People v. Spirles

• Decision Date: 05 February 2016
• Citation: 136 A.D.3d 1315,25 N.Y.S.3d 462
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Michelle D. SPIRLES, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

136 A.D.3d 1315

25 N.Y.S.3d 462

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Michelle D. SPIRLES, Defendant–Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

Feb. 5, 2016.

Timothy P. Donaher, Public Defender, Rochester (James Eckert of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant.

Sandra Doorley, District Attorney, Rochester (Daniel Gross of Counsel), for Respondent.

PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., SMITH, CENTRA, CARNI, AND SCUDDER, JJ.

MEMORANDUM:

On appeal from a judgment convicting her, upon a jury verdict, of manslaughter in the first degree (Penal Law § 125.20[1] ), defendant contends that Supreme Court erred in refusing to suppress the statements she made to the first police officer who responded to the crime scene, i.e., her home, in response to a 911 call. According to defendant, she was subjected to custodial interrogation and was not Mirandized. We reject that contention. It is well settled that " both the elements of police ‘custody’ and police ‘interrogation’ must be present before law enforcement officials constitutionally are obligated to provide the procedural safeguards imposed upon them by Miranda " (People v. Huffman, 41 N.Y.2d 29, 33, 390 N.Y.S.2d 843, 359 N.E.2d 353 ; see People v. Anthony, 85 A.D.3d 1634, 1635, 925 N.Y.S.2d 313, lv. denied 17 N.Y.3d 813, 929 N.Y.S.2d 801, 954 N.E.2d 92 ). "Under the circumstances [presented here], we conclude that a reasonable person, innocent of any crime, would not have believed that he or she was in police custody but, rather, would have believed that he or she was being interviewed as a witness to a crime" (People v. Debo, 45 A.D.3d 1349, 1350, 844 N.Y.S.2d 800, lv. denied 10 N.Y.3d 809, 857 N.Y.S.2d 43, 886 N.E.2d 808 ). Furthermore, the officer asked only preliminary questions in an attempt to identify the victim and determine what had happened to him, and "[i]t is well established that threshold crime scene inquiries designed to clarify the situation and questions that are purely investigatory in nature do not need to be preceded by Miranda warnings" (People v. Shelton, 111 A.D.3d 1334, 1336–1337, 974 N.Y.S.2d 224, lv. denied 23 N.Y.3d 1025, 992 N.Y.S.2d 808, 16 N.E.3d 1288 [internal quotation marks omitted] ). "This determination disposes of defendant's further argument that [her] statement[s] to the investigator [at the police station were] tainted by the alleged illegality of the [officer's] initial questioning" (People v. Coffey, 107 A.D.3d 1047, 1050, 966 N.Y.S.2d 277, lv. denied 21 N.Y.3d 1041, 972 N.Y.S.2d 538, 995 N.E.2d 854 ; see People v. Oakes, 57 A.D.3d 1425, 1426, 871 N.Y.S.2d 512, lv. denied 12 N.Y.3d 786, 879 N.Y.S.2d 63, 906 N.E.2d 1097 ).

Defendant failed to preserve for our review her further contention that the court deprived her of her right of confrontation by limiting her cross-examination of her landlord (see People v. Liner, 9 N.Y.3d 856, 856–857, 840 N.Y.S.2d 755, 872 N.E.2d 868, rearg. denied 9 N.Y.3d 941, 844 N.Y.S.2d 782, 876 N.E.2d 510 ; People v. Castor, 99 A.D.3d 1177, 1181, 952 N.Y.S.2d 318, lv. denied 20 N.Y.3d 1010, 960 N.Y.S.2d 353, 984 N.E.2d 328 ), and we decline to exercise our power to review it as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15[6][a] ). We otherwise reject defendant's contention that the court abused its discretion in sustaining the prosecutor's objection to the questioning of the landlord on cross-examination concerning possible fraud by the witness. "Although a witness may be questioned about prior bad acts which bear upon his [or her] credibility, the questions must be asked in good faith and must have a basis in fact" (People v. Steele, 168 A.D.2d 937, 938, 565 N.Y.S.2d 339, lv. denied 77 N.Y.2d 967, 570 N.Y.S.2d 501, 573 N.E.2d 589 ) and, here, defense counsel failed to establish that she had a good-faith basis for the questions at issue (see People v. Lester, 83 A.D.3d 1578, 1578–1579, 921 N.Y.S.2d 435, lv. denied 17 N.Y.3d 818, 929 N.Y.S.2d 807, 954 N.E.2d 98 ; People v. Dellarocco, 115 A.D.2d 904, 905, 496 N.Y.S.2d 801, lv. denied 67 N.Y.2d 941, 502 N.Y.S.2d 1033, 494 N.E.2d 118 ).

Defendant failed to preserve for our review her contention that the prosecutor engaged in several instances of misconduct during summation inasmuch as she failed to object to any of those instances (see People v. McEathron, 86 A.D.3d 915, 916, 926 N.Y.S.2d 249, lv. denied19 N.Y.3d 975, 950 N.Y.S.2d 358, 973 N.E.2d 768 ). In any event, the challenged comments were " ‘either a fair response to defense counsel's summation or fair comment on the evidence’ " (People v. Green, 60 A.D.3d 1320, 1322, 875 N.Y.S.2d 390, lv. denied 12 N.Y.3d 915, 884 N.Y.S.2d 696, 912 N.E.2d 1077 ; see generally People v. Halm, 81 N.Y.2d 819, 821, 595 N.Y.S.2d 380, 611 N.E.2d 281 ).

Defendant further contends that the court failed to conduct an audibility hearing prior to ruling on the admissibility of a recording of a witness's 911 call. That contention is belied by the record, however, which establishes that the court reviewed the recording in open court with the attorneys present and concluded that it was admissible (see e.g. People v. Lubow, 29 N.Y.2d 58, 68, 323 N.Y.S.2d 829, 272 N.E.2d 331 ). Contrary to defendant's further contention, the court properly determined that the recording was not "so inaudible and indistinct that the jury would have to speculate concerning its contents" (People v. Cleveland, 273 A.D.2d 787, 788, 709 N.Y.S.2d 751, lv. denied 95 N.Y.2d 864, 715 N.Y.S.2d 218, 738 N.E.2d 366 ; see People v. Leeson, 299 A.D.2d 919, 919, 750 N.Y.S.2d 389, lv. denied 99 N.Y.2d 560, 754 N.Y.S.2d 212, 784 N.E.2d 85 ).

We reject defendant's contention that the court abused its discretion in curtailing defense counsel's cross-examination of the officers during the suppression hearing. Defense counsel...