People v. Siebert
| Decision Date | 31 August 1995 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 4-6,Docket Nos. 98267,98509 and 98603,s. 4-6 |
| Citation | 537 N.W.2d 891,450 Mich. 500 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Douglas SIEBERT, Defendant-Appellant. PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Mary JEFFERSON, Defendant-Appellant. (After Remand) PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Raymond OATMAN, Defendant-Appellant. Calendar |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
In People v. Killebrew, 416 Mich. 189, 330 N.W.2d 834 (1982), we approved of sentence bargaining and held that when a judge plans to impose a sentence that exceeds the sentence recommendation or agreement, the defendant may withdraw his plea. These consolidated cases present the question whether a prosecutor may withdraw from a plea bargain that includes a sentence agreement when the court intends to impose a sentence lower than the agreement calls for.
We hold that a court may not accept a plea bargain containing a sentence agreement but impose a lower sentence than that agreed to. Because such action trespasses on the prosecutor's charging authority, the people must be given an opportunity to withdraw from the agreement.
We affirm the Court of Appeals in Jefferson and would affirm in Siebert and Oatman insofar as these decisions held that a prosecutor may withdraw in this situation. 1
Codefendants Raymond Oatman and Douglas Siebert were charged, in one information, with delivery of cocaine in an amount exceeding 650 grams, 2 and conspiracy to deliver cocaine in an amount exceeding 650 grams. 3 Conviction of either of these offenses carries a mandatory penalty of life imprisonment without parole. In another information, they were charged with conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to deliver. A third information charged defendant Siebert with conspiracy to gamble and gambling or taking bets.
At the codefendants' pretrial conferences, they advised the trial court judge that each of them had entered into a plea agreement with the prosecutor. The nearly identical written agreements, signed by the parties, were incorporated into the record at the prosecution's request. Each agreement called for the defendant to provide information to law enforcement agencies, to cooperate with them, and to testify truthfully at any court proceedings. The agreements provided that
[a]fter the Prosecutor's Office has satisfied itself with [the defendant's] compliance ..., the Prosecutor's Office agrees to allow [the defendant] to plead guilty to the offenses of Conspiracy to Deliver 225 grams or more but less than 650 grams of cocaine and Delivery of 225 grams or more but less than 650 grams of cocaine, contrary to M.C.L.A. 333.7401(2)(A)(ii), with a sentence agreement of twenty (20) to thirty (30) years.
Twenty years was the statutory minimum sentence at the time these defendants were charged. The trial court accepted defendants Siebert's and Oatman's pleas to these offenses on October 31 and November 1, 1990, respectively. Before defendant Oatman's plea, the prosecutor specifically raised the sentence agreement with the court:
Mr. Bernier: Your Honor, I also indicate that we had in there a plea agreement of 20 to 30 years. I understand the Court does not enter into plea agreements with the parties.
The Court: Well, that's simply redundant, because that's the required sentence.
Mr. Bernier: I understand, your Honor. I just wanted to point out that it is a term of the agreement, but I understand the Court's philosophy on the matter.
Sentencing was deferred to enable the court to obtain presentence reports and to allow Siebert and Oatman to perform according to their agreements. The court held a joint presentence conference on October 16, 1991, at which the judge stated that he felt free to impose a minimum sentence below twenty years if he found substantial and compelling reasons to do so, pursuant to M.C.L. § 333.7401(4); M.S.A. § 14.15(7401)(4). Following this, he asked whether this would influence the prosecutor's position regarding the plea agreements. The prosecutor responded that, depending on the sentence the court planned to impose, he would withdraw his consent to the plea agreement, pursuant to People v. Killebrew.
At defendant Siebert's sentencing hearing, law enforcement officers testified that his cooperation and assistance had been extensive and very helpful, and that, in addition to the cooperation necessary to satisfy his plea agreement, the defendant participated in three additional cases. Primarily on this basis, defense counsel argued that the court was presented with substantial and compelling reasons to impose a sentence lower than the statutory minimum. The court announced that it would sentence the defendant to five to thirty years imprisonment. The prosecutor immediately moved to withdraw from the plea agreement. The court noted and denied the motion.
Although defendant Oatman had not assisted law enforcement agencies as had defendant Siebert, the prosecutor acknowledged that "he was always willing and able to cooperate." The prosecutor argued that the court should not reduce the sentence further on the basis of the defendant's willingness to cooperate because the possibility of cooperation was the quid pro quo for the plea bargain. The court sentenced defendant Oatman to three to thirty years imprisonment. As he did at defendant Siebert's sentencing, the prosecutor immediately moved to withdraw from the agreement. The motion was denied.
The prosecutor appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed. See 201 Mich.App. 402, 507 N.W.2d 211 (1993). The Court concluded that the trial court erred in denying the prosecutor's motions to withdraw from the plea agreements:
When the court sentenced defendants to terms of years less than those set forth in the sentence agreements, the prosecutor then had a right to withdraw from the agreements, subject to defendants' right--arising from their performance of the provisions of the agreements requiring that they cooperate with state and federal drug investigations by providing information, testimony, and other assistance--to specific performance of the agreements, at their option. [201 Mich.App. at 430-431, 507 N.W.2d 211.]
We granted the defendants' applications for leave to appeal, and directed that the case be submitted with People v. Jefferson. See 446 Mich. 865, 522 N.W.2d 630 (1994).
Defendant Mary Jefferson was originally charged with delivery of cocaine in an amount exceeding 650 grams. The defendant entered a plea agreement with the prosecutor that called for her to provide "all information, known to her, concerning the trafficking of controlled substances," including knowledge about two defendants who had been charged along with her in the same information. The agreement stated that if she satisfied the agreement, the prosecutor would "agree to a plea of guilty of Delivery of 225 grams or more, but less than 650 grams of a powder containing cocaine," and that the defendant should be "sentenced to a period of incarceration of Ten (10) to Thirty (30) years, subject to the Court's approval." Ten years was the statutory minimum sentence at the time defendant Jefferson was charged. The trial court accepted Jefferson's plea, noted this provision, and affirmed that he could not deviate from this sentence.
Eleven months later at defendant Jefferson's sentencing hearing, a special agent from the Drug Enforcement Administration testified that his agency was pleased with the defendant's cooperation. Defense counsel asked the court to impose a minimum sentence below the ten years called for by the agreement. The prosecutor replied that the court should either honor the sentence agreement or else allow the prosecutor to withdraw. The court, however, did not address the prosecutor's suggestion that he wished to withdraw from the agreement, but rather proceeded to announce its sentence of five to thirty years imprisonment.
The prosecutor appealed, and the Court of Appeals peremptorily reversed. We vacated that order and directed that the case be given plenary consideration. 437 Mich. 1034, 471 N.W.2d 557 (1991). On remand, the majority stated that, although it disagreed with the decision in People v. Siebert, it was bound to follow it under Administrative Order No. 1990-6. We granted the defendant's application for leave to appeal, and ordered that the case be submitted with Siebert and Oatman. 446 Mich. 865, 522 N.W.2d 630 (1994).
The threshold legal issue in these cases is whether, in a case involving a plea bargain that contains a sentence agreement, 4 the prosecution may withdraw its consent to the plea when the court intends to impose a sentence lower than that called for by the agreement.
As a matter of practical reality, bargaining and concessions have become a permanent feature of the judicial landscape. Plea bargains, however, are more than contracts between two parties. As the judicial representative of the public interest, the trial judge is an impartial party whose duties and interests are separate from and independent of the interests of the prosecutor and defendant. The court's interest is in seeing that justice is done. In the context of plea and sentence agreements, the court's interest in imposing a just sentence is protected by its right to reject any agreement, except that which invades the prosecutor's charging authority. 5 A trial court may reject pleas to reduced charges, and...
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... ... Killebrew, 416 Mich. 189, 330 N.W.2d 834 (1982). The 1989 staff comment discusses that point ... 6 N 5 supra at 209, 330 N.W.2d 834 ... 8 The Court stated in People v. Siebert, 450 Mich. 500, 515, 537 N.W.2d 891 (1995), that the trial court "erred when it failed to announce the sentence it intended to impose and then allow the prosecution to withdraw consent to the plea agreement." ... In addition, the lead opinion relies on People v. Blue, 428 Mich. 684, 411 N.W.2d ... ...
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