People v. Smith

• Decision Date: 05 November 1992
• Docket Number: No. 4-92-0209,4-92-0209
• Citation: 177 Ill.Dec. 51,602 N.E.2d 946,236 Ill.App.3d 812
• Parties: , 177 Ill.Dec. 51 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Clarence SMITH, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 946

602 N.E.2d 946

236 Ill.App.3d 812, 177 Ill.Dec. 51

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Clarence SMITH, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 4-92-0209.

Appellate Court of Illinois Fourth District.

Nov. 5, 1992.

Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Karen Munoz, Asst. Defender, Springfield, for defendant-appellant.

Donald M. Cadagin, State's Atty., Springfield, Norbert J. Goetten, Director, State's Attys. Appellate Prosecutor, Robert J. Biderman, Deputy Director, David E. Mannchen, Staff Atty., Springfield, for plaintiff-appellee.

Justice McCULLOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant Clarence Smith was convicted of murder, aggravated battery and robbery following a jury trial in Sangamon County, Illinois (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, pars. 9-1(a), 12-4(b)(1), 18-1(a)). Defendant was sentenced to 60 years' imprisonment on the murder charge. He now appeals, contending (1) the State failed to rebut the prima facie showing that its peremptory challenges had been used in a racially discriminatory manner and (2) the trial court erred in admitting hearsay evidence of incriminating statements allegedly made by defendant. We affirm.

Inasmuch as defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence--which was overwhelming--against him, we very briefly recite the facts of this case. Defendant was one of four individuals involved in the murder of 18-year-old Paul Babcock. The evidence established that Babcock died of massive brain trauma after being stabbed in the head approximately 11 times with instruments believed to be a Phillips screwdriver and a flathead screwdriver.

Defendant first contends the State failed to rebut the prima facie showing that it exercised its peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. Defendant further argues the trial court erred in applying The equal protection clause of the United States Constitution forbids a prosecutor from challenging potential jurors solely on account of race on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable to impartially consider the prosecutor's case against a black defendant. (Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1719, 90 L.Ed.2d 69, 83.) A prima facie showing of discrimination under Batson requires that the defendant raise the inference that the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges to remove venire members based upon their race. (People v. Andrews (1992), 146 Ill.2d 413, 424, 167 Ill.Dec. 996, 1003, 588 N.E.2d 1126, 1133.) Racial identity between the defendant and the excluded venireperson, while not required, remains a relevant factor in determining if a prima facie case of discrimination has been established. (Andrews, 146 Ill.2d at 425, 167 Ill.Dec. at 1003, 588 N.E.2d at 1133; Powers v. Ohio (1991), 499 U.S. 400, ----, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 1373-74, 113 L.Ed.2d 411, 429.) Once the defendant establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the prosecution to come forward with race-neutral reasons for striking the black venire members. (People v. Williams (1991), 147 Ill.2d 173, 220, 167 Ill.Dec. 853, 870, 588 N.E.2d 983, 1000.) Once a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant has made a prima facie showing becomes moot. Hernandez v. New York (1991), 500 U.S. 352, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395; People v. Jackson (1991), 145 Ill.2d 43, 101, 163 Ill.Dec. 859, 886, 582 N.E.2d 125, 152.

[177 Ill.Dec. 54] a pre-Batson standard to overrule his objections to the State's use of its peremptory challenges.

A prosecutor's explanation must demonstrate that the excluded veniremen exhibit a "specific bias" related to the particular cause to be tried, rather than the fact that their race, being shared with the defendant, will bias them in favor of the defendant or render them unfit to serve on the jury. (People v. McDonald (1988), 125 Ill.2d 182, 198-99, 125 Ill.Dec. 781, 788, 530 N.E.2d 1351, 1358.) The State's explanation for the exclusion of a black venireman cannot be considered race neutral, however, if the State failed to exclude white veniremen having the same or similar characteristics and there are no further characteristics meaningfully distinguishing the white veniremen who were retained from the black venireman who was challenged. However, in many instances there will be no single criterion that serves as the basis for the decision whether to excuse a particular venireman. A characteristic deemed to be unfavorable in one prospective juror and, hence, grounds for a peremptory challenge, may be outweighed by other, favorable characteristics in a second prospective juror. (People v. Mack (1989), 128 Ill.2d 231, 239, 131 Ill.Dec. 551, 555, 538 N.E.2d 1107, 1111, cert. denied (1990), 493 U.S. 1093, 110 S.Ct. 1170, 107 L.Ed.2d 1072.) When the State's explanations for excluding certain persons from the venire are based upon the fact that it lacked certain information about them, such explanations should be closely scrutinized since they can be easily utilized as a pretext for discriminatory challenges. The courts, in evaluating such explanations, should consider whether the State made any attempt at discovering the unknown information by, for example, requesting that supplemental questions be asked during voir dire. People v. Harris (1989), 129 Ill.2d 123, 188, 135 Ill.Dec. 861, 890, 544 N.E.2d 357, 386.

Once the State has come forward with its reasons for striking the persons from the venire, the trial court must then determine whether the explanations are sufficient to rebut defendant's prima facie case. To do so, the trial court must make a sincere and reasoned attempt to evaluate the prosecutor's explanation in light of the circumstances of the case. (Harris, 129 Ill.2d at 174-75, 135 Ill.Dec. at 883-84, 544 N.E.2d at 379-80.) In reviewing the trial court's finding, we are mindful that a trial court's determination of purposeful discrimination is a finding of fact and will not be overturned on review unless Keeping these principles in mind, we must examine explanations offered by the State for excluding the two black veniremen from the jury.

[177 Ill.Dec. 55] it is found to be against the manifest weight of the evidence. McDonald, 125 Ill.2d at 199, 125 Ill.Dec. at 788, 530 N.E.2d at 1358.

JUROR DAVID HOWSE

David Howse stated he was a senior instructor at a health spa in Springfield. He also was a full-time student at Sangamon State University studying law enforcement administration. Howse expressed a desire to obtain employment either with the Illinois State Police or the Sangamon County police. He indicated he had friends in law enforcement, but none who were involved in this case, nor would he feel the need to explain or apologize to these friends for whatever verdict would be rendered in this case. He also believed that his chances of becoming a State trooper or county deputy sheriff would not be affected by the verdict rendered in this case.

The State exercised one of its peremptory challenges to exclude David Howse. The trial court noted for the record that Howse was black and then asked the State the reasons for excusing him. The prosecutor replied:

"Judge, there were several reasons. One, he's young. He's a student. I just do not like young jurors. The first juror we excused, Mr. Metcalf, was a student. He was excused for that reason, but the primary reason is the fact that in Sangamon County we have had Howses for defendants for years and years and years, Vincent Howse, Mark Howse, also blacks. I don't know if they're related or not, but like I say, the Howse name is well known in Sangamon County law enforcement and for that reason, that's the primary reason he's been excused."

Defendant noted that the State, while excluding a white male juror who was a student, had accepted a white female student as a juror. Based on this, defendant asserts the explanation for excusing Howse because he was a student was "transparently pretextual." Defendant further contends the second reason asserted by the State--i.e., because other people with the same last name had been prosecuted in Sangamon County--was too vague to rebut the prima facie case of discrimination, especially since the prosecutor failed to ask Howse whether, in fact, he was related to any of those people.

Defendant is correct in his assertion that the State accepted a white student, Dawn Colclasure, while rejecting Howse based on his status as a student. However, there are other distinguishing characteristics which differentiate this juror from the one excused. Specifically, Colclasure also had a full-time job in data entry, did not have any friends involved in the field of law enforcement, and was female. These different characteristics were sufficient to explain the alleged inconsistency in accepting her while rejecting David Howse.

As to the second reason offered by the State as justification for excluding Howse, we find it to be race neutral as well. The trial court stated it was familiar with the prosecutor and did not believe his exclusion of this juror was based on race. Defendant contends the State had to establish the juror was, in fact, related to these people in order to make this a race-neutral explanation for excusing him. We disagree. The possibility that this juror could have been related to other people previously prosecuted in Sangamon County was a sufficiently race-neutral reason for excusing this juror. A trial court may use its experience, as well as its superior knowledge of local conditions and prosecutors, in determining whether the State's peremptory challenges were motivated by discrimination. People v. Mahaffey (1989), 128 Ill.2d 388, 415, 132 Ill.Dec. 366, 379, 539 N.E.2d 1172, 1185, cert. denied (1989), 493 U.S. 873, 110 S.Ct. 203, 107 L.Ed.2d 156; People v....