the potential disruption to the...
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