People v. Sorber, 25029
| Decision Date | 25 September 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 25029,25029 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Mylin Gene SORBER, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., John P. Moore, Deputy Atty. Gen., E. Ronald Beeks, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for plaintiff-appellee.
Rollie R. Rogers, Colorado State Public Defender, J. D. MacFarlane, Chief Deputy State Public Defender, Randolph M. Karsh, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for defendant-appellant.
Defendant-appellant, Mylin Gene Sorber, was convicted by a jury of entering without breaking a motor vehicle with intent to commit theft, and stealing therefrom, in violation of 1967 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 40--5--10(2). We affirm the conviction.
The motor vehicle involved was a 1964 Chevrolet and the item of property stolen was the carburetor. The vehicle was located on the used car lot of Garrett Motors in Loveland, Colorado. The defendant Sorber admitted that shortly after 1 a.m. on May 2, 1970, he and a friend, Gregory Neisner, drove to the Garrett used car lot in Neisner's automobile (which was also a 1964 Chevrolet) with the avowed purpose of stealing two racing mirrors. After accomplishing this theft, they proceeded to the rear of the car lot where the Garrett 1964 Chevrolet was located. There, they raised the hood of the Chevrolet and inspected the motor. Neisner stated he would like to have the carburetor. He then obtained a wrench and flashlight from his automobile and returned to the Garrett vehicle. While Neisner held the flashlight, Sorber unbolted the carburetor and removed it from the vehicle. Shortly thereafter, defendant was captured fleeing from the scene. Neisner was apprehended later in the day.
Neisner was charged jointly with Sorber. However, he pled guilty and testified for the People in Sorber's trial. He also testified as a defense witness for Sorber.
Sorber first contends the trial court erred in not granting his motions for acquittal on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence. It is specifically argued that the element of specific intent to commit theft must coincide with the entry into the vehicle and that this was not established by the evidence. The trial court correctly instructed the jury that the defendant must have had the intent to commit the theft at the very time of entering the vehicle. Both Neisner and Sorber testified that when they first raised the hood of the Chevrolet they had no intent to steal but were merely inspecting the motor; and that it was not until after the entry that they determined to take the carburetor.
It is fundamental that the credibility of the witnesses is for the jury, which may accept or reject all or any part of a witness' testimony. Maisel v. People, 166 Colo. 161, 442 P.2d 399. Here, the jury rejected defense witness' version of Sorber's claimed innocence. From the admitted entry into the vehicle, and the subsequent theft of the carburetor therefrom, the jury could properly infer that the specific...
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People v. McCormick
...the circumstances surrounding the accused's entry into the apartment, together with what occurred after the entry was gained. People v. Sorber, Colo., 501 P.2d 121; Johnson v. People, 174 Colo. 413, 484 P.2d 110; Peterson v. People, 133 Colo. 516, 297 P.2d 529. Here the jury could reasonabl......
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...including their requisite intent, and hence, the motions for acquittal were properly denied. People v. Bennett, supra; People v. Sorber, 179 Colo. 434, 501 P.2d 121 (1972). Finally, the defendants urge in support of the asserted propriety of acquittal on the first degree criminal trespass c......
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Chapter 6 - § 6.15 • REDIRECT AND RECROSS-EXAMINATION
...refuse to reopen a trial to allow a witness to be recalled when the testimony would have been repetitive and cumulative. People v. Sorber, 501 P.2d 121, 123 (Colo. 1972). ➢ Recross-Examination; Scope. Recross-examination embraces "those matters testified to on redirect examination." People ......
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Chapter 6 - § 6.16 REDIRECT AND RECROSS-EXAMINATION
...refuse to reopen a trial to allow a witness to be recalled when the testimony would have been repetitive and cumulative. People v. Sorber, 501 P.2d 121, 123 (Colo. 1972). ➢ Recross-Examination; Scope. Recross-examination embraces "those matters testified to on re-direct examination." People......