People v. Snow
| Decision Date | 27 May 2015 |
| Docket Number | NO. 4-14-0721,4-14-0721 |
| Citation | 2015 IL App (4th) 140721 |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES SNOW, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
NOTICE
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from Circuit Court of McLean County No. 99CF1016
Honorable Alesia A. McMillen Judge Presiding.
¶ 1 Held: (1) Defendant failed to plead claims meeting the prejudice element required for leave to file a successive postconviction petition.
(2) Defendant's pleadings and documentation lack reliability and conclusive character and, thus, fail as a matter of law to set forth a colorable claim of actual innocence in order to claim "fundamental miscarriage of justice" exception.
¶ 2 In 2001, defendant was found guilty of the 1991 murder of William Little. He was sentenced to natural life in prison. After a direct appeal and a previous postconviction petition were filed, petitioner remains in prison serving a term of natural life for murder.
¶ 4 On direct appeal, this court vacated defendant's convictions and sentences on the knowing-murder and felony-murder counts because defendant could only stand convicted of onemurder for Little's death and affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for intentional murder in all other respects. People v. Snow, No. 4-01-0435 (Aug. 20, 2004) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The Supreme Court of Illinois denied defendant's petition for leave to appeal. People v. Snow, 212 Ill. 2d 549, 824 N.E.2d 290 (2004). The full scope of the evidence against defendant may be found in our decision on direct appeal.
¶ 5 In May 2004, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition. Defendant amended the petition twice before counsel filed an amended postconviction petition. Defendant again filed a pro se amended postconviction petition. In April 2008, the Exoneration Project entered its appearance on defendant's behalf.
¶ 6 In January 2010, the Exoneration Project filed a motion for discovery and an amended petition for postconviction relief. The State filed a motion to dismiss. After a hearing, in April 2011, the trial court granted the State's motion to dismiss. Defendant appealed. On March 5, 2012, this court affirmed the dismissal of defendant's postconviction petition. People v. Snow, 2012 IL App (4th) 110415, 964 N.E.2d 1139.
¶ 7 In May 2013, defendant filed a motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition. In January 2014, the trial court denied the petition for leave to file a successive postconviction petition.
¶ 8 This appeal followed.
¶ 10 Defendant's motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition raised claims based on alleged newly discovered evidence. These claims included defendant's allegations his right to due process under Brady v.Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and his right tothe effective assistance of counsel were violated at trial. The allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel stemmed from the failure to find evidence defendant has now found and claims the State withheld from him. He does not argue this point in his appellate brief and it is deemed forfeited. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013). Counsel also filed a motion for postconviction deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing not yet ruled on by the trial court and not a subject of this appeal. The allegations of newly found evidence relate to three witnesses: Danny Martinez, Bruce Roland, and Steve Scheel.
¶ 12 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2012)) provides a remedy for defendants who have suffered a substantial violation of constitutional rights at trial. People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 471, 861 N.E.2d 999, 1007 (2006). Under the Act, a petitioner may only file one petition. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2012). Leave of court is required to file a successive petition and leave "may be granted only if a petitioner demonstrates cause for his or her failure to bring the claim in his or her initial post-conviction proceedings and prejudice results from that failure." 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2012 ). For purposes of the Act, a prisoner shows cause by identifying an objective factor impeding his ability to raise a specific claim during his initial postconviction proceedings. A prisoner shows prejudice by demonstrating the claim not raised in his initial postconviction proceedings so infected the trial the resulting conviction or sentence violated due process. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2012).
¶ 13 The cause-and-prejudice test is applied to individual claims in the petition or leave to file successive postconviction petition and is not applied to the petition as a whole.
People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 462, 793 N.E.2d 609, 623 (2002). Therefore, as to each claim, the petitioner must show cause by identifying an objective factor impeding his ability to raise the claim during his initial postconviction proceeding and must show prejudice by demonstrating the claim not raised during his initial postconviction proceeding so infected the trial the resulting conviction or sentence violated due process. 725 ILCS 5/1221(f) (West 2012).
¶ 14 Leave of court to file successive postconviction petitions should be denied when the claims fail as a matter of law or where the successive petition with supporting documentation is insufficient to justify further proceedings. People v. Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 35, 21 N.E.3d 1172. At this stage, prior to filing a successive petition, no evidentiary hearing is intended for cause-and-prejudice analysis and the determination is to be made on the pleadings. Smith, ¶ 33.
¶ 15 Because the trial court did not hold an evidentiary hearing when it reviewed petitioner's motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition, this court will review the denial of leave to file de novo. See People v. Gillespie, 407 Ill. App. 3d 113, 124, 941 N.E.2d 441, 452 (2010).
¶ 17 Defendant argued Danny Martinez was a key witness against him because Martinez was an eyewitness. He testified at trial he saw defendant in the parking lot of the gas station shortly after the shooting. Martinez stated he recognized defendant when he saw a picture of him in a newspaper in 1999. He had not been able to pick him out of a lineup in 1991, shortly after the crime, and testified the lighting was too dark. On cross-examination, he admitted the lighting was fine and was the same lighting as a photograph of the lineup he saw in 2000 and identified defendant.
¶ 18 Now defendant argues he had obtained new evidence through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request in 2012 which indicated Martinez told the police earlier than 1994 defendant was not the person he saw in the gas station parking lot. Defendant received a copy of a polygraph work sheet from an exam taken by Martinez in 1994. Handwritten notes in the margin indicated Martinez "says" defendant is "not [the] person he saw." The subject of the redacted polygraph exam is not actually identified. Defendant assumed it was him.
¶ 19 The State does not contest the "cause" portion of the test for filing a successive postconviction petition. Information as to all three witnesses whom defendant discusses was received through 2012 FOIA requests. Thus, this information was not available at his trial or first postconviction proceeding. Defendant claims this information was available to the State at the time of trial and the fact it was not given to him at that time was a Brady violation. Defendant argues Martinez was a key witness against him, and if he had this evidence at the time of trial, he could have called police officers to impeach Martinez at trial.
¶ 20 The State argues this is not an eyewitness case. They so argued in their opening argument at trial. The State presented circumstantial evidence and an accumulation of witnesses who testified defendant implicated himself to them and some actually stated he confessed to the crime. Hours after the crime, defendant showed up at Karen Strong's house needing somewhere to stay for a few days. Strong's husband told her defendant needed a place to stay because he was involved in Little's murder. Weeks after the shooting, when defendant was wanted for the crime, Missouri police found him hiding in an attic underneath the insulation. After Illinois police went to pick him up, on the ride back and not under arrest for the Little murder, defendant asked why the police were looking at him for that crime. Defendant was said to be "verynervous" and he asked the police "what would happen to him if he knew something about the murder." During the ride, defendant asked periodically about the murder.
¶ 21 During questioning at the police station, defendant became most agitated when talking about the gas station murder. Defendant asked, "why could he be charged with murder if he didn't have the gun." After the police explained accountability, defendant wanted to know "what would happen to him if he knew something." Defendant indicated if he told the truth about his involvement, he would have to incriminate himself. The police concluded defendant had implicated himself in the murder.
¶ 22 In September 1999, defendant was a murder suspect and, when stopped in Ohio, he lied and told police he was "David Arison" and presented Arison's birth certificate. He denied being defendant and fled from police when they tried to check his tattoos.
¶ 23 There was a large amount of evidence implicating defendant in the crime. The polygrapher's notes do not come close to the materiality standard for a Brady claim. See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 698 (2004) (...
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