People v. Soranno, Cr. 19403

• Decision Date: 22 December 1971
• Docket Number: Cr. 19403
• Citation: 22 Cal.App.3d 312,99 Cal.Rptr. 235
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Patrick Francis SORANNO, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 235

99 Cal.Rptr. 235

22 Cal.App.3d 312

The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Patrick Francis SORANNO, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 19403.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

Dec. 22, 1971.

Donald F. Roeschke, Woodland Hills, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for defendant and appellant.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Barbara T. King, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

HERNDON, Associate Justice.

Appellant was charged in Count I of the information with grand theft auto (Pen.Code, § 487, subd. 3), and in Count II with taking and driving an automobile without the consent of the owner and with the intent to deprive the owner of title to and possession of the automobile (Veh.Code, § 10851). Three prior felony convictions were alleged.

Appellant personally and his counsel joined in waiving his right to a jury trial and his rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses. Pursuant to stipulation of counsel, to which appellant gave his personal approval, the People's case was submitted on the transcript of the preliminary hearing. The testimony of appellant and of one other witness was introduced by the defense.

The court acquitted appellant of the grand theft charge and found him guilty of the offense charged in the second count. Appealing from the judgment, appellant states his contentions as follows: '(1) There is insufficient evidence to sustain the judgment of conviction. (2) Whenever a case is submitted on the transcript of a preliminary hearing, the accused must be advised of his right to cross-examine his accuser, and in the absence of such advice and a waiver of said right, which must appear in the record, the judgment must be reversed.'

Summary Of The Evidence

At about 8:30 a.m. on December 15, 1969, Diane Reyes parked her 'Sixty-six Super Sport Malibu' automobile, license number SVL--431. After work at 5:20 p.m. on the same day, she returned to the place where she had parked her automobile. It was gone. She did not know appellant, and had not given him permission to take her automobile.

On December 27, 1969, Sergeant James Wilson of the Los Angeles City Police Department was assigned to the Traffic Enforcement Division. At about 11:15 p.m. on that date he observed appellant make a U-turn causing two cars to brake and stop to avoid hitting him. Appellant was driving a 1966 model automobile matching the description given by Mrs. Reyes and bearing license number SVL--431.

Sergeant Wilson stopped appellant and asked him for his driver's license and his vehicle registration. Appellant produced his driver's license, but was unable to produce the vehicle registration. Appellant was placed under arrest when a 'Want and registration check' revealed that the vehicle was stolen.

Charles Mauser, called by the defense, testified that appellant lived with him between approximately December 7 and 20 of 1969. He never saw appellant in possession of or driving a Chevrolet. On approximately December 27, 1967, Mr. Mauser saw appellant in the lobby of the El Rey Hotel.

Appellant testified that he did not go to downtown Los Angeles on December 15, 1969, and that he did not drive a motor vehicle out of a parking lot on that day. He further testified that on December 26, 1969, he met a man named Don whom he had known for three and a half years while he was serving a sentence in San Quentin prison; that on December 27, 1969, Don gave him the keys to the car he was driving when arrested; and that he was going to get some fried chicken when he was arrested.

On cross-examination appellant answered questions as follows: 'Q. Didn't you tell the officers that it was a fellow named John whom you knew in San Quentin? A. I may have said that, yes. Q. Was it Don or John? A. Don. Q. Why did you say John? A. I may have been nervous. . . . Q. Now, didn't you also tell the police that you got the car from John and you went out for sandwiches? A. I was going for chicken.'

Sufficiency Of The Evidence

Appellant's contention that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction is so obviously untenable that it deserves nothing more than summary rejection. His possession of the stolen vehicle, his own inherently implausible testimony and his unsatisfactory explanation provided more than adequate support for the judgment.

In People v. Brown, 1 Cal.App.3d 161, 81 Cal.Rptr. 401, 404, the court was presented with the same argument that appellant advances here. The court in Brown, after reviewing the leading case of People v. McFarland, 58 Cal.2d 748, at page 165, 26 Cal.Rptr. 473, 376 P.2d 449, stated:

'It is the essence of defendant's position that the explanation he gave to the police was a reasonable explanation of his possession of the stolen car; that by reason thereof it became the obligation of the prosecution to produce other evidence to prove defendant's explanation false, or otherwise to show that defendant was guilty of the offense. To accept his argument It would be necessary to find that as a matter of law defendant's statements gave rise to a reasonable doubt.' (Emphasis added.)

The trial judge had the opportunity to observe the demeanor and manner of appellant and his apparent candor or lack thereof. After hearing the argument of counsel, the court made the following very appropriate comment: 'I don't believe your chicken story and if somehow we could find the man who is either usually Joe, sometimes Don, sometimes John, we could solve about every car theft that ever occurred in the County of Los Angeles. . . . I am satisfied without question and beyond a reasonable doubt that you intended to keep the car and deprive the owner, at least for a period of time, of that car knowing full well that the car was stolen.'

'The unlawful taking of the vehicle having been clearly established, only slight evidence was necessary to connect defendant in possession of the vehicle with the commission of the crime. Possession of the recently stolen property was not enough; but such possession and an explanation from defendant that did not invite reasonable acceptance, coupled with inconsistencies that tended to cast doubt...