People v. Britt

• Decision Date: 30 June 1994
• Docket Number: No. 4-92-0262,4-92-0262
• Citation: 638 N.E.2d 282,202 Ill.Dec. 636,265 Ill.App.3d 129
• Parties: , 202 Ill.Dec. 636 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Vincent BRITT, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 282

638 N.E.2d 282

265 Ill.App.3d 129, 202 Ill.Dec. 636

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Vincent BRITT, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 4-92-0262.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

Fourth District.

Argued Jan. 19, 1994.

Decided June 30, 1994.

Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, Office of State Appellate Defender, Springfield, Lori L. Mosby, Staff Atty. (argued), for appellant.

Craig DeArmond, State's Atty., Danville, Norbert J. Goetten, Director State's Attys. Appellate Prosecutor, Springfield, Robert J. Biderman, Deputy Director, David E. Mannchen, Staff Atty. (argued), for appellee.

Justice STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:

In December 1991, a jury convicted defendant, Vincent Britt, of two counts of first degree murder (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 38, par. 9-1(a)), and one count each of aggravated arson (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 38, par. 20-1.1(a)), residential burglary (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 38, par. 19-3(a)), attempt (robbery) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 38, pars. 8-4(a), 18-1(a)), and theft of property having a value in excess of $300 (felony theft) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 38, par. 16-1(b)(4)). The trial court imposed a sentence of natural life in prison for the murders, and extended-term sentences of 60 years for aggravated arson, 30 years for residential burglary, and 10 years each for attempt (robbery) and felony theft. The court ordered the 60-year sentence for aggravated arson to run consecutively to the murder sentence and all other sentences to run concurrently.

Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) his constitutional rights were violated by the State's exercise of peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner; (2) the jury returned legally inconsistent guilty verdicts of both first degree murder and involuntary manslaughter; (3) the trial court erred in sustaining an objection during his cross-examination of the codefendant's testimony; (4) a witness' reference to a polygraph examination denied him a fair trial; (5) the trial court erred by entering a conviction for aggravated arson based upon the same conduct supporting the first degree murder convictions; and (6) the trial court erred in sentencing him to an extended term for offenses other than first degree murder.

We disagree with each of defendant's arguments and affirm his convictions and sentences.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. Accordingly, we review the evidence presented at trial only to the extent necessary to place the issues in this appeal in their appropriate context. During the late evening hours of September 22 or early morning hours of September 23, 1990, defendant and Brian Brandon went to the home of the victims, Warren and Delores Johnson, both of whom were over 60 years of age. Defendant and Brandon had earlier discussed stealing aluminum cans or copper wiring from the Johnson residence, but once there decided instead to ask to borrow some money. While Brandon waited outside, defendant knocked on the door, and Mr. Johnson let him in. About a half hour later, defendant rejoined Brandon outside, telling him that "he did what he had to do," which Brandon interpreted to mean defendant beat up Mr. Johnson.

At that point, defendant and Brandon both entered the house. Mrs. Johnson, who was physically handicapped and could not walk without assistance, was in bed. Defendant and Brandon asked Mr. Johnson for money, who responded that he did not have any. Defendant stated that he did not believe him and threatened to set Mrs. Johnson on fire unless Mr. Johnson complied. Defendant then pushed Mr. Johnson aside and went into the bedroom. After Mr. Johnson again denied having any money, defendant set Mrs. Johnson's nightgown on fire. Defendant and Mr. Johnson began to fight, and Brandon left the Johnson residence and ran away. Defendant eventually knocked Mr. Johnson unconscious by a blow to his head. Defendant then brought several old tires from the back porch into the kitchen and moved the refrigerator against the door, leaving a small space through which he could escape while blocking in the physically larger Johnsons. Defendant ignited the tires in the kitchen and left the residence.

In the early morning hours of September 23, a passerby noticed the Johnson house on fire and called the authorities. Both Mr. and Mrs. Johnson died from fire and smoke inhalation. Mrs. Johnson most likely died from the fire lit in the kitchen that consumed the house, rather than from the fire lit on her torso.

At some point between September 23 and October 12, 1990, defendant returned to the Johnson residence and stole a lawnmower.

On October 31, 1990, approximately 6,700 feet of insulated copper wire, weighing nearly 130 pounds, was stolen from CSX Transportation. The police followed drag marks to the home of defendant's relatives. Later, the police interviewed Brandon regarding the theft of the copper wire and the earlier fire at the Johnson residence, ultimately leading to defendant's arrest for both offenses.

As part of an agreement with the State, Brandon pleaded guilty to aggravated arson, residential burglary, and attempt (robbery) in exchange for the State's agreement that his sentence would not exceed 30 years. Brandon testified against defendant at defendant's trial as part of this agreement. II. ANALYSIS

A. The Batson Challenge

Defendant argues that the State violated his rights under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution by using its peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from the jury. In Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69, the United States Supreme Court held that the State may not use its peremptory challenges to strike prospective jurors solely on the basis of their race. Batson established a three-step analysis to determine whether a particular peremptory challenge was proper. First, the defendant must establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in the State's use of the peremptory challenge. (Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 87.) If the defendant establishes the prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the State to provide a "clear and reasonably specific" race-neutral explanation for each challenge in question. (Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98 n. 20, 106 S.Ct. at 1723-24 n. 20, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88-89 n. 20.) Defense counsel may then rebut the prosecutor's reasons as being pretextual. People v. Mitchell (1992), 152 Ill.2d 274, 288, 178 Ill.Dec. 354, 362, 604 N.E.2d 877, 885.

The State's reason for exercising a peremptory challenge must be race neutral. The State must demonstrate to the trial court that the stricken prospective juror exhibited a "specific bias" related to the particular cause to be tried other than being the same race as the defendant. (People v. Andrews (1993), 155 Ill.2d 286, 293, 185 Ill.Dec. 499, 504, 614 N.E.2d 1184, 1189.) In other words, the State's peremptory challenge must be "based on something other than the race of the venireperson." People v. Hudson (1993), 157 Ill.2d 401, 428, 193 Ill.Dec. 128, 139, 626 N.E.2d 161, 172.

In this case, the trial court found that defendant successfully established the prima facie showing. At that point, the burden shifted to the State to offer a legitimate, race-neutral reason for each of its contested peremptory challenges. After considering the State's explanation and defendant's response, the trial court rejected defendant's claim and found that the State's use of each peremptory challenge was legitimate.

Once the State offers a race-neutral explanation and the trial court rules on the ultimate issue of intentional discrimination, the preliminary question of whether defendant established a prima facie showing becomes moot. (People v. Smith (1992), 236 Ill.App.3d 812, 814, 177 Ill.Dec. 51, 54, 602 N.E.2d 946, 949; Hernandez v. New York (1991), 500 U.S. 352, 359, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1866, 114 L.Ed.2d 395, 405.) Thus, we need only address the legitimacy of the State's proffered explanations.

The exclusion of even one prospective juror on account of race is unconstitutional and requires reversal of a defendant's conviction. (Andrews, 155 Ill.2d at 294, 185 Ill.Dec. at 504, 614 N.E.2d at 1189.) We must therefore examine the State's explanations for excluding each prospective juror against whom it exercised a peremptory challenge. Initially, we note that the State offered at least three, and in most cases four, reasons for its peremptory challenges against each prospective juror at issue here. None of these explanations referred to the individual's race. If a single explanation offered by the State is acceptable, the State's use of the peremptory challenge is legitimate. Andrews, 155 Ill.2d at 294, 185 Ill.Dec. at 504, 614 N.E.2d at 1189 ("[r]esolution of the issue now before us, however, requires only that we accept one of the explanations advanced by the State with respect to each venire member").

Defendant notes that only four of the 78 members of the total venire were black, and all four were ultimately excused. However, two of those individuals were excused for cause. Batson and its progeny were only intended to prevent the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. Therefore, prospective jurors excused by the court for cause are entirely irrelevant to a Batson analysis, and we examine the circumstances of only those prospective jurors excused as a result of the State's peremptory challenges. In the same vein, we add that the numbers of blacks in the original venire is similarly irrelevant to a Batson analysis. Before this court, defendant has repeatedly emphasized that only four of the 78 members of the venire were black, but our analysis is the same regardless of whether the number is 14 of 78 or four of 78.

The initial determination of the legitimacy of the State's proffered explanation for a peremptory challenge...